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This dissertation examines how differences between the strategic-systems audit approach 
and the traditional, transaction-based audit approach affect the content and complexity of 
client business knowledge in long-term memory, how these mental representations 
develop with experience, and how the representations affect risk assessment. Knowledge 
of the client’s business is essential to conducting an effective and efficient audit, but 
researchers have devoted little attention to how this knowledge is represented in memory 
and what effect it has on audit judgment. Moreover, proponents of the strategic-systems 
approach argue that this approach leads to the formation of a more-complex client 
business model and results in better audit judgments than the transaction-based approach. 
The study’s results contradict these claims, with the strategic-systems auditors having 
less-complex models than their TBA counterparts. Also, no experience-related 
differences were found in the client models, and risk assessments were only weakly 
affected by content and complexity differences between client models. After a variety of 
supplemental analyses, it was concluded that there is no evidence from this dissertation to 
suggest that the SSA methodology does not result in an auditor possessing an enhanced 
knowledge of the client’s business compared to that possessed by an auditor employing a 
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Recent audit-market pressures have led to “radical and pervasive” (Eilifsen, Knechel, and 
Wallage 2001) changes to the audit methodologies of some accounting firms. In an effort 
to reduce audit costs while increasing both an audit’s effectiveness and its value to the 
client, these firms have developed a new audit methodology. The methodology 
incorporates the analysis of a client’s business and strategic risks into client business 
models that allow the formation of knowledge-laden expectations about the client’s 
financial position and results of operations (Lemon, Tatum, and Turley 2000). In addition 
to being documented in audit workpapers, some form of these client business models is 
likely stored in the auditor’s long-term memory (Waller and Felix 1984). 
 The content and complexity of an auditor’s mental representation of the client 
business model is an important topic to study regardless of the audit approach used. 
Bonner and Pennington (1991) suggest that the development of a client model is crucial 
to guiding subsequent audit judgments and that it takes about 3.5 years of experience to 
develop a well-structured model. Bédard and Chi (1993) propose that auditors seek a 
context of client data within which they can condition their complex audit judgments. 
Despite the importance of these models, researchers have yet to empirically examine how 
client models develop with experience. The investigation of client models is now even 
more important given the new methodology’s increased emphasis on the application of an 
in-depth knowledge of the client’s business. This dissertation contributes evidence 
concerning this important, but largely unexplored area of auditor expertise. 
 A firm’s audit methodology can affect both an auditor’s knowledge and judgment 
performance (Libby and Luft 1993). Therefore, we may expect any methodological 
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differences to influence auditors’ client models and the audit judgments based on these 
models. The new strategic-systems audit (SSA) approaches differ from the traditional, 
transaction-based audit (TBA) approach in at least two ways.1 First, only after the SSA 
auditor has gathered in-depth client business knowledge does she begin to focus on the 
account balances and the transactions that comprise them. Thus, the SSA is a top-down 
approach, and is considered an audit of the client’s business which results in an opinion 
on the financial statements (Salterio and Weirich 2002). In contrast, the TBA takes a 
bottom-up approach, with the auditor first focusing on the client’s transactions and 
accounts and then working up to the financial statements, ultimately resulting in an 
opinion on the financial statements. Second—and perhaps most important—the SSA’s 
enhanced client knowledge base constitutes part of a chain of substantive audit evidence, 
whereas in a TBA, the client knowledge serves mainly as background to the planning, 
testing, and completion procedures of the audit. Overall, knowledge of the client’s 
business is used more extensively in an SSA than in a TBA. Both approaches obviously 
result in an opinion on the client’s financial statements, but the SSA focuses effort and 
evidence gathering on the client’s high-level systems dynamics, whereas the TBA 
focuses on the client’s low-level accounting systems and transactions (Bell, Marrs, 
Solomon, and Thomas 1997).  
 Studying the effects of these methodological differences on the development of 
auditors’ client models is important for several reasons. Strong claims have been made 
regarding the superiority of the SSA over the TBA. For instance, Bell et al. (1997) assert 
                                                 
1 In this paper, the term strategic-systems audit, or SSA, will be used to refer to the new audit 
methodologies, such as KPMG’s Business Measurement Process and Ernst & Young’s Audit Innovation. 
The term transaction-based audit, or TBA, will be used to refer to the more traditional, audit risk-based 
methodologies, which are still in use by the vast majority of public accounting firms. 
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that the “use of the top-down, aggregative, strategic-systems lens increases the likelihood 
that the auditor will have obtained a sufficient understanding of the client's business and 
industry for the purpose of conducting a financial-statement audit” (p. 7, emphasis 
added). Erickson et al. (2000) make a similar claim in their case study of the Lincoln 
Savings and Loan audit failure. In his Foreword to the Bell et al. monograph, Kinney 
states that many of the authors’ claims of SSA’s superiority “are controversial, and 
should be subjected to systematic inquiry” (p. vi). By investigating how the content and 
complexity of client models differ between auditors applying SSA and TBA 
methodologies, and how these differences affect auditors’ risk assessments, this 
dissertation contributes needed empirical evidence related to these claims.  
Several recent studies have investigated the effects of methodology differences on 
auditors’ knowledge (Kopp and O'Donnell 2005) and judgment (Kotchetova 2002; 
O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; Kopp and O'Donnell 2005), but all of them 
manipulated methodology in a laboratory setting. Simply manipulating audit 
methodology in a laboratory setting, however, is not sufficient for determining how years 
of experience using one methodology affects an auditor’s knowledge and, ultimately, his 
judgment. This is because methodology affects judgment by interacting with experience, 
knowledge, and ability (Libby and Luft 1993). Therefore, the designs of these studies 
make it difficult to draw firm conclusions about their results, since important 
determinants of an auditor’s judgment were not examined. This dissertation overcomes 
these limitations—and therefore makes an important contribution to this stream of 
research—by examining the knowledge and judgment of auditors with roughly three 
years of assurance experience employing one of three audit methodologies that vary in 
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the extent to which they incorporate SSA information and analysis.  
These critical features of the research design permitted the investigation of three 
related research questions. First, what are the effects of audit methodology on the 
development of auditors’ client models? Second, what are the effects of audit experience 
on the development of these client models? Finally, do methodology- and experience-
related differences in these client models result in different risk assessments? In general, 
this dissertation examines the relations between audit experience, audit methodology, an 
auditor’s client business knowledge, and resulting audit judgments. It is important to note 
that this dissertation cannot—and was not intended to—determine which type of audit 
methodology is most effective, but it was designed to provide evidence on how 
knowledge and judgment varies across methodologies. 
To provide the data needed to answer these research questions, 88 experienced 
auditors from six firms that apply an SSA methodology, a TBA methodology, or a hybrid 
of the two (classified as the SSA-TBA methodology) studied 60 pieces of information 
about a fictional audit client, then recalled this information from memory, and also used it 
to make risk assessments and write a memo justifying their assessments. Thirty university 
students with limited audit experience completed the same set of tasks. The resulting data 
were used to make inferences about the content and complexity of the participants’ client 
models and the effects of model differences on the risk assessments.  
Contrary to expectations, the data revealed that TBA auditors had better 
developed client models than the SSA auditors. Specifically, the TBA auditors recalled 
significantly more client facts than the SSA auditors and also possessed significantly 
more-complex relational knowledge than their SSA counterparts. The SSA-TBA auditors 
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had client models that were statistically indistinguishable from the TBA auditors. In 
addition—and also unexpectedly—the experienced auditors did not recall significantly 
more facts than the auditing students, nor did they display significantly more-complex 
relational knowledge than their less-experienced counterparts. Even removing the SSA 
and SSA-TBA auditors from the experienced group because they had similar levels of 
task-specific experience to the students did not alter the experience-related findings: the 
students’ recall performance and knowledge complexity were not significantly different 
from those of the significantly more-experienced TBA auditors. 
Finally, weak support was found for the relation between auditors’ client models 
and their risk judgments, although supplementary analyses revealed that the SSA-TBA 
auditors made significantly higher risk assessments than one or both of the other two 
groups of auditors on two of eight issues. This latter finding can be interpreted as being 
somewhat consistent with recently introduced changes to assurance standards, which 
require auditors to employ an approach similar to the hybrid approach used by the SSA-
TBA auditors in this study, in the hope that such an approach will lead to better risk 
assessments than those that would be made using a pure TBA approach. 
Because of the puzzling results of this dissertation, its findings should be 
interpreted with caution. A large body of empirical evidence in accounting supports the 
theory (Libby and Luft 1993) that experienced auditors possess a larger body of better 
organized knowledge than their junior counterparts (e.g., Weber 1980; Bonner and Lewis 
1990; Frederick 1991; Tubbs 1992; Libby and Tan 1994). So, the failure to replicate 
those findings here likely has much more to do with the limitations of this dissertation’s 
research design than it does to the possibility that less-experienced students actually 
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possess client business models similar to those of more-experienced auditors. 
Similarly, because even the students displayed significantly better developed 
client models than the SSA auditors, firmly concluding that TBA and SSA-TBA 
methodologies produce auditors with better client business knowledge than a pure SSA 
methodology is not possible. It seems that there may have been something peculiar about 
the sample of SSA auditors in this study that caused such unexpected findings. 
Unfortunately, the opportunities for future research to follow-up on these unexpected 
results are severely limited by the fact that international and Canadian assurance 
standards now require auditors to apply a methodology very similar to those used by the 
SSA-TBA auditors in this study. Therefore, all firms must now incorporate SSA-type 
evidence and analyses into their audit approaches, making it impossible to investigate the 
types of SSA vs. TBA research questions that were examined in this dissertation. These 
changes also make such questions somewhat moot, because standard setters have clearly 
decided that an SSA-based methodology is better than a pure TBA approach. 
This dissertation proceeds with a chapter that reviews the relevant literature from 
accounting and psychology. Chapter 2 then synthesizes this literature for the purpose of 
developing the dissertation’s hypotheses. The research design is then described in 
Chapter 3 and the results of the hypothesis tests are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
further explores the results of the hypothesis tests by presenting a variety of supplemental 
statistical analyses. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with discussion of its findings 
and a delineation of its limitations. 
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CHAPTER 1 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the various streams of audit and psychology 
literature that have a direct relation to this dissertation’s research questions. The first 
section describes the SSA approach in depth and identifies key differences between this 
approach and the TBA, differences that may affect auditors’ knowledge development and 
judgment. The second section details the determinants of auditor judgment performance 
which are relevant to this study, namely the audit environment, audit experience, and 
auditor knowledge. The final section reviews the cognitive psychology literature on 
schema theory, which presents one view of how knowledge is encoded in, stored in, and 
retrieved from memory. This section also reviews a variety of theoretical and empirical 
audit judgment studies which build on the foundations of schema theory and provide 
insight into the structure of knowledge in an auditor’s memory and how these knowledge 
structures affect audit judgment. A recent series of studies comparing the effects of 
differences between the SSA and TBA methodologies on auditors’ knowledge and 
judgment are also discussed and summarized. The key findings from these streams of 




 Strategic-systems auditing (SSA) is a relatively recent advance in financial 
statement auditing. As such, there is relatively little extant literature describing either the 
nature of the approach or the practical application of the approach. The primary source of 
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information is a monograph by Bell et al. (1997), which describes the nature of and 
concepts underlying an SSA while also providing detailed insights into how KPMG is 
applying this approach in practice. Complementing this monograph is an SSA primer by 
Salterio and Weirich (2002), which compares an SSA with the traditional TBA, details 
the phases of an SSA, and introduces some of the tools used in this approach. Lemon et 
al. (2000) published a monograph that describes recent developments in the 
methodologies of several international accounting firms, including those adopting the 
SSA approach. Eilifsen et al. (2001) present a descriptive field study comparing the SSA 
and TBA.  Erickson et al. (2000) describe a case study in which they argue an SSA could 
have been very helpful in detecting management fraud and averting an audit failure. 
Finally, Ballou et al. (Ballou, Earley, and Rich 2004), Kotchetova (2002), and O’Donnell 
and various colleagues (O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; Kopp and 
O'Donnell 2005) present early empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the SSA 
approach.2 
Overview of the SSA approach 
 The SSA approach has four major components: strategic analysis, business 
process analysis, risk assessment, and business measurement. Each of these components 
is described in detail below. This dissertation focuses primarily on the strategic analysis 
phase of the approach and, to a lesser extent, business process analysis and how these 
phases affect SSA auditors’ knowledge development and judgment performance. Details 
on the latter two components of the approach are presented mainly to provide a thorough 
                                                 
2 Several teaching-oriented cases have also been written to demonstrate how the SSA approach can be used 
in practice (Bell and Solomon 2002). The focus of this portion of the literature review is on the theoretical 
basis and general nature of the approach, thus these cases are not reviewed here because they detail case-
specific applications of the SSA approach.  
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overview of the new audit methodology. 
 Salterio and Weirich (2002) note that the SSA is an evolution in audit practice 
akin to past advances, such as the decision to begin auditing the income statement in 
addition to the balance sheet, or the conception of the audit risk model. Bell et al. (1997) 
argue that this latest evolution is necessary because it allows auditors to “embrace and 
master, rather than simplify, the complexity inherent in the [globalized] economic web of 
interrelationships of which the client organization is a part” (p. 1). The “strategic” in 
strategic-systems auditing refers to the client’s business strategy, which has been defined 
as “how a company creates value by differentiating its products or services from its 
competitors” (Simmons 1992). Bell et al. (1997) define an SSA’s second component—a 
system—as a “collection of parts that interact to function as a whole”, with the relevant 
parts being the client’s strategic management process, its business processes and related 
controls, its information systems, and its risk management process. To comprehend a 
system one needs to understand not only its parts, but the interrelationships among the 
parts and how the system interacts with the larger environment in which it operates 
(Salterio and Weirich 2002). It is this attention to a system’s interrelationships and 
interactions—instead of simply the components of a system—that distinguishes the SSA 
from the TBA.  
Knowledge of the client's business 
 In accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, all auditors must use 
knowledge of the client’s business in the planning, testing, and completion phases of the 
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audit (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 2001, Section 5140).3 The 
amount and type of knowledge gathered is left to the auditor to judge based on each 
client’s circumstances, but in a TBA this knowledge typically includes: past financial 
statements; a brief history of the client; a summary of its operations; an organizational 
chart; and a list of major competitors, suppliers, and customers. Salterio and Weirich 
(2002) note, however, that if the auditor acquired all of the knowledge of the client’s 
business as outlined in professional auditing standards, “s/he would have most of the 
information necessary for a SSA audit” (p. 13). Thus, in principle, auditing standards do 
not discourage the TBA auditor from acquiring the same amount and types of client-
environmental facts as the SSA auditor. Firms’ audit manuals and leading auditing 
textbooks, however, suggest that in practice the SSA auditor may routinely gather a 
larger quantity and wider array of facts than the TBA auditor. Therefore, the primary 
distinction between the client business knowledge gathered by a TBA auditor and that 
gathered by an SSA auditor is not that the latter necessarily collects more client 
knowledge than the former. Rather, the advantage of the SSA is that it organizes this 
knowledge into a logical model that constitutes part of a chain of substantive audit 
evidence (Salterio and Weirich 2002). In contrast, the TBA auditor generally just gathers 
and lists the client knowledge without assembling it into a readily interpretable 
framework. Moreover, this knowledge is generally not considered audit evidence, but 
merely information that will be used to plan the nature, extent, and timing of evidence to 
be gathered.  
                                                 
3 Section 5140 of the CICA Handbook was replaced by Section 5141 in May 2005. The participants who 




Integral to the formation of this SSA model is an understanding of the client's 
business strategy. In a strategic analysis, the auditor evaluates the client’s industry, the 
client’s strategy to attain a sustainable competitive advantage in that industry, the risks 
that threaten the strategy’s success, and the client’s responses to these risks. Tools from 
the strategy literature, such as PEST (Political-legal, Economic, Social, and 
Technological) analysis and Porter’s Five Forces Model (Porter 1980), are commonly 
used by an SSA auditor to aid the evaluation.4 Upon completion of the strategic analysis, 
the SSA auditor will have a framework for understanding the client’s strategic business 
risks (see Figure 1).5 A business risk is a threat that an event or action will adversely 
affect an organization’s ability to achieve its business objectives and execute its strategies 
(Lemon et al. 2000). Improperly managed business risks can ultimately have a serious 
impact on a client’s operations and financial position, so a thoroughly conducted strategic 
analysis is the first major step in forming expectations about the client’s financial 
statements. Indeed, strategic analysis can be so useful to the auditor that the CICA’s 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AASB), in conjunction with the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), has recently (May 2005) issued new assurance 
standards that require analysis similar to this on all audit engagements. 
Business process analysis 
The business process analysis provides the auditor with an in-depth understanding 
of the client's key business processes. A business process is a structured set of activities, 
                                                 
4 The five forces are competitive pressures coming from: the threat of new market entrants; the threat of 
substitute products or services from industry outsiders; the rivalry among existing industry competitors; 
supplier-client collaboration and bargaining; and client-buyer collaboration and bargaining (Porter 1980). 
5 Note that Figure 1 is not a generic framework, but rather one that is specific to a large retail organization. 
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which produces a specific output and creates value for the organization. For example, a 
retail client's key business processes might include brand and image delivery, product and 
service delivery, customer service delivery, and customer sales. In turn, each process will 
have several sub-processes, such as customer service policies, store staffing, operational 
standards, customer loyalty, and after-sales service within the customer service delivery 
process. It is important for the auditor to gain a basic understanding of each of the client’s 
processes and sub-processes, but special attention is devoted to the analysis of key 
processes. 
The auditor chooses key processes by subjectively weighing at least three factors: 
(1) the strategic relevance of the process, that is, how vital the process is to achieving a 
client’s strategic objectives, (2) the process’s inherent business risk, that is, how likely it 
is that a business risk will occur in the process, ignoring the effects of related controls, 
and (3) the strength of the client’s control environment, that is, management’s attitude, 
awareness, and commitment toward the importance of controls. Once chosen, the auditor 
studies each key process to gain an understanding of significant process objectives and 
related business risks, the controls in place to mitigate these risks, and the financial-
statement implications of these risks and controls. To assist with the generation of 
financial-statement expectations, the auditor identifies classes of transactions within each 
process that pose differential misstatement risks (e.g., routine versus non-routine 
transactions and accounting estimates) and relates these risks to specific account 
balances. Upon completion of the business process analysis, the auditor has an updated 
understanding of (1) how the client creates value, (2) whether the client has effectively 
aligned the process activities with the business strategy, (3) the significant process risks 
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that threaten the achievement of the business objectives, (4) how effective the processes 
are at controlling the significant strategic and process risks, and (5) the financial-
statement implications of process activities and their related risks and controls (Bell et al. 
1997). This detailed knowledge of the client's business allows the auditor to develop 
expectations about its operating results and financial condition. 
Ballou et al. (2004) present experimental evidence of how the strategic-
positioning aspect of the auditor’s business process analysis can hinder audit 
effectiveness. They examine the effects of changes in the strategic positioning of one 
critical client business process on the auditor’s evaluation of another (unrelated) critical 
business process. Based on prior findings in the cognitive psychology and auditing 
literatures, the authors predicted that auditors would unduly weight (ignore) problems in 
one critical business process when the strategic positioning of an unrelated process trailed 
(matched) industry norms. Consistent with these predictions, the strategic positioning of a 
grocery retailer’s brand-and-image-delivery process negatively affected auditors’ 
evaluations of evidence regarding the logistics-and-distribution process. 
Risk assessment 
The next SSA phase is risk assessment, which is actually more of a continuous 
process than a static one, in contrast to risk assessment in a TBA where inherent risk, 
control risk, and detection risk are assessed in the planning phase and then left unchanged 
for the remainder of the audit (unless information arises that causes the auditor to revise 
them). SSA risk assessment is an iterative process of considering and reconsidering 
strategic risks, business risks, and process risks and relating these risks to overall audit 
risk. The SSA auditor uses the knowledge gained from the strategic analysis and the 
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business process analysis, combined with an appraisal of the reasonableness of 
management's perception of and assumptions underlying its assessments of the potential 
impacts of the risks, to judge whether management has considered all significant business 
risks and how it has dealt with them. This latter analysis includes gaining an 
understanding of the management controls in place to reduce these risks and also testing 
the effectiveness of the controls. The auditor then groups any residual strategic and 
process risks (i.e., risks that management controls have not reduced to a sufficiently low 
level) based on the financial-statement assertions to which they relate and generates 
expectations of how the risks might be manifested in the financial statements. This 
integrated knowledge of residual risks and financial-statement expectations provides a 
basis for assessing the validity of the client’s financial-statement assertions. Just as in a 
TBA, the results of this assessment determine the need for additional audit evidence to 
support an opinion on the validity of the assertions. 
Kotchetova (2002) supplies evidence concerning the potential effectiveness of 
strategic analysis in assisting with risk assessment and audit planning. She proposes 
that—compared to the traditional understanding of the client’s business— strategic 
analysis will improve an auditor’s ability to identify various types of client risks, thus 
ultimately leading to better audit planning decisions. She provided participants with 
varying levels of strategic information (from none to a combination of strategy content 
and strategy processes) regarding a client and then asked them to make risk judgments 
and substantive planning decisions. In some cases strategic analysis led to better risk 
judgments, but in others a basic understanding of the client’s business led to judgments 
that were just as accurate as those made using extensive strategic information. Moreover, 
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participants with just the basic client understanding made better substantive planning 
decisions than those with extensive strategic information. This dissertation addresses 
similar research questions using a different research design, so it may be able to provide 
insights into these somewhat surprising results. 
In a related series of studies, O’Donnell and some colleagues (O'Donnell 2003; 
O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; Kopp and O'Donnell 2005) investigated how differences 
between the SSA and TBA approaches affected risk assessments in various contexts. 
O’Donnell (2003) provided undergraduate accounting students with computer-system 
control information organized with either a process focus, as in an SSA audit, or with a 
control-objective focus, as would be typical in a TBA audit. The participants in the 
process-focus condition found the task less complex than those in the objective-focus 
condition, and also displayed higher primacy bias and poorer recall performance. 
O’Donnell attributed these results to the fact that the process-focus condition provided 
the participants with the control information in a way that increased the clarity of the 
information compared to the way it was presented in the objective-focus condition, thus 
resulting in decreased task complexity. The enhanced clarity in the process-focus 
condition also required less effortful encoding of the information, thus explaining the 
higher primacy bias and lower recall performance among the process-focus participants. 
O’Donnell concluded that differences between these SSA and TBA approaches to 
organizing information have differing effects on auditors’ cognition during the 
acquisition of client knowledge, and suggested that future research should examine these 
differences among experienced auditors. This dissertation provides evidence directly 
related to these issues. 
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O’Donnell and Schultz (2003) examined how SSA vs. TBA differences in the 
way client information is presented to auditors affected their ability to identify and assess 
risks in an analytical-procedures planning context. They presented experienced auditors, 
all of whom were seniors from a TBA firm, with client information organized with either 
a process focus, as in an SSA audit, or a transaction-cycle focus, as in a TBA audit. The 
auditors were then asked to use analytical procedures to identify risks and rate the level 
of misstatement risk for the engagement. Results showed that the auditors in the SSA 
condition identified more risks and rated misstatement risk at a higher level than auditors 
in the TBA condition, indicating that SSA vs. TBA differences can affect an auditor’s 
decision performance. The authors concluded by suggesting that future research examine 
other dimensions of the association between knowledge acquisition and decision 
performance. This dissertation does so by investigating the effects of methodology 
differences on auditors’ knowledge acquisition, content, and organization, as well as the 
effects of any resulting knowledge differences on audit judgment. 
Finally, Kopp and O’Donnell (2005) examined whether organizing internal-
control information using a business-process focus instead of a control-objective focus 
resulted in better category knowledge and improved internal-control evaluation. Eighty-
two undergraduate accounting students with no previous internal-control knowledge were 
trained to evaluate internal controls using either a process focus or a control-objective 
focus. They were then given a case and were asked to identify as many control strengths 
and weaknesses as they could. Finally, they were asked to sort 20 controls into four 
unlabelled categories. Results showed that category knowledge was significantly greater 
for participants in the process-focus condition and that these participants identified 
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significantly more control issues than those in the objective-focus condition. Additional 
analysis showed that the process-focused task structure improved issue identification 
beyond the benefits provided by stronger category knowledge. This dissertation examines 
related research questions, but uses auditors with actual practice experience employing 
SSA or TBA audit approaches. Thus, it will provide information that will be useful for 
comparing whether the knowledge and judgment effects found in the lab using novice 
participants also extend to experienced field auditors. 
In summary, this series of SSA vs. TBA studies shows that organizing client 
information using a process focus, as in an SSA approach, instead of an objective focus, 
as in a TBA approach, results in less-complex tasks (O'Donnell 2003), better knowledge 
(Kopp and O'Donnell 2005), and improved risk judgments (O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; 
Kopp and O'Donnell 2005). The Kotchetova (2002) results, however, are somewhat 
inconsistent with this pattern, as she found that in some cases TBA information led to 
better judgment performance than SSA information. This dissertation investigates related 
research questions using auditors with actual experience applying SSA or TBA 
approaches in the field. Thus, it should provide empirical evidence to complement the 
results of these studies that manipulated methodology in the lab. 
Business measurement 
The fourth SSA phase is business measurement, which integrates the preceding 
strategic, process, and residual risk analyses to develop expectations about the contents of 
the financial statements. The overriding goal of this phase is to carefully consider 
whether these expectations are consistent with the operations and financial position 
portrayed in the client's financial statements. To achieve this goal, the auditor performs 
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several procedures, including (1) a review and evaluation of significant accounting 
policies, particularly revenue recognition policies, (2) a comparison of the client's 
performance with its industry peers, primarily using ratio analysis, (3) an analysis of the 
client's earnings quality, (4) an integrated analysis of linkages among financial and 
nonfinancial performance measures, and (5) an assessment of the fairness of the financial 
statement presentation and disclosure. The very rich client knowledge base gained from 
the SSA approach increases the effectiveness of these procedures, in particular the 
auditor should be in a very strong position to evaluate non-routine accounting 
transactions, accounting estimates, measurement uncertainty disclosures, and going-
concern issues (Salterio and Weirich 2002). At the conclusion of the audit, the SSA 
auditor will have constructed a fully integrated client business model, containing all of 
the information collected and assimilated through the application of the four principles 
described above and through his mental or more formal business simulation processes 
(Bell et al. 1997). This completed model is the basis for the final review of the adjusted 
financial statements and the final assessment of the client's ability to continue as a going 
concern. 
Summary of the SSA approach 
 There are four interlocking and iterative phases in a strategic-systems audit 
(Salterio and Weirich 2002):  
Phase 1:  Strategic Analysis – The auditor analyzes the client's business strategy, 
including the environment in which it operates, whether it has a 
sustainable competitive advantage, what its business risks are, and how 
the risks are being managed. 
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Phase 2: Business Process Analysis – The auditor identifies business processes 
that are key to the client achieving success. She analyzes these 
processes in detail to gain a deep understanding of significant business 
risks and mitigation strategies, including performance metrics and 
management controls. 
Phase 3: Risk Assessment – This is a continuous process that considers the 
reasonableness of the client's assessments of its business risks, the 
adequacy of management's controls to minimize the risks, and the 
residual risks remaining after controls have been applied. 
Phase 4:  Business Measurement – Building on the evidence gathered in the 
previous phases, the auditor evaluates the client's revenue recognition 
policies, assesses its quality of earnings, analyzes the consistency of the 
client's financial and nonfinancial performance measures, and reviews 
any going-concern issues. 
This dissertation focuses primarily on the first phase’s effects on auditors’ knowledge 
development and judgment, with a lesser focus on the second phase. The third and fourth 
phases here receive only expository attention.   
Contrasts between the TBA and SSA approaches 
There are at least two significant differences between an SSA and the traditional 
TBA (see Table 1 for a summary of major differences between the two approaches). 
First, the SSA auditor gathers knowledge of the client's business and logically arranges it 
into a client business model that highlights the interlinked activities carried out within the 
client, the external forces that bear upon the entity, and the business relationships with 
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external organizations (Bell et al. 1997). Moreover, this enhanced knowledge base 
constitutes part of a chain of substantive audit evidence that can be relied upon in 
forming an audit opinion, unlike the client knowledge gathered in a TBA, which serves 
mainly to inform the planning, testing, and completion procedures of the audit. 
 Second, and most important, the SSA approach has a top-down, holistic, business-
risk orientation. It guides the focus, breadth, and depth of the auditor's knowledge 
acquisition, and the integration of business knowledge into expectations about financial-
statement assertions. It focuses the auditor's assessment of risk through a broad strategic-
systems lens, which directs the auditor's attention to the client's systems dynamics (Bell 
et al. 1997). In contrast, the TBA is a bottom-up, disaggregative, audit risk-based 
approach that focuses the auditor's assessment of risk through a finer accounting lens, 
which directs her attention, and her related assessment and testing activities, to the nature 
of account balances, classes of transactions, and properties of the client's accounting 
system for the purpose of assessing the risk that financial-statement assertions are 
materially misstated (Bell et al. 1997). The SSA auditor, however, does not initially focus 
on transactions and balances, which he views as the end product of the client's business 
strategy and the processes used to effect this strategy. Instead, only after gathering and 
organizing knowledge of the client's strategy and core processes does he focus on 
accounting transactions and related balances (Salterio and Weirich 2002). Throughout 
their monograph, Bell et al. argue that the use of a top-down, aggregative, strategic-
systems lens increases the likelihood that the auditor will have obtained a sufficient 
understanding of the client's business and industry, thereby reducing the risk that audit 
procedures applied to specific high-risk transactions will be prematurely truncated. They 
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conclude their monograph with this claim (Bell et al. 1997, p. 71): 
The [transaction-based] approach assumes that accounting and auditing 
knowledge plays the primary role in forming audit judgments, and implicitly de-
emphasizes the role of knowledge about the business. The risk-based strategic-
systems approach reflects the systems-thinking view that to audit assertions 
effectively, the auditor must comprehend the client’s whole business environment 
and interpret the role of significant transactions from this business knowledge 
frame—the broader context infuses meaning into the parts.    
Application of the SSA approach 
 Eilifsen et al. (2001) present the first (externally peer-reviewed) descriptive 
evidence of the application of the SSA approach in practice. They conducted a field study 
of the 1997 KPMG audit of a state-owned bank in the Czech Republic, which was the 
first year that KPMG applied their Business Measurement Process (their version of the 
SSA methodology) to this client. The researchers compared and contrasted the conduct of 
and evidence from this audit with that from previous years' audits, which they note were 
textbook applications of a TBA's substantive testing with some reliance on internal 
controls and performance data. 
 KPMG's risk assessment of the bank changed significantly in 1997. In prior years, 
audit planning focused on risks related to loan management, investment management, 
and regulatory compliance. As a result of applying the SSA approach in 1997, the audit 
team de-emphasized certain of these risks, concluding that there were no significant 
residual risks requiring substantive testing. The new approach also led them to conclude 
that other risks were of greater significance than they had been assessed in the past. The 
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audit team emphasized that these changes in risk assessment were due to their better 
understanding of the bank's conditions and environment rather than to any specific 
changes in its actual operations or environment. Also, by broadening their view of risks 
to include those related to the bank's strategy, they identified several process, political, 
social, and technological risks that had not been noted in the past. 
 The audit workpapers reflected a distinct shift from substantive evidence to 
evidence concerning risks, their related controls, and key performance indicators. KPMG 
relied much less on evidence from the documentation of routine transactions than in the 
past, instead relying on corroborative interview evidence, available performance 
measures, and assessments of management's handling of exceptions. Also, relying on key 
business processes and linking business risks to specific audit risks allowed them to 
significantly decrease substantive testing, while focusing the testing that was done on the 
banks more-complex transactions and particularly risky loans. The audit team noted that 
the SSA's enhanced client business knowledge and risk assessment provided far more 
evidence about risks and potential financial statement errors than did the much larger 
quantity of relatively shotgun-like substantive test evidence gathered in past years. 
 Total engagement hours decreased by 9.5 percent from prior years, with the 
team's audit managers forecasting a further 20 percent reduction in future years. The audit 
team held more than ten biweekly planning and review meetings, which were attended by 
all available team members, including specialists. The information shared at these 
meetings facilitated the coordination of risk assessment where key processes and 
activities were linked to other areas of the engagement. Team members claimed that the 
new approach enabled early identification of problems and the involvement of the entire 
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team permitted a proactive response. 
 Overall, the claimed advantages of the SSA methodology—even in its first year 
of application—were apparent in KPMG's audit of the bank. The strategic-systems lens 
focused the auditors' attention on important social, political, economic, technological, and 
process risks that had been ignored in the past, while simultaneously reducing the 
attention paid to audit objective-based risks that were the focus of prior years' audits. In 
addition, the auditors significantly reduced the substantive tests of routine transactions 
and account details, replacing them with interview data, performance measurements, and 
tests focusing on only the most-complex transactions and riskiest loans. Finally, 
engagement hours were reduced by almost 10 percent, there was an increased use of 
interim audit work, and the audit team met much more frequently than in the past, thus 
facilitating improved intrateam communication. The researchers caution, however, that 
the stated impressions of the audit team members must be weighed carefully, since they 
are subjective and likely self-serving6, perhaps reflecting the novelty of the new 
methodology rather than actual quality improvement. 
Would an SSA have averted this audit failure? 
 Erickson et al. (2000) published a case study of the Lincoln Savings and Loan 
(LSL) audit, relying heavily on deposition testimony and audit working papers to study 
                                                 
6 An individual who is motivated to reach a desired conclusion may rely on a biased set of cognitive 
processes to reach such a goal (Kunda 1990). That is, the individual searches memory for those beliefs and 
rules that could support their desired conclusion. The individual often does not realize that that their 
reasoning process is biased by their goals (Kunda 1990). In the context of the introduction of the SSA 
approach to the 1997 bank audit, KPMG’s auditors may have been motivated to find reasons supporting the 
new approach’s superiority while ignoring situations where it may have been less effective than the 
traditional audit. 
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and evaluate the audit procedures and decisions that led to this audit failure.7 The authors 
concluded that the most significant shortcoming in the 1987 LSL audit was the auditor’s 
failure to obtain and use knowledge of LSL’s business, its industry, and the economic 
forces that affected them. They argue that had the auditors gained this understanding of 
their client’s business, using data that were publicly available at the time of the audit, and 
applied it to the evaluation of the substance of LSL’s sales of undeveloped land, they 
would have concluded that LSL’s aggressive revenue recognition policies resulted in 
profit margins that were “too good to be true.” The type of knowledge they believe would 
have been useful in uncovering this fraud is that which is normally gathered and used as 
audit evidence in an SSA audit. Thus, the crux of their argument is that an SSA audit 
provides more—and more reliable—audit evidence than a TBA, both in the presence and 
absence of management fraud.8 The authors rightly suggest that research is needed to test 
their assertion that an in-depth understanding of a client’s business provides an effective 
framework from which to assess risks, develop financial-statement expectations, and 
evaluate the proper accounting for transactions. 
                                                 
7 LSL was the largest savings and loan failure in U.S. history, reportedly costing taxpayers in excess of $2 
billion in bailouts and resulting in litigation settlements by three then-Big Six auditors exceeding $135 
million. LSL's failure involved management fraud, but many critics laid significant blame on its auditors, 
who did not prevent the release of “materially misstated” financial statements. All three audit firms settled 
out-of-court. 
8 Evidence gathered using the SSA approach is more reliable than TBA-based evidence in the sense that a 
higher proportion of audit evidence comes from sources external to the company, which are more reliable 
than internal evidence, especially when management fraud has occurred. For example, in the LSL case, the 
authors suggest that economic, real estate, and LSL market position data could have been gathered from a 
variety of external sources, such as the financial press and the local real estate board. This type of evidence 
would have been much more reliable than any internally generated figures regarding growth rates and 
profits, given that management had the need to disguise their fraudulent activities. 
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Determinants of Auditor Judgment Performance 
Introduction 
 Libby and Luft (1993; see also Libby 1995), building on the results of prior 
research in accounting and other fields, suggested the following conceptual equation of 
the determinants of auditor decision performance: 
 Performance = f (Ability, Knowledge, Environment, Motivation). 
They supplement the equation by specifying a model that details the antecedents and 
consequences of knowledge, with experience and ability directly affecting knowledge 
and ability and knowledge directly affecting judgment performance (see Figure 2 for an 
illustration of this model). A wide variety of studies have investigated specific links 
within the model, thus providing empirical support for the specified relations (e.g., 
Bonner and Lewis 1990; Bonner and Walker 1994; Tan 1995; Ricchiute 1999; Solomon, 
Shields, and Whittington 1999). Using structural equation modeling, Libby and Tan 
(1994) reanalyzed data gathered by Bonner and Lewis (1990) to simultaneously test all 
four links in the model. Their results support the general form of the model and, 
consistent with the underlying theory, suggest considerable variability in the determinants 
of performance on specific tasks.  
 In general, this dissertation is a study of auditor expertise, so many elements of 
the Libby and Luft (1993) model are applicable to this research. In particular, this study 
examines the relations among the audit environment (in the form of audit methodology), 
audit experience, auditors’ knowledge, and their resulting judgment performance. Given 
the importance of the model to the research questions, these four elements of it are next 
discussed in more detail. 
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Environment 
 The auditing environment can be characterized as a complex sequence of 
judgments leading to the formation of an audit opinion, which are made by individuals 
working in hierarchical audit teams whose decision choices are guided or constrained by 
professional standards, firm policies and procedures (i.e., audit methodology), and 
decision support systems (Libby and Luft 1993). In the context of the present study, the 
pertinent environmental factor is audit methodology (i.e., SSA or TBA), which is posited 
to affect the type and quantity of evidence gathered, the procedures and tools used to 
analyze the evidence, and the information outputs used to form an audit opinion. Overall, 
elements of the audit environment affect auditor judgment by interacting with experience, 
knowledge, or ability or by altering the motivation of the auditor(s) performing the 
judgment task (Libby and Luft 1993). 
Experience  
Experience includes first-hand encounters such as audit-task completion and file 
review, as well as second-hand encounters via discussion, education, and firm training 
(Libby 1995). The significant conceptual and procedural differences between an SSA and 
a TBA obviously necessitate divergent training programs, and will likely result in 
substantively dissimilar inter- and intra-audit discussions with colleagues. Moreover, an 
SSA incorporates many audit tasks (e.g., strategic analysis, business process analysis) 
that are not necessarily part of a TBA, while also excluding (or limiting the extent of) 
many standard TBA tasks, such as balance confirmations and internal accounting control 
testing. So audit methodology differences will result in disparate first- and second-hand 
audit experiences.  
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Knowledge 
Libby (1995) defines knowledge as information stored in memory, with 
knowledge including both general domain knowledge (e.g., how to apply the audit risk 
model) and subspecialty knowledge (e.g., software revenue recognition principles). In an 
audit context, knowledge of the client’s business is essential, and here, too, we may 
expect differences between methodologies. As noted above, the SSA relies on an in-depth 
understanding of the client’s business in forming expectations about the client’s financial 
statements. This understanding comprises knowledge of the client’s business strategies, 
the processes that implement and monitor the strategies, the risks associated with these 
strategies and processes, and management’s controls over these risks. In principle, the 
TBA auditor could (and may) also collect and analyze these types of client knowledge. 
Indeed, most of the information used by an SSA auditor is listed in the Appendix of 
CICA Handbook Section 5140 (CICA 2001), a Section that was last updated in July 1996 
when the SSA had yet to be introduced. A review of firms’ audit manuals and leading 
auditing textbooks, however, suggests that in practice TBA auditors often do not collect 
the quantity or array of knowledge gathered by SSA auditors. The auditor’s view of the 
client context in which this knowledge is considered also varies between approaches.  
 The SSA auditor views the client organization as being the core of a broad, 
complex economic web which comprises many interrelationships and interactions among 
such entities as suppliers, customers, capital markets, and many others (Bell et al. 1997). 
Figure 3 presents one view of this web of interrelationships. The SSA auditor develops 
knowledge about, and evidence in support of, the nature and strengths of these 
interrelationships, the rapidity and magnitude of changes in connectivity, and the viability 
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of the client’s strategy (Bell et al. 1997). In contrast, the TBA auditor generally attends to 
only a subset of these interrelationships, and usually applies a more-piecemeal approach 
to their analysis. For instance, she may address the client-customer relationship by 
confirming accounts receivable, or examine interactions with related parties by reviewing 
and testing the transactions with these entities. In the end, methodology differences 
potentially result in an SSA auditor having a richly detailed, tightly interconnected body 
of knowledge about the client, whereas the TBA auditor may have a more impoverished 
model of client knowledge. 
Judgment performance 
 Judgment performance is generally defined as the degree of correspondence 
between a judgment and some criterion value of effectiveness (e.g., an event outcome, a 
statistical norm, or the judgments of others) or efficiency (e.g., time to complete a task or 
cost per unit of information gained) (Libby 1995). The direct determinants of 
performance are ability and knowledge, in interaction with the audit environment and 
individual motivation (see Figure 2). 
In the model, abilities are defined as the capacity to complete information 
encoding, retrieval, and analysis tasks that contribute to audit problem solving (Libby and 
Luft 1993). These abilities can be measured using psychometric measures of verbal and 
quantitative skills (e.g., the GMAT) and they tend not to be specific to accounting 
settings. That is, these abilities can be considered innate to the individual and are not 
affected by any of the salient factors within accounting settings, although individual 
differences in abilities do affect learning and judgment performance (Libby 1995). 
Both knowledge content and knowledge organization can independently affect 
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auditor judgment performance (Libby and Luft 1993). This dissertation’s research 
questions focus on audit methodology-related differences in auditors’ knowledge content 
and organization, and any related variations in audit judgment. Therefore, the next 
section reviews the cognitive psychology theory underlying the content and organization 
of knowledge in memory and details the audit research that has investigated these 
concepts and their effects on audit judgment. 
Knowledge Structures in Memory 
Introduction 
 Concepts in long-term memory (or knowledge) can be seen as being stored in 
memory structures called schemas (Rumelhart and Ortony 1977), which contain clusters 
of organized expectations and represent abstract knowledge about some domain (Bower 
2000). A schema allows for the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information related to 
that domain (Alba and Hasher 1983). Schemas can contain any number of concepts, with 
few or many links among them, and some schemas can be embedded within others. 
Through experience people acquire schemas for routine tasks, novel activities, and 
narrative forms.9 Each schematized activity comprises an ordered sequence of actions to 
achieve a goal, and these actions are performed (and recalled in chunks) more or less 
automatically (Bower 2000). Structured schemas can be viewed as simply large clusters 
of elementary associated concepts, which “truly are the building blocks of cognition. 
They are the fundamental elements upon which all information processing depends” 
                                                 
9 Examples of common, well-developed schemas include shopping for groceries, making a phone call, and 
visiting the dentist. 
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(Rumelhart 1980).10 
Encoding knowledge in schemas  
 Only some of the concepts in a given event or message will be encoded in 
memory. Three schema-encoding principles determine what concepts are ultimately 
represented. Whether or not a piece of information is encoded first depends on the 
existence of a relevant schema (Alba and Hasher 1983). That is, previously acquired, 
relevant knowledge stored in a well-developed schema is critical to the acquisition of 
new knowledge. Mismatches between incoming knowledge and existing schemas can 
occur either because the structure of the incoming information differs from the relevant 
schema or because the individual lacks adequate knowledge of the relevant schema. 
Absent a concept-structure match, there is no available schema into which new 
information can be integrated, so it is sometimes lost because it has to be handled by less 
effective and efficient generic information processing actions. The encoding of new 
information is a mapping process, new onto old, which depends on a sufficiently well-
developed knowledge base (Alba and Hasher 1983).11 
Also necessary for the encoding of new information is the activation of the 
relevant schema. That is, the mere possession of adequate background knowledge is not 
sufficient for encoding; the knowledge must be activated at the time of encoding (Alba 
                                                 
10 Besides schemas, psychology research has postulated a number of alternative memory structures. For 
example, rather than viewing memory as a set of items combined with an addressing scheme that allows the 
items to be accessed, in connectionist models of memory, events are represented not by items but by 
patterns of activity across a set of connected neurons (McClelland 2000). As discussed in more depth 
below, audit judgment research has shown that various types of audit knowledge are stored in schema-type 
structures in auditors’ memory. Thus, this dissertation focuses on schematic memory structures rather than 
one of the other alternative structures.  
11 Schemas are built up through experience, developing much like scientific theories (Rumelhart 1980). 
That is, when a person encounters a new event, object, or situation, he first tries to comprehend it using an 
existing schema. If the new data don’t fit an existing schema, he will begin to construct a new one, 
specifying it further as more data (from more similar events, objects, or situations) become available. 
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and Hasher 1983). When knowledge structures lie dormant during encoding, new 
information cannot be easily assimilated. Even when a relevant schema is invoked, 
incoming knowledge may be improperly encoded. This can occur when the activated 
schema can be applied to only a subset of the incoming information, in which case the 
relevant information is encoded but the remainder will either be rejected or distorted to fit 
the existing schema. In either case, inconsistent information will not be well represented 
in memory (Alba and Hasher 1983).  
Finally, the importance of the incoming information in the context of the relevant 
schema also affects encoding. The concepts that are most important to the theme of the 
information and that cannot be derived from previously encoded information will be 
given special attention and will be remembered best (Alba and Hasher 1983). 
Retrieving knowledge from schemas  
As a result of these three schema-encoding principles, the representation of a 
given information set is likely to be incomplete. Because of this, people cannot recall 
from memory an exact copy of the information set, even when motivated to do so (Alba 
and Hasher 1983). Three major factors influence what is recalled: (1) the nature of 
connections established during encoding, (2) differences in the number and distribution 
of rehearsals, and (3) the role of retrieval cues at recall (Alba and Hasher 1983). 
Individual concepts within a schema can have either or both of two sets of 
relations: (a) hierarchical connections descending from the main theme of the schema and 
(b) associative connections that link concepts directly to others via shared arguments 
(Kintsch and van Dijk 1978). Frederick (1991) provides an example of an internal-control 
schema containing both hierarchical and associative connections. In his example (see 
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Figure 4), an individual accounting cycle (e.g., the purchasing-and-disbursements cycle) 
forms the superordinate level of organization, with the temporally associated flow of 
transactions within a cycle (e.g., purchasing, receiving, payables, disbursements, journal 
entries and reconciliation) forming the intermediate level in the hierarchy. At a 
subordinate level are the specific control procedures associated with each transaction at 
the intermediate level and with each other temporally. Thus, within an auditor’s internal-
control schema there are hierarchical links between cycles, transactions, and controls, as 
well as temporal associations between transactions and between controls at each of the 
lower levels in the hierarchy.  
Concepts related to one another either hierarchically or associatively are easier to 
recall than are unrelated concepts, so the ability to relate concepts to one another during 
encoding is likely a determinant of recall ability (Alba and Hasher 1983). That is, if ideas 
are not or cannot be connected to a higher-order concept or to other concepts during 
encoding, recall will be poor. Thus, the components of each connection serve as (implicit 
or explicit) retrieval cues when an individual attempts to recall information from memory 
(Alba and Hasher 1983). 
Kintsch and van Dijk’s (1978) model of text comprehension provides a 
hierarchical algorithm useful in explaining this principle. If the first idea retrieved is the 
highest-level concept (or theme), then recall will occur in a top-down manner, with each 
concept cuing one or more below it in the schema. So items higher in the hierarchy are 
likely to be recalled before lower items, and lower level concepts will not be recalled 
unless the chain of ideas above is kept intact.  
The model also offers an explanation of how important ideas are determined. The 
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more-important ideas in an information set (or text) are likely often referred to by other 
concepts in the set and thus spend more time in working memory than less-important 
ideas. As a consequence of these rehearsal processes, important ideas will tend to have 
connections to a greater number of other ideas than will unimportant ideas. Moreover, it 
is very possible that the theme of an information set is that proposition or concept that is 
most frequently rehearsed or referred to during encoding, thus its relatively easy retrieval. 
Recent theoretical schema research 
 In a recent, influential theoretical paper by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995), schemas 
play a key role in the encoding and retrieval of data to and from long-term working 
memory (Gobet 1998).12 In summary, the authors’ long-term working memory theory 
proposes that domain experts encode information by elaborating long-term memory 
schemas, which are in turn stored within an integrated, hierarchical retrieval structure that 
relates pieces of information with each other, thus allowing rapid encoding of 
information into long-term memory. The authors argue that this type of memory structure 
overcomes the limited storage capacity of short-term memory (Miller 1956), thereby 
allowing domain experts to maintain access to large quantities of information during the 
performance of complex cognitive tasks. They support their claim by reviewing empirical 
evidence on memory in text comprehension and expert performance in domains such as 
mental calculation, medical diagnosis, and chess.   
Accountants’ knowledge structures 
 Drawing on the schema literature, Gibbins (1984) made several propositions 
regarding accountants’ knowledge structures. He proposed that accounting experience 
                                                 
12 As at April 2, 2004, the ISI Web of Science citation index shows 261 citations of the Ericsson and 
Kintsch (1995) article. 
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produces prestructured guides to judgment, which are stored in long-term memory and 
are shaped by the judgment environment. Calling these guides templates, he suggested 
that templates are more complete for more frequently experienced tasks and, in turn, that 
more-complete templates lead to more-efficient memory use. These templates are 
constantly updated through perceptual processes that continuously monitor the judgment 
environment, thus providing an up-to-date background against which judgments can be 
made. Gibbins also proposed that the judgment process begins with a search of long-term 
memory for a relevant template. This search is based on perceived salient aspects of the 
judgment task, with template selection ultimately depending on the fit between these 
aspects and the retrieval cues stored in the template. That is, the accountant (consciously 
or unconsciously) selects the template with the greatest number of retrieval cues 
matching the salient judgment circumstances. A variety of stopping rules (e.g., deadline 
nearing, all relevant information has been used) will terminate the search process if a 
suitable template cannot be found. Finally, the output of a template is a conscious 
response that specifies an action preference. In summary, through experience the 
accountant develops templates (or schemas) in long-term memory, which she accesses 
according to environmental demands and, if she finds a template that fits the perceived 
circumstances, she takes the preferred response from the template. She then evaluates the 
risks and constraints associated with this response prior to acting on it. 
 Contemporaneous with Gibbins (1984), Waller and Felix (1984) made several 
conjectures about auditors’ knowledge structures, also drawing heavily on schema theory 
as well as theory on the categorical (or taxonomic) organization of knowledge. They 
argued that as an auditor gains experience he forms and develops categorical and 
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schematic organizations of declarative knowledge. For example, the basic categorical 
organization of accounting knowledge includes assets, liabilities, owners’ equity, 
revenues, and expenses. Basic schemas include the double-entry representation of 
accounting events and skeletal forms of the balance sheet and income statement. Waller 
and Felix further suggest that these knowledge structures are brought to bear upon 
judgments at each step in the auditor’s opinion formulation process, and that repeated 
experience in applying these steps leads to adaptations in the relevant knowledge 
structures. 
 Waller and Felix (1984) also make several specific conjectures regarding the 
auditor’s knowledge of the client’s business. They posit that this knowledge consists of 
both client-specific data and the auditor’s generalized cognitive structures evoked to 
comprehend these data and incorporate them into her judgment processes. They argue 
that knowledge about client-environmental factors and their interrelationships is largely 
declarative in form, and thus is organized in categories and schemas. Professional 
experience, rather than formal education, is likely to be the primary determinant of these 
structures. They suggest that a reasonably well-formed categorical organization of client 
data pre-exists for the incipient auditor and learning this context involves merely 
internalizing this categorization. The development of client-environmental schemas, 
however, depends upon generalizations drawn from direct experiential observations, 
hearing or reading the analyses of specialists, and discussions with knowledgeable 
colleagues. Schemas for relations among environmental factors may range from 
simplistic stereotypes for client personnel to highly sophisticated representations of 
causal knowledge about accounting control features and economic conditions and their 
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respective error propensities. Pursuant to the propositions of Waller and Felix (1984) and 
Gibbins (1984), accounting researchers undertook experimental investigations to gather 
empirical evidence regarding these theoretical claims about auditors’ knowledge 
structures. 
Auditors’ internal control knowledge 
 Central to an auditor’s understanding of the inner workings of the client’s 
business is her knowledge of the client’s internal control system. Evidence related to how 
this client knowledge is stored in an auditor’s memory may provide insight into how 
higher-level knowledge of the client’s business is organized in memory. This sub-section 
reviews the key findings in the area of auditors’ internal control knowledge. 
In the only knowledge-structure study to precede the theoretical papers by 
Gibbins (1984) and Waller and Felix (1984), Weber (1980) examined how EDP auditors 
imposed organization on computer controls. He had internal and external EDP auditors as 
well as university students with some computing experience perform a free-recall task 
using 50 computer controls. Both groups of EDP auditors recalled controls in clusters 
closely corresponding to the superordinate categories (e.g., input, processing, output) 
used to initially formulate the list of 50 controls. Further, the external auditors recalled 
more controls per category than did the internal auditors, possibly reflecting their more-
intensive training and exposure to a greater variety of computer systems across clients. 
The students showed no evidence of category clustering in their recall of the controls and 
they recalled significantly fewer controls than the experienced auditors. Thus, the results 
of Weber's study indicate that experienced EDP auditors organize their knowledge of 
controls in generally accepted superordinate categories whereas novice auditors have no 
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apparent organization of controls in memory. Also, experience-based differences between 
the internal and external auditors resulted in the external auditors having more-extensive 
categorical knowledge.  
 Next, Frederick (1991) examined how experienced and inexperienced financial 
statement auditors store and retrieve internal control knowledge. He employed auditors 
(mean four years' experience) and undergraduate accounting students in a recall task 
using 33 internal controls. The stimulus list was presented either taxonomically (i.e., 
controls grouped by internal control objective) or schematically (i.e., controls grouped by 
temporal transaction flow). Frederick’s results showed that the experts recalled 
significantly more controls than the novices and that experts recalled more controls in the 
schematic condition than they did in the taxonomic condition. Novices, however, recalled 
a statistically equivalent number of controls in each condition. Further analysis showed 
that subjects in the schematic condition clustered more than those in the taxonomic 
condition. In the schematic condition, even the novices listed the few controls they 
remembered in a coherent sequence. These findings indicate that auditors have both 
taxonomic and schematic memory representations of internal controls, with the schematic 
representations becoming better developed with experience. The temporal structure of the 
schematic representation appears to provide more-effective memory-retrieval guides than 
the taxonomic structure, as indicated by the greater quantity of controls recalled by 
experts in the schematic condition. 
 Curtis and Viator (2000) examined the relation between knowledge organization 
and judgment performance in a study again involving computer controls. Their subjects 
(staff, senior, and manager levels) studied nine computer controls and assessed the 
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relatedness of each possible pair of controls. They then read a case and were asked to 
identify control weaknesses and their potential effects on the financial statements. The 
analysis revealed that the manager-auditors had three structural dimensions to their 
control knowledge, with processing flow being the dominant dimension, control objective 
the secondary dimension, and control method the other dimension. These results further 
confirm Weber's (1980) and Frederick's (1991) findings. Also consistent with Frederick's 
findings, Curtis and Viator found that staff-auditors had a more well-developed control-
objective dimension than a transaction-flow dimension. Results also showed a positive 
association between the two dominant knowledge dimensions and the quantity of control 
weaknesses and financial statement errors identified, indicating that a more well-
developed knowledge structure can lead to increased audit effectiveness. 
 In summary, these three studies of auditors' control-knowledge representations 
showed consistent evidence that controls are represented in memory along two main 
dimensions: a schematic dimension, which temporally organizes controls in a transaction-
flow order, and a taxonomic dimension, which organizes controls categorically according 
to control objective. The schematic representation develops with experience and tends to 
dominate the taxonomic representation as it becomes better developed. The schematic 
representation also permits better retrieval of controls from memory, though both 
dimensions have been found to be positively and concurrently associated with audit 
performance. Weber’s study also found richer knowledge structures in external EDP 
auditors compared to internal EDP auditors.  
These findings have several implications for this dissertation’s research questions. 
First, they suggest that higher-level client business knowledge may be stored in 
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categories or schemas in memory, similar to an auditor’s knowledge of a client’s internal 
controls. Second, they suggest that client business knowledge may become better 
organized as an auditor gains experience. Third, audit-methodology differences may 
result in one type of auditor (i.e., SSA or TBA) possessing richer knowledge structures 
than the other, similar to Weber’s internal-external auditor differences.13 Finally, any 
differences in the structure of client business knowledge may affect the audit judgments 
made based on that knowledge. 
Auditors’ going-concern knowledge 
 An auditor must have a thorough understanding of a client’s business in order to 
make a proper assessment of the client’s ability to continue as a going concern. 
Therefore, evidence related to how going-concern knowledge is organized in memory 
may suggest how client business knowledge in general is stored by auditors. This sub-
section reviews the literature regarding the structure of auditors’ going-concern 
knowledge. 
Choo and Trotman (1991) were the first to investigate the structure of auditor's 
going-concern knowledge and how this structure affected related judgments. Expert 
(mean four years' experience) and novice (mean three months' experience) auditors read a 
partner memo describing issues related to a client's going-concern situation. They then 
recalled from memory the issues present in the memo, made likelihood judgments 
regarding the truth of inferences that were not explicitly stated in the memo, and judged 
the likelihood of the client failing within one year. The results showed that the experts 
                                                 
13 Libby and Luft’s (1993) model of auditor judgment performance (reviewed earlier) specifies that the 
audit environment, which includes a firm’s audit methodology, can affect an auditor’s knowledge. Thus, 
Weber’s (1980) finding of differences between internal and external auditors’ knowledge structures could 
be partially explained by the different methodologies employed by the two types of auditors.  
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tended to recall issues in clusters of typical (i.e., those that indicated the client would fail) 
and atypical (i.e., those that indicated the client would not fail) items, whereas novices 
showed no evidence of clustering, indicating that experts' going-concern knowledge is 
better organized than novices'. Results also showed that experts' inferences are contingent 
upon the degree to which they organize memory by a particular type of information. 
Finally, there was no direct correlation between items recalled and the auditors' going-
concern judgments, indicating that the knowledge-performance relationship is mediated 
by the inferences made during the judgment process. 
 Ricchiute (1992) investigated how auditors' going-concern knowledge structures 
affect judgment. In the process, he also extended Frederick's (1991) finding of a memory 
organization-evidence organization interaction by examining the effect of this interaction 
on judgment. Audit partners read 60 evidence sentences one at a time, with the order of 
the evidence manipulated between subjects, and then made their going-concern judgment. 
The partners decided there was substantial doubt about the client's viability more often 
when the strongest evidence supporting this position was presented in causal order, least 
often when the strongest evidence was shown in working-paper order. These results 
indicate that partners store going-concern knowledge in causally ordered schemas and 
that a match—or mismatch—between knowledge organization and information 
organization can have important effects on auditors' judgment performance. 
Choo (1996) employed a cognitive-script approach in an attempt to refine the 
understanding of the structure of auditors' going-concern knowledge. A cognitive script is 
a sequence of actions in an individual's knowledge structure that enables her to 
understand a specific situation or context and guides her behaviour in that situation or 
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context.14 Differences among auditor's cognitive scripts are determined by the extent of 
their knowledge distinctiveness, abstractness, and contingency.15 Choo proposed that 
there would be a positive association between each of these three script dimensions and 
auditors' going-concern judgments. Auditors with varying levels of experience on 
engagements with going-concern issues read a case with client background information 
and financial statements. They then listed the typical items (i.e., issues increasing the 
likelihood of failure) and atypical items (i.e., issues decreasing the likelihood of failure) 
gleaned from the given information, made a going-concern judgment, and prepared a 
memo justifying their decision. The results showed that all three dimensions were present 
in auditors' knowledge structures and that the larger the extent of these dimensions, the 
better an auditor's going-concern judgment. These findings provide us with insight into 
the richness of an auditor's going-concern knowledge structure and also show that such 
richness can improve judgment performance. 
 Overall, the findings from these three studies indicate that as auditors gain 
experience, their going-concern knowledge becomes better organized. More important, 
each of these studies showed a link between well-organized knowledge structures and 
improved going-concern judgments. In Choo and Trotman this relation was mediated by 
inference-making ability and in Ricchiute it was moderated by evidence presentation 
order. These findings have two main implications for this dissertation’s research 
questions. First, they suggest that, in general, client business knowledge may become 
                                                 
14 A script (Schank and Abelson 1977) is a specific type of schema, which contains general information 
about a particular, frequently experienced event (e.g., a restaurant visit), as well as more-specific 
information about the contents of the event (e.g., being seated, ordering the meal, and so on). 
15 Knowledge distinctiveness refers to the extent of atypical actions and events in a script. Knowledge 
abstractness refers to the extent of general actions and events in a script. Knowledge contingency refers to 
the extent a script is represented by a tree-like hierarchical sequence of contingent actions and events. 
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better organized with experience. Second, judgments based on this knowledge may 
improve as the knowledge becomes better organized.   
Auditors’ financial-statement error knowledge 
 During an audit, the auditor must rely on error knowledge to design appropriate 
tests and procedures that will assist her in identifying actual and potential sources of 
financial statement errors. Because the number and types of errors can vary by client 
type, it is reasonable to assume that financial-statement error knowledge is a component 
of client business knowledge. Thus, reviewing the literature on auditors’ error knowledge 
should provide insight into how client business knowledge is stored in memory. 
Libby and Frederick (1990) were the first to investigate the structure of auditors' 
knowledge of financial-statement errors. They employed auditors with varying 
experience levels (from zero to five years, on average) in a task that required subjects to 
list errors that could be associated with given financial ratio fluctuations. Expert auditors 
recalled more errors than novices and also had both transaction-cycle and audit-objective 
dimensions to their error knowledge structures, whereas novices had only an audit-
objective dimension. This indicates that an auditor's education and training facilitate 
development of the latter dimension, but that practical experience is necessary to develop 
the former dimension.  
 Tubbs (1992) replicated and extended the findings of Libby and Frederick (1990) 
by specifically investigating the nature of experience-related changes in auditor's 
knowledge of financial-statement errors. Auditors ranging in experience from student to 
manager level performed an unconstrained free recall of errors from memory and were 
then given several errors and were asked to make estimates of the probability of these 
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errors occurring conditional on the presence of another error. In addition to finding that 
the quantity and quality of auditors' error knowledge increased with experience, he found 
that the causal relationship between an error and the control objective violated became 
more salient with experience.  
 Frederick et al. (1994) sought to extend the work of both Libby and Frederick 
(1990) and Tubbs (1992) by directly examining how auditors' error category structures 
develop with experience and which structure—transaction cycle-based or audit objective-
based—auditors prefer. They investigated these research questions using auditors with 
varying experience (students through managers), who were asked to sort 35 errors by 
either transaction cycle, audit objective, or however they desired. The results indicated 
that the structure of auditors' error knowledge is multidimensional and that these 
dimensions evolve with experience. The authors also note that managers seem to 
incorporate their knowledge of audit risk into their audit-objective dimension. Overall, 
these results showed that auditors’ error knowledge becomes more complex with 
experience. 
 Nelson, Libby, and Bonner et al. (1995) employed the Frederick et al. findings to 
aid their investigation of how a mismatch between an auditor's error knowledge structure 
(organized by audit objectives) and an audit task's structure (organized by transaction 
cycle) affects audit planning. Auditors with a mean of three years' experience free sorted 
errors, viewed nine errors presented in varying frequencies, made conditional error-
probability judgments, and made audit-effort allocation decisions.16 Findings showed that 
                                                 
16 The error-frequency presentation was an experimental proxy for errors encountered through actual audit 
experience. Prior research indicates that frequency knowledge is time-tagged in memory, so individuals are 
able to discriminate experimental frequencies from existing frequency knowledge. 
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the mismatch between error knowledge structure and planning-task structure hindered 
auditors' ability to draw on previously experienced error frequencies when estimating 
conditional probabilities and allocating audit effort. No such problem was found when 
the structures matched. These results again show the importance of knowledge structures 
to an auditor’s judgment quality. 
 This series of studies provides several important insights into auditors' error 
knowledge structures and the effects of these structures on judgment. First, experienced 
auditors know more possible errors than less-experienced auditors. Second, the structure 
of auditors’ error knowledge becomes more complex, taking on additional dimensions as 
experience is gained. Third, and most important, error knowledge structures affect 
judgment performance, with poor-quality decisions resulting if there is a mismatch 
between knowledge structure and task structure. 
Considered together, these findings have several implications for this 
dissertation’s research questions. First, we may expect an auditor’s quantity of client 
business knowledge to increase with experience. Second, the structure of this knowledge 
in memory might become more complex as the auditor gains experience. Finally, the 
structure of client knowledge might have a differential effect on audit effectiveness 
depending on how it interacts with various audit task structures. 
Pre- and post-cognitive structures 
 This dissertation investigates the complexity of auditors’ client business 
knowledge and how varying levels of knowledge complexity affect judgment. Pratt 
(1982) studied the complexity of accountants’ pre- and post-cognitive structures (i.e., 
knowledge structures) and their effects on information use and performance, so his 
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results should provide insight into how different levels of knowledge complexity 
influence accountants’ judgments.  
A pre-cognitive (post-cognitive) structure is an individual’s cognitive structure 
before (after) exposure to a set of declarative facts, represented in Pratt’s study by 
information in a corporate annual report. Pratt measured the complexity of advanced 
accounting students’ cognitive structures before and after reading a low-, medium-, or 
high-complexity corporate annual report. He then related the complexity of these 
structures to the subjects’ performance on a net-income prediction task and their self-
reported use of 12 different sections of the annual report considered in making this 
prediction. Results showed a strong correlation between pre- and post-cognitive structure, 
but post-cognitive structure was more closely related than pre-cognitive structure to an 
individual’s decision process and eventual decision. In addition, individuals with 
complex post-cognitive structures made more-accurate income predictions than their 
structurally simple counterparts as the complexity of the annual report increased. Thus, 
Pratt’s results show a link between knowledge structures and judgment, with judgment 
quality improving as knowledge complexity increases. 
Causal mapping 
 This sub-section provides details on causal mapping, a form of content analysis, 
which will be used to analyze and measure auditors’ knowledge complexity when testing 
some of this dissertation’s hypotheses. A causal map is a type of cognitive map, which is 
a representation of the elements of an environment and their interrelations as held in 
long-term memory (Shavelson 1972). Tolman (1948) first used cognitive maps as 
representations of the mental models of rats and humans. Both cognitive mapping and 
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causal mapping are methods of analyzing the content of a document to identify critical 
assertions dealing with causality, existence, or categorization (Huff 1990; Eden 1992). 
Axelrod (1976) and his colleagues first used causal mapping to examine the 
cognitive structures of political leaders. Researchers in the areas of strategy and 
management began using cognitive and causal maps in the late 1980s to better understand 
the structure of strategic thought. A 1989 special issue of the Journal of Management 
Studies was devoted to mapping strategic thought, as was an edited book by Huff (1990). 
A 1994 special issue of Organization Science presented various methods of mapping 
managerial cognition, including causal mapping. Thus, given this dissertation’s focus on 
auditors’ cognitive structures, particularly their knowledge of client strategies and how 
this knowledge differs by audit methodology and experience, causal mapping seems to be 
an appropriate method to use because of its recent application in similar studies. 
A recent study by Nelson et al. (Nelson, Nadkarni, Narayanan, and Ghods 2000) 
in MIS Quarterly shows how causal mapping can be used to investigate the cognitive 
structure of expertise. In particular, they examine the expertise of software-operations 
support personnel. Using data gathered from interviews with a variety of support staff in 
two organizations, they analyzed the content of the participants’ responses using a causal 
mapping approach. The analysis revealed that support expertise comprises five major 
constructs: personal competencies (i.e., ability, experience, and knowledge), 
environmental factors, motivation, IS policies, and support personnel outcomes (i.e., 
performance). Note the similarity between these findings and Libby and Luft’s (1993) 
model of auditor expertise as described earlier and shown in Figure 2. Thus, this recent 
study provides a specific example of how useful causal mapping should be when 
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studying auditor expertise. Details on the actual application of causal mapping are 
provided in Chapter 3. 
Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed descriptive, theoretical, and empirical research findings 
that are relevant to examining this dissertation’s research questions. First, evidence 
describing the major facets of the SSA approach were reviewed and important 
distinctions between this approach and the TBA approach were identified. Related, a 
series of empirical studies on the SSA methodology revealed potential problems with the 
effectiveness of this new approach, but generally found both improved auditor knowledge 
and judgment performance as a result of applying such an approach. This dissertation will 
examine the effects of some of the SSA-TBA distinctions on auditors’ knowledge and 
judgment and may provide evidence that will clarify some of the surprising findings from 
the empirical studies. Third, given this dissertation’s focus on auditor expertise, the most-
pertinent elements of Libby and Luft’s (1993) model of auditor judgment performance 
were reviewed in depth. Next, the cognitive psychology literature on schema theory was 
reviewed to highlight how an auditor’s knowledge of the client’s business may be 
encoded in, stored in, and retrieved from memory. Finally, several theoretical and 
empirical papers from the audit judgment literature were reviewed. In general, these 
papers showed that audit experience leads to well-organized knowledge structures in an 
auditor’s memory and that better organized knowledge can improve judgment 
performance. All of the evidence reviewed in this chapter will be incorporated into this 
dissertation’s hypotheses, which are developed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 - HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter reviewed the theoretical, empirical, and descriptive literature that 
is directly related to answering this dissertation’s research questions. This chapter 
synthesizes that literature and develops the hypotheses to be tested in providing empirical 
evidence regarding those questions. The first three hypotheses predict how experience- 
and methodology-related differences in the content and organization of client business 
knowledge in an auditor’s memory affect the relative recall abilities of novice versus 
expert auditors and SSA versus TBA auditors. The next three hypotheses predict how 
experience and methodology affect the complexity of an auditor’s client business 
knowledge. The final hypothesis predicts how differences in knowledge complexity 
affect auditors’ risk assessments. The chapter concludes with a summary of the study’s 
hypotheses.     
Content and Organization of Client Business Knowledge in Memory 
The auditor’s mental representation of client knowledge 
 To gain an understanding of the client’s business, the auditor engages in several 
cognitive processes, including searching for and retrieving information from external 
sources and from memory (Bonner and Pennington 1991). This information comprises 
knowledge about client-environmental facts and the interrelationships between and 
among these facts. Such knowledge is predominantly declarative and is thus likely 
organized in memory using categories and schemas (Waller and Felix 1984). Combined, 
this knowledge forms a mental representation of the client and its current situation 
(Bonner and Pennington 1991). 
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Client-environmental facts 
 Several broad categories of environmental facts are relevant to the construction of 
this mental representation: knowledge of the external economic, industry, and financial 
reporting environments in which the client operates; knowledge of the client’s internal 
operating environment, including its ownership structure, corporate governance, and 
management personnel; and knowledge of its operational characteristics, including its 
major revenues and expenditures, capital structure, and other financial and administrative 
factors. Table 2 (drawn from the Appendix of CICA Handbook Section 5140 (CICA 
2001)) presents a partial list of the individual facts within each of these three categories 
that might be of significance to the auditor when gathering knowledge of the client’s  
business. The Appendix to International Standard on Auditing 310 (IFAC 2003) on 
knowledge of the client’s business contains a similar categorical list of facts.17 The 
auditor’s mental representation of these facts is likely in the form of a reasonably well-
formed categorical organization (Waller and Felix 1984).  
Methodology-related differences in knowledge of client-environmental facts  
 The number and types of client-environmental facts gathered by the auditor may 
not differ across audit methodologies. That is, asked to gather information about a given 
company, it is possible that the TBA auditor and the SSA auditor could collect 
substantially similar quantities and types of facts. Indeed, Salterio and Weirich (2002) 
note that most of the information necessary for an SSA audit is listed in the Appendix of 
Section 5140 (see Table 2 for details on the contents of the Appendix). International 
                                                 
17 CICA Section 5140 and ISA 310 have recently been replaced by Section 5141 and ISA 315, respectively. 
The participants who supplied data for this dissertation completed the study while 5140 and 310 were still 
in effect, however. 
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auditing standards (IFAC 2003) suggest a very similar list of facts could be gathered by 
the auditor in gaining an understanding of the client’s business.  
 Thus, in principle, existing auditing standards do not discourage the TBA auditor 
from acquiring the same amount and types of client-environmental facts as the SSA 
auditor. Moreover, as discussed further below, the primary advantage of the SSA over the 
TBA is not that it uses a greater quantity of environmental data, but that it organizes this 
data in a more logical and useful way. So, it is argued here that the amount of client-
environmental facts gathered may not differ between methodologies.18 Research in 
auditing has shown that task-specific experience directly determines auditing knowledge 
(Libby and Luft 1993; Libby 1995), so differences in task-specific experience lead to 
differences in related knowledge. A corollary of this theoretical relation is that 
individuals with similar types and levels of task-specific experience will not greatly differ 
in related knowledge. If TBA auditors actually collect the same quantity and types of 
client-environmental facts as SSA auditors, then both types of auditors should possess 
similar experience with this specific task. As detailed in Chapter 1, an auditor’s task-
specific experience is a direct determinant of her audit knowledge content and structure 
(Libby and Luft 1993; Libby and Tan 1994). Hence, given their similar experiences with 
the task of collecting client facts, SSA and TBA auditors may have similar knowledge-
acquisition schemas. Given that schemas determine the amount of information encoded 
and enable more-effective information retrieval (Alba and Hasher 1983), the similar 
schemas of SSA and TBA auditors as they pertain to gathering facts could lead to 
                                                 
18 The term “gathering” as used here refers to the number and types of facts collected and not to the 
procedures used to collect these data. The procedures used to collect the information may differ between 
methodologies, but the end results of these procedures would be a substantially similar body of client facts. 
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auditors’ recall of facts being equivalent across methodologies. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H1a: SSA auditors recall the same quantity of client-environmental facts as 
TBA auditors.19 
 While in principle there is no reason to expect differences in the quantity and 
types of facts gathered across methodologies, in practice it seems that there may be some 
differences between the approaches. A review of two leading auditing textbooks, each 
dealing almost exclusively with only one of the methodologies, suggests that the SSA 
auditor may routinely collect a greater quantity of facts from a broader array of categories 
than the TBA auditor. In their textbook detailing the traditional TBA approach, Arens et 
al. (Arens, Loebbecke, Lemon, and Splettstoesser 2000) spend only four pages outlining 
the client-environmental facts needed to gain an understanding of the client’s business. 
This information falls into a few broad categories: industry background, operational 
background, significant policies and procedures, related parties, and legal obligations. In 
contrast, Knechel’s (2001) text detailing the SSA approach contains two chapters 
outlining facts from a variety of categories: local, internal, and global environments; 
external forces and agents; resources and suppliers; markets, customers, and products; 
internal processes (including strategic management); and strategic partners. Thus, a 
comparison of these instructional texts indicates that the SSA auditor may regularly 
gather a greater quantity of facts from a wider variety of environmental categories than 
the TBA auditor. 
 A review of firms’ audit manuals reinforces the client-knowledge differences 
                                                 
19 The null of this hypothesis is: SSA auditors recall a lower quantity of client-environmental facts than 
TBA auditors or SSA auditors recall a greater quantity of client-environmental facts than TBA auditors. 
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noted in these texts. In the audit manual of one of the Big 4 firms currently using the SSA 
approach, it is suggested that auditors collect client-environmental facts very similar to 
those discussed in the Knechel SSA text. In contrast, an audit manual from the same firm, 
but from the era when the firm still applied a TBA approach, indicates that auditors 
should collect client facts similar to those suggested in the Arens et al. TBA text. Thus, 
when this Big 4 firm changed from a TBA to an SSA approach, they began to gather a 
more-thorough set of client facts. In addition, the audit manual from one of the Big 4 
firms that still uses a TBA approach suggests that auditors collect a more-limited set of 
client facts similar to those in the Arens et al. text, indicating that much or all of the SSA-
specific information from the Knechel text is not gathered by this firm. Thus, textbooks 
and audit manuals suggest that, in practice, SSA auditors may routinely collect more 
client facts than TBA auditors. 
Erickson et al. (2000) argue that had the (TBA) auditors of Lincoln Savings and 
Loan collected the types of client-environmental facts normally gathered by SSA 
auditors, they may have avoided one of the most significant audit failures in the scandal-
plagued savings-and-loan industry. This again suggests that SSA auditors tend to collect 
more client facts than TBA auditors. If SSA auditors actually collect a greater quantity 
and more types of client-environmental facts than TBA auditors, then this differential 
task experience should lead to knowledge differences across methodologies (Libby and 
Luft 1993; Libby 1995). Hence, SSA auditors may have richer, more complex 
knowledge-acquisition schemas than TBA auditors. Richly developed schemas lead to 
the encoding of more information than impoverished schemas, and also tend to make 
information retrieval easier (Alba and Hasher 1983). For example, Frederick (1991) 
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found that the well-developed internal-control schemas of expert auditors led to their 
ability to retrieve more controls from memory compared to novice auditors, who had 
poorly developed schemas. In a recent study, Kopp and O’Donnell (2005) found that 
novice accountants trained to apply an SSA-style approach had better category 
knowledge of internal controls compared to novices trained using a TBA-style approach. 
This latter result indicates that use of an SSA methodology may lead to better knowledge 
structures in memory, when compared to those of auditors who use a TBA methodology. 
Given the more-detailed schemas of SSA auditors as they pertain to gathering client-
environmental facts, SSA auditors’ recall of these facts could be greater than TBA 
auditors’ recall. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 H1b: SSA auditors recall a greater quantity of client-environmental facts than 
TBA auditors.20 
Experience-related differences in knowledge of client-environmental facts 
 The number and types of client-environmental facts known by auditors may differ 
between expert and novice auditors. Bonner and Pennington (1991) report data that 
indicate 3.5 years of experience are required to gain an adequate understanding of a 
client’s business.21 The knowledge of an auditing student or a novice auditor is gained 
primarily from textbook-based university education and professional training sessions, 
with novice auditors having some practical audit experience as well. Thus, with little or 
no task-specific experience gathering client-environmental facts, the novice auditor’s 
                                                 
20 The null of this hypothesis is: SSA auditors recall the same quantity of client-environmental facts as 
TBA auditors or SSA auditors recall a lower quantity of client-environmental facts than TBA auditors. 
21 At the time of Bonner and Pennington’s (1991) study only the TBA was in use in practice. Thus, this 3.5-
year experience requirement refers only to TBA auditors. The SSA auditor’s length of time required to gain 
an adequate understanding of the client’s business may differ from this figure. 
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knowledge of these facts may be low. 
The auditor’s development of client business knowledge will be a function of 
audit experiences, discussion of audits with colleagues, supervision and review of work 
by superiors, additional firm training, and the use of audit plans and audit guides. 
Advanced-level tasks such as the actual collection and assimilation of client business 
knowledge, the use of this knowledge in designing audit plans, and the review and 
supervision of subordinates are likely to reinforce and enhance client business 
knowledge. 
 Research in a variety of domains has demonstrated that a person with more 
experience in a substantive area has more knowledge stored in memory (e.g., Chase and 
Simon (1973) in chess; Chi et al. (1981) in physics). In auditing, researchers have found 
that more-experienced auditors possess a greater quantity of financial-statement error 
knowledge (Libby and Frederick 1990; Tubbs 1992), internal-control knowledge (Weber 
1980), and factors affecting going-concern judgments (Choo and Trotman 1991) than 
less-experienced auditors. In general, auditing knowledge increases commensurately with 
task-specific experience (Libby and Luft 1993; Libby 1995). Hence, more-expert auditors 
may have richer, more complex knowledge-acquisition schemas than novice auditors. As 
already noted, richer schemas tend to allow better retrieval of information from memory. 
Given the more-detailed schemas of experts, their recall of facts could be greater than 
novices’ recall. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2:  Expert auditors recall a greater quantity of client-environmental facts than 
novice auditors. 
 Panel A of Figure 5 presents a graphical representation of H1a through H2, 
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wherein audit methodology is predicted to have either no effect (H1a) or a significant 
effect (H1b), and audit experience is predicted to have an increasing effect (H2) on the 
quantity of client-environmental facts known by auditors. 
Interrelationships and interactions of client-environmental facts 
 Once the auditor has gathered the client-environmental facts deemed significant to 
a particular audit, she must then analyze the interrelationships and interactions (hereafter 
referred to collectively as relations) among these facts to further her understanding of the 
client’s business. For example, when auditing a Canadian company with a significant 
number of American customers, the auditor may analyze how exchange-rate trends and 
trade-pact changes will affect the client’s future sales to these customers. An auditor 
whose client manufactures automobiles may consider how interest-rate changes will 
affect sales and whether impending environmental regulations will force changes in car 
design, which in turn would affect research and development practices and production 
engineering. As these illustrations suggest, the facts involved in these relations are not 
necessarily confined to one subcategory of environmental facts, but rather may be drawn 
from several different categories. The causal nature of these intra- and inter-category 
relations suggests that schematic organizations are used to form the auditor’s mental 
representation of the interrelationships and interactions of client-environmental facts 
(Waller and Felix 1984). 
Methodology-related differences in mental representations of relations 
 The complexity of relations known by auditors may differ between 
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methodologies.22 Specifically, the SSA auditor may possess more complex relational 
knowledge than the TBA auditor. This difference is expected because the SSA auditor 
generally considers far more relations than the TBA auditor, using formal techniques 
such as PEST Analysis and Porter’s Five Forces Analysis to aid his examination of the 
complexities of the modern business environment (Thompson and Strickland 2001). 
Indeed, proponents of the SSA argue that its greatest advantage over the TBA is how it 
organizes and analyzes client-environmental facts, with the end result being a rich, highly 
developed client model which forms part of a chain of substantive audit evidence (Bell et 
al. 1997; Salterio and Weirich 2002). Figure 3 presents a partial graphical representation 
of the complex web of relations that is analyzed by the SSA auditor. This is not to 
suggest that the TBA auditor does not examine relations between and among client-
environmental facts, merely that fewer of them are analyzed and that the analyses lack 
the depth and complexity of those performed by the SSA auditor.  
As Alba and Hasher (1983) noted, through experience people acquire memory 
schemas for various tasks and activities. These schemas can contain any number of 
concepts, with few or many links among them, and some schemas can be embedded 
within others. In general, the complexity of a particular schema is determined by the 
complexity of the related task or activity that has been repeatedly experienced (Alba and 
Hasher 1983; Libby and Luft 1993). Because the TBA auditor’s analysis of the 
interrelationships among client-environmental facts may be less-complex than the SSA 
                                                 
22 Pratt (1982) notes that the number of elements in a cognitive structure does not always determine its 
complexity. Therefore, in this study, the complexity of relational knowledge is considered to be a function 
of both the number of client-environmental facts and the number of interrelationships among these facts. 
Thus, it is possible for two individuals to know the same quantity of facts while at the same time possessing 
relational knowledge of differing complexity, with one individual knowing more interrelationships among 
these facts than the other. 
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auditor’s analysis of facts, the TBA auditor may develop a relatively impoverished web 
of relations compared to the SSA auditor’s web portrayed in Figure 3.  
 To illustrate the depth and complexity of the SSA auditor’s analyses, Figure 1 
presents a series of panels that outline how he might view the external forces and agents 
acting upon a retail client’s operations. Panel A presents what the SSA auditor calls an 
entity-level business model (ELBM). The ELBM is a categorical representation of 
significant client-environmental facts, which in content—but not in organization—is not 
substantively different from the TBA auditor’s collection of client business knowledge. 
The SSA auditor proceeds, however, to organize and analyze the facts within these 
categories in greater detail to bring out the interactions and interrelationships among 
them. For example, the macroenvironmental forces and external agents contained within 
the top box of the ELBM can be viewed spatially in the context of a strategic business 
risk framework. Panel B of Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of how these 
forces and agents bear down upon the facts contained within the lower categories of the 
ELBM. Panels C and D further decompose the strategic business risk framework into two 
constituent analyses: the PEST analysis, which analyzes the political, economic, social, 
and technological factors affecting the client; and the Five Forces analysis, which 
examines the relations among the client and its suppliers, customers, competitors, new 
market entrants, and potential product substitutes. Upon completing these analyses, the 
SSA auditor has a relation-rich, holistic representation of his client at the center of a 
complex web of external factors and agents. Similarly detailed analyses of the significant 
internal client factors, such as its critical business processes and related controls, are then 
conducted so that the core of the web is as well understood as the surrounding 
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environment.  
Thus, it is argued here that the task of analyzing relations between and among 
client-environmental facts greatly differs between methodologies. Relative to the SSA 
auditor, the TBA auditor lacks task-specific experience related to analyzing these 
relations with the level of depth required by the SSA methodology. In particular, the 
complexity of relations analyzed is greater in the SSA than the TBA. Research in 
auditing has shown that task-specific experience directly determines auditing knowledge 
(Libby and Luft 1993; Libby 1995), so differences in task-specific experience lead to 
differences in related knowledge. Hence, given the specified differences in the task-
specific experiences of SSA and TBA auditors as they pertain to analyzing relations 
among client-environmental facts, the SSA auditor’s knowledge of these relations may be 
more complex than the TBA auditor’s knowledge, controlling for any differences in 
factual knowledge predicted in Hypothesis 1b. This leads to the following hypothesis:   
H3: Controlling for differences in factual knowledge, SSA auditors possess 
more-complex relational knowledge than TBA auditors. 
Experience-related differences in mental representations of relations 
 The complexity of relations known by auditors may differ between relatively 
more-expert and novice auditors. Consistent with the arguments put forth above in 
respect of expert-novice differences in knowledge of client-environmental facts, the 
novice auditor has little or no task-specific experience analyzing the relations among 
client-environmental facts, so her knowledge of these relations may be lower and less 
complex than the expert’s knowledge of relations. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H4a:  Controlling for differences in factual knowledge, expert auditors possess 
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more-complex relational knowledge than novice auditors. 
 It is also expected that audit methodology will moderate this effect of experience 
on relational knowledge. Specifically, it is expected that the predicted expert-novice 
difference in relational knowledge will be greater for SSA auditors than for TBA 
auditors. As detailed in the preceding subsection, the task of analyzing client-
environmental relations is more complex in the SSA than in the TBA. Bonner (1994) 
suggests that complex audit tasks tend to increase the quantity or decrease the clarity of 
information that must be considered in the input, processing, and output phases of the 
task, thus increasing the demands made on the auditor’s cognitive capacity. Prawitt 
(1995) found that increased task complexity resulted in the assignment of more-
experienced auditors to complete these tasks. Based on these findings, it is argued here 
that, on average, more experience is required to properly analyze many of the relations of 
interest to the SSA auditor—particularly the more-complex relations—than is necessary 
to analyze the relatively simpler relations of interest to the TBA auditor. Hence, in the 
SSA a significant proportion of the relation-analysis task must be performed by experts 
rather than novices, whereas in the TBA a comparatively larger proportion of the 
relation-analysis task may be performed by novices. 
Therefore, within the SSA methodology the expert-novice difference in task-
specific experience may be greater than it is in the TBA methodology. Research has 
shown that differences in task-specific experience lead to differences in related 
knowledge (Libby and Luft 1993; Libby 1995). So, the specified methodology-related 
expert-novice differences in task-specific experience are expected to result in a greater 
expert-novice difference in relational knowledge for SSA auditors when compared with 
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the expert-novice knowledge difference for TBA auditors. Therefore, as an auditor gains 
experience, his knowledge of relations may increase in complexity, with this increase 
being more pronounced for the SSA auditor than for the TBA auditor. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
H4b:  Controlling for differences in factual knowledge, the expert-novice 
difference in relational-knowledge complexity will be larger for SSA 
auditors than for TBA auditors. 
 Panel B of Figure 4 presents a graphical representation of H3 and H4, wherein 
both the SSA methodology (H3) and audit experience (H4a) are predicted to result in a 
greater complexity of relational knowledge, with these two factors interacting to result in 
greater experience-related differences in relational knowledge for SSA auditors than for 
TBA auditors (H4b). 
Summary of knowledge-content-and-organization hypotheses 
 Considered together, these hypotheses make several predictions about auditors’ 
mental representations of client business knowledge. This knowledge comprises internal 
and external client-environmental facts as well as the relations between and among these 
facts (Waller and Felix 1984; Bonner and Pennington 1991). Consistent with prior 
theoretical research in auditing (Gibbins 1984; Waller and Felix 1984; Libby and Luft 
1993), it is expected that this knowledge is organized in long-term memory by means of 
categories and schemas and that the complexity of these structures varies with task-
specific experience. In particular, consistent with prior empirical research in auditing 
(e.g., Weber 1980; Libby and Frederick 1990; Choo and Trotman 1991; Frederick 1991; 
Tubbs 1992), both audit methodology (i.e., SSA or TBA) and audit experience are 
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expected to influence the quantity and complexity of the facts and relations known by 
auditors. 
 More precisely, SSA auditors and TBA auditors may know the same number of 
client-environmental facts because in principle the quantities and types of facts gathered 
does not vary by methodology. Alternatively, a review of leading auditing textbooks and 
Big 4 audit manuals suggests that in practice SSA auditors may routinely collect 
significantly more client facts from a broader array of categories than TBA auditors, thus 
leading to the expectation that SSA auditors know a greater quantity of facts than TBA 
auditors. 
Controlling for any differences in factual knowledge, methodological differences 
may also lead to SSA auditors knowing more-complex relations among these facts. This 
difference is expected because the task of examining these relations requires a greater 
breadth and depth of analysis in the SSA than in the TBA (see Figure 1 for a series of 
panels illustrating some of these analyses). Thus—even after controlling for any factual 
knowledge differences—the SSA auditor may have a richer, more-complex mental 
representation of client business knowledge compared to the TBA auditor’s relatively 
impoverished mental representation of this knowledge. 
 In addition, novice auditors within each methodology may know fewer client-
environmental facts and less-complex relations among these facts than their expert 
counterparts. Expert auditors in both methodologies have extensive experience gathering 
and analyzing client business knowledge, whereas novices have little experience beyond 
collecting these facts. Because more task-specific experience leads to greater related 
knowledge (Libby and Luft 1993), expert auditors are expected to possess a greater 
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quantity of more-complex client business knowledge compared to novices. Thus, 
compared to the highly populated and richer, more-complex mental representation of the 
expert auditor, the novice auditor is predicted to have a very impoverished mental 
representation of client business knowledge. Moreover, the expert-novice contrast in 
mental representations may be greater for SSA auditors than for TBA auditors because 
the task of analyzing client business knowledge is more complex in the SSA 
methodology than in the TBA methodology, thus requiring more-experienced auditors to 
perform a greater proportion of the analysis task in the SSA compared to the TBA. 
The Effect of Knowledge Complexity on Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment 
 Risk assessment is perhaps the most important task for an auditor because it 
affects the nature, extent, and timing of evidence accumulation (Arens et al. 2000). 
Indeed, in their analysis of financial-statement errors, Houghton and Fogarty (1991) 
concluded that inherent risk assessment is significantly important in judging the relative 
risk of errors. The auditor can do very little to influence a client’s risks, so he must 
identify the factors that determine these risks, assess their severity (e.g., low, medium, or 
high risk), and then modify evidence accumulation accordingly. 
 According to Arens et al. (2000), the auditor should consider several major factors 
when assessing risk, among them being (1) the nature of the client’s business, including 
its products and services; (2) management integrity; (3) client motivations; (4) related 
parties; and (5) nonroutine transactions. Empirically, Houghton and Fogarty (1991) found 
that auditors with a good understanding of their client’s business can make good risk 
assessments with relative ease. They also noted that a knowledge of the client’s industry 
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characteristics and non-routine transactions were useful in identifying risk factors. In 
developing a knowledge-based model to assist with risk assessment, Peters et al. (Peters, 
Lewis, and Dhar 1989) noted that auditors incorporate knowledge about changes in the 
client and the client’s industry, management’s motivations, and prior operating history 
into their assessment of risk. Thus, in general, knowledge of the client’s business is 
essential to thorough risk identification and assessment. 
Knowledge-related performance differences 
 Risk assessment may differ according to the complexity of auditors’ relational 
knowledge of the client’s business. As argued in detail above, audit experience and 
methodology may interact to affect the development of auditor’s relational knowledge, 
resulting in some auditors possessing more complex mental representations of client 
business knowledge than others. In general, greater quantities of better organized 
knowledge lead to superior judgment performance (Libby and Luft 1993). For example, 
Curtis and Viator (2000) found a significant effect of experience on auditor’s internal 
control knowledge structures, with the dimensions of these structures in turn having a 
significant effect on control weakness and error identification. They also found no 
significant relation between experience and weakness/error identification, suggesting that 
knowledge structures mediate the experience-judgment relationship, as specified in the 
Libby and Luft model. Kopp and O’Donnell (2005) have recently found that better 
category knowledge of a client’s internal controls leads to improved risk assessments. 
Other research (e.g., Tubbs 1992; Libby and Tan 1994; Nelson et al. 1995; Choo 1996) 
has also found significant effects of knowledge structures on judgment performance. 
Thus, given the previously stated importance of client business knowledge to risk 
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assessment and the theoretical relation between knowledge and judgment performance, it 
follows that auditors with more complex relational knowledge of the client’s business 
may make different risk assessments than those auditors with less complex relational 
knowledge. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H5:  Auditors with more-complex relational knowledge will make different risk 
assessments than auditors with less-complex relational knowledge. 
 The theoretical model underlying this and the study’s other hypotheses is 
displayed in Figure 6. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter developed the hypotheses related to this dissertation’s research 
questions, relying on a synthesis of the literature reviewed in Chapter 1. Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b are competing hypotheses, proposing that SSA and TBA auditors will either recall 
equivalent numbers of client-environmental facts or that SSA auditors will recall more 
facts than TBA auditors. Hypothesis 2 proposes that expert auditors will recall more facts 
than novice auditors, and is essentially a replication of earlier findings from the auditing 
literature. Hypothesis 3 predicts that SSA auditors will possess more-complex knowledge 
of the relations among client-environmental facts than TBA auditors. Hypothesis 4 
predicts that expert auditors will possess more-complex knowledge of the relations 
among client-environmental facts than novices and that this difference will be greater for 
SSA auditors than for TBA auditors. Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicts that auditors with 
more-complex relational knowledge will make different risk assessments than auditors 
with less-complex relational knowledge. The next chapter details the research design that 
will be used to test these hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHOD 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the research design that was used to test the study’s hypotheses, 
which were detailed in the preceding chapter. First, the participants recruited to take part 
in the study are discussed. Next, the tasks these participants were asked to perform are 
detailed, with particular attention paid to the construction of the tasks. Then, the study’s 
administration and specific procedures are described. Finally, the measures generated by 
the participants and used as dependent variables for hypothesis testing are detailed, with a 
focus on how the participant-generated data were coded.  
Participants 
Methodology 
 One of this study’s main objectives is to examine the effects of differences 
between audit methodologies on auditors’ knowledge content and structure. Simply 
manipulating audit methodology in a laboratory setting would not be sufficient to 
determine how years of experience using one methodology affects knowledge and 
ultimately judgment. Four recent studies (Kotchetova 2002; O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell 
and Schultz 2003; Kopp and O'Donnell 2005) have examined the effects of SSA vs. TBA 
methodology differences on knowledge or judgment by manipulating methodology in the 
laboratory. It is important to note, however, that methodology affects judgment by 
interacting with actual experience using such a methodology, as well as the knowledge 
gained from this experience (Libby and Luft 1993). These studies focused only on the 
direct, short-term effects of methodology on knowledge or judgment. Thus, it is difficult 
to draw firm conclusions about their results because important factors from the 
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underlying theoretical model were intentionally omitted from the experimental designs.  
So, to examine the effects of methodology on knowledge and judgment in this 
study, auditors with actual audit experience applying one of three different audit 
methodologies were required. Because the methodology variable in this study is 
measured instead of manipulated, it was not possible to randomly assign participants to 
conditions. Random assignment achieves comparability among experimental conditions 
by probabilistically counterbalancing idiosyncrasies across groups so that the “average” 
participant within each condition is substantively equivalent except for the experimental 
manipulations of interest in the study (Cook and Campbell 1979). Thus, randomization 
facilitates strong causal inferences related to the effects of the manipulated variables on 
experimental outcomes. Hence, by not using randomization in this study, the internal 
validity of its results is reduced. Cook and Campbell (1979), however, advise that it is 
reasonable to sacrifice some internal validity if construct validity is thereby strengthened.  
In this study, construct validity is enhanced because the threat of “construct 
underrepresentation” is largely avoided by treating methodology as a measured variable 
instead of a manipulated variable. Construct underrepresentation occurs when a 
researcher fails to include all the relevant dimensions in the construct (Cook and 
Campbell 1979). In this study, audit methodology is defined as the policies, procedures, 
and tools used by an audit firm to carry out financial statement audits. Further, it is 
hypothesized that it is an auditor’s actual experience using this methodology that, over 
time, leads to the development of schemas to organize and store knowledge of the client’s 
business. Given participants’ time constraints, manipulating methodology in a lab setting 
would require exposing participants over a very short period of time to only a very small 
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subset of the policies, procedures, and tools used in a particular methodology. Instead, by 
allowing participants to perform the study’s tasks while relying on their years of 
experience with all aspects of their firm’s methodology, a more thorough representation 
of the methodology construct is attained.  
Moreover, randomly assigning auditors to methodology conditions would result in 
auditors with experience using one methodology being assigned to a condition where 
they are asked to apply a different methodology, which could lead to these auditors using 
a methodology in the lab that they were not used to in practice. This could cause 
participant confusion, thereby clouding the study’s results.  
Finally, in two studies that examined the effects of structured versus unstructured 
audit methodologies on auditors’ task perception and judgment, Bamber and his 
colleagues (Bamber and Snowball 1988; Bamber, Snowball, and Tubbs 1989) used 
auditors from firms that actually used one of these two methodologies to operationalize 
the methodology construct.  
For these reasons, the auditors in this study were categorized into one of three 
methodology conditions, which were defined based on the extent to which their firm 
incorporated SSA techniques into its audit approach. The SSA condition includes any 
firm that uses a comprehensive version of the SSA approach similar to that described by 
Bell et al. (1997) in their original SSA monograph. Such an approach would include 
thorough analyses of a client’s business strategy, key business processes, and key 
performance indicators, which are analyses that are critical to the implementation of the 
SSA and would thus be performed on the vast majority of audit engagements conducted 
by a firm employing such an approach. In contrast, the TBA condition includes firms that 
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focus their audit attention on the accounts and transactions underlying a client’s financial 
statements and place little emphasis on analyzing a client’s strategy, business processes, 
or performance indicators (i.e., the critical components of the SSA approach), and which 
would therefore perform these types of analyses relatively infrequently compared to SSA 
firms. The SSA-TBA condition includes firms that use a hybrid of the two approaches, 
which would consist primarily of an analysis of a client’s business strategy (as in the 
SSA) combined with standard procedures from a TBA approach, with less emphasis on 
key business processes and key performance indicators. Information on the approaches 
employed by firms supplying participants for this study was obtained from discussions 
with partners and employees of the firms, firm training resources, a full-time faculty 
member at the author’s institution who was familiar with firms’ audit approaches, and 
published sources. Based on the preceding classification scheme and the methodology-
related information reviewed, of the six firms that provided participants for this study, 
one was an SSA firm, two were SSA-TBA firms, and three were TBA firms. 
Experience 
 This study also examines how audit experience affects the development of 
auditors’ client business knowledge. Thus, to investigate the related research questions, it 
was necessary to have auditors with varying amounts of audit experience complete the 
study. According to Abdolmohammadi’s (1999) taxonomy of audit tasks, of the 45 tasks 
usually performed in an audit’s orientation (or planning) phase, 31 tend to be performed 
by seniors (two to five years’ experience), with four performed by staff auditors (one to 
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two years’ experience) and 10 by managers (five to 12 years’ experience).23 Based on 
these findings, auditors with three years of experience would have a reasonable 
background performing the vast majority of planning-related audit tasks, whereas 
auditors with less than one year of assurance experience would have less background 
overall and less exposure to the broad range of planning tasks. Therefore, the participants 
recruited as the experienced auditors for this study were those with roughly three years of 
assurance experience, whereas the less-experienced participants were accounting students 
with less than one year of assurance experience. Past studies of auditor expertise (e.g., 
Libby and Frederick 1990; Frederick 1991; Frederick et al. 1994) have tended to have 
three-to-four year spreads between their experienced and inexperienced auditors. So, with 
a spread of less than three years, the experience gap between participants in this study is 
not quite as large as those of prior studies. As noted above, however, auditors with levels 
of experience similar to those of the students in this study perform only four of the 45 
audit planning tasks in Abdolmohammadi’s (1999) taxonomy, compared to the 31 tasks 
typically performed by auditors with the experience of those in this study. Thus, there 
should be a significant enough difference in the amounts of task-specific experience held 




 Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 were tested using a variation of the memory-recall 
                                                 
23 Abdolmohammadi’s (1999) definition of orientation phase comprises three subphases: understanding the 
client’s business, engagement risk assessment, and inherent risk assessment, which are also the three 
subphases of interest in this dissertation. For this reason, the experience levels related to the particular tasks 
within these subphases were useful in guiding the expert-novice participant selection in this study. 
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paradigm first used to study knowledge structures by Bousfield (1953), and later 
employed by many accounting researchers to investigate auditors’ knowledge content and 
organization (e.g., Weber 1980; Libby and Frederick 1990; Frederick 1991; Tubbs 1992; 
Christ 1993; Solomon et al. 1999; Thibodeau 2003). This paradigm involves presenting 
participants with a stimulus list containing items from the knowledge domain of interest, 
letting them study the list for a pre-determined amount of time knowing they will be 
asked to recall the items later, and then finally having them recall from memory as many 
of the items as possible after performing a short distracter task to clear their short-term 
memory. 
 Although free recall is not one of the usual tasks of an auditor, it is a good 
experimental tool for eliciting the structures built up through experience (Craik and 
Lockhart 1972). For example, participants recall randomly presented categorized lists by 
category. This is not because they are accustomed to having to recall the items together, 
but rather, because they have organized the items together over time (Adelson 1981). In 
addition, Reitman and Rueter (1980) suggest that, given an unusual task, participants will 
very likely resort to using the structures and processing categories that they use most 
frequently. Given these findings and the extensive use of recall-based studies in 
accounting, it was believed that a recall task would be both useful and valid in the present 
study. 
 With the permission of one of the case’s authors, the stimulus list for the recall 
task was adapted from the Virtual Control Corporation (VCC) SSA case by Wright et al. 
(Wright, Wright, and Gordon 2001). The case is based on a real company that 
manufactures computer joysticks. Thibodeau (2003) notes that most auditing and 
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accounting textbooks feature examples from the manufacturing industry, so all auditors 
are expected to have a basic level of manufacturing industry knowledge from their 
university education. Thus, the manufacturing industry provides a familiar context for the 
participants. To accommodate participants’ limits on their time available to take part in 
the study, a subset of 60 pieces of information were selected from the 17-page VCC case.  
To ensure that the 60 pieces of information chosen for the tasks were relevant to 
gaining an understanding of the client’s business, 21 senior managers  from three of the 
firms (12 from an SSA-TBA firm, four from an SSA firm, and five from a TBA firm) 
providing auditors for the main experiment rated the importance of each piece of 
information.24 The senior managers had mean auditing experience of 10 years (s.d. = 
2.34). They were asked to consider each piece of information’s “importance within the 
context of gaining an understanding of a manufacturing client’s business.” Each piece of 
information was rated on a seven-point scale ranging from –3 (labelled Very 
Unimportant) to +3 (labelled Very Important), with the midpoint of 0 labelled Neutral. 
The mean ratings of the 60 pieces of information ranged from -0.64 to 2.73, with an 
overall mean importance rating of 1.29 (s.d. = 0.77). Only the lowest-rated piece of 
information (rating of –0.64, s.d. = 1.36) was significantly less than the Neutral midpoint 
of the Importance scale (p = 0.04), which indicates that only one out of 60 pieces of 
information could be construed as “unimportant”. Of the remaining 59 pieces of 
information, 10 were rated as statistically equivalent to the Neutral midpoint (p > 0.05) 
and 49 were rated on the “important” half of the scale (i.e., significantly greater than the 
                                                 
24 All of the senior managers who participated in this study completed their assigned tasks within a survey-
style Excel file which was emailed to them, completed entirely in electronic form, and then returned to the 
researcher via email. The unequal number of senior managers across methodologies occurred due to 
difficulties encountered recruiting participants for this task.  
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Neutral midpoint; p < 0.05). Thus, only 2% of the pieces of information were rated as 
relatively unimportant while 82% were rated between important and very important, with 
the remaining 16% receiving a neutral rating. These ratings indicate that the vast majority 
of the 60 pieces of information were relevant to the task of gaining an understanding of 
the client’s business. Table 3 presents the 60 pieces of information and their mean 
importance ratings. 
 To aid in ruling out serial-order effects on participants’ recall (Bower 2000), each 
participant received the list of client information presented in one of two random orders 
and the first three and the last three pieces of information were held constant across these 
two random orders. The six pieces of information selected to begin or end the list were 
those receiving the lowest importance ratings by the senior managers. 
Also, to inhibit participants’ ability to use the surface features of the 60 pieces of 
information as an aid in recalling them, the repetition of key words across pieces of 
information was minimized. For example, instead of repeatedly using the word 
“competitors” or variants of it, the words “other manufacturers”, “opposition”, “other 
developers”, and “rivals” were also used in pieces of information that referred to the 
competition. By varying the syntax in this way, participants had to rely more on whatever 
pre-existing knowledge structures they had in long-term memory to help them mentally 
organize the pieces of information for later recall, rather then simply use common terms 
as memory aids.25 Finally, each of the 60 pieces of information was stated in 10 words or 
                                                 
25 The use of common wording across pieces of information would allow participants to chunk pieces 
together in memory based on the common words, thereby aiding their recall of the information (Chase and 
Simon 1973) even if they lack an existing schema to help them organize the information in memory. 
Common wording would be particularly helpful to novice participants, who tend to use surface features to 
store knowledge (Chi et al. 1981). Therefore, this design feature permits a clean test of Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 
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less (mean = 8.5; SD = 1.3) to facilitate participants’ ability to hold one entire piece of 
information in short-term memory (Miller 1956) while either studying or recalling the 
pieces of information. 
The recall task was pretested using 73 Masters of Accounting students. The 
pretesting was done primarily to ensure that the task’s instructions were clear, that the 
task itself was understandable, and that the data generated would be useful for testing the 
related hypotheses. No significant problems were found in any of these areas. Minor 
modifications to the task were made where necessary. 
Risk-assessment task 
  To test Hypothesis 5, which pertains to the effect of knowledge complexity on 
risk judgments, a risk-assessment task employing the same 60 pieces of information as 
the recall task was used. This task required participants to study the list of client 
information and then assess the level of various risks associated with the fictional audit 
engagement. This task was modelled on past auditor judgment studies (e.g., Colbert 
1988; Messier and Austen 2000) that examined differences in auditors’ risk judgments. 
Thus, the data generated by this study’s risk assessment task should be suitable for 
identifying differences among auditors’ risk judgments (i.e., Hypothesis 5). 
  The risk-assessment task was constructed as follows. The same 21 senior 
managers who rated the importance of the 60 pieces of information were also asked to 
analyze the information and then identify any audit risks they felt were relevant to the 
audit of VCC (i.e., all risks were self-generated). From the full set of risks identified, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and 2 because participants had to rely on their existing schemas (i.e., the memory structures hypothesized 
to affect participants’ recall) rather than common words (i.e., a factor of no interest in this study) to help 
them organize and recall the information.  
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seven were selected for use in the risk-assessment task. To ensure that the risks selected 
for the task were highly relevant to the fictional audit and were representative of risks 
identified by senior managers from at least two of the three methodology conditions, the 
following selection criteria were used. Three of the risks selected were identified by a 
majority of both the SSA and SSA-TBA senior managers. Two of the risks selected were 
identified by a majority of the SSA-TBA senior managers, but by 50% or fewer of the 
SSA senior managers. The remaining two risks selected were identified by a majority of 
the SSA senior managers, but by 50% or fewer of the SSA-TBA senior managers.26 
Participants were also asked to make an assessment of the overall risk of material 
misstatement for the fictional engagement. Table 4 presents the seven specific risks, 
along with the proportion of SSA and SSA-TBA senior managers who identified each as 
a risk, and the one general risk used in the risk-assessment task. 
To help test for order effects, the seven specific risk factors were presented to 
participants in one of two orders. One order had the two SSA-relevant risks first, 
followed by the three common risks, then by the two SSA-TBA risks (Table 4 presents 
the risks in the sequence used for this order). The second order simply reversed this 
sequence. These two risk orders were fully crossed with the two orders used for the client 
information. The general risk was presented immediately after the seven specific risk 
factors for all participants so that they could use their assessments of the specific risks as 
inputs in their overall risk assessment. 
                                                 
26 At the time the risk task was designed, it was thought that participants recruited for the main study would 
not be drawn from the TBA firm that supplied senior managers to help identify risk factors, so risks 
identified by these senior managers were not factored into the construction of the risk task. Only after the 
SSA participants completed the main study was it decided that participants from the TBA firm would be 
asked to take part in the study. At this point, obviously, the instrument could not be changed. 
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Risk-justification task  
 To examine Hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b, which involve the effects of methodology 
and experience on auditors’ knowledge complexity, this study employed a risk-
justification task similar to that used by Choo (1996) to investigate the complexity of 
auditors’ cognitive scripts. Choo had his participants write a memo justifying the going-
concern judgment they had just made and he then analyzed the contents of the memos to 
assess each participant’s knowledge complexity. The present study uses a task that 
simply requires the participants to write a memo justifying the risk assessments they just 
made. Because this task is based on a prior audit judgment study examining a similar 
knowledge construct and because practising auditors typically document the basis for 
their judgments in justification memos, this task seems suitable for testing Hypotheses 3, 
4a and 4b.  
Again following Choo (1996), participants performed the risk-justification task 
immediately after the risk-assessment task. Choo conducted a second experiment to 
determine if having auditors prepare the justification memo before making their going-
concern judgments had any effect on the content of the memos. He found no significant 
differences in content across task orders. Thus, it seemed reasonable to use only the 
assessment-then-memo order in the present study. 
Both the risk-assessment and the risk-justification tasks were pretested using 11 
Masters of Accounting students. The pretesting was done primarily to ensure that the 
task’s instructions were clear, that the task itself was understandable, and that the data 
generated would be useful for testing the related hypotheses. No significant problems 




 All participants completed the study in the presence of the researcher, except for 
one group of SSA auditors, who completed it in the presence of the researcher’s PhD 
supervisor. Two groups of participants completed the experiment during a firm training 
session, with the remaining participants completing it in group sessions at their respective 
firm’s office or in university classrooms. The participants were given a packet of three 
envelopes containing the task materials. The materials included an introduction, general 
instructions, the tasks to be completed, and a demographic questionnaire. The 
introduction informed participants that the study was part of a project aimed at examining 
how auditors gain an understanding of a client’s business. The confidentiality of 
responses and the importance of independent work were stressed. The demographic 
questionnaire requested information about the participant’s amount and type of audit 
experience, their firm’s audit methodology, and their reaction to the study. Further details 




 After signing the participant consent form, participants removed the recall task 
from the first envelope. The task proceeded as follows. All the participants first read the 
brief introduction and some general instructions, which informed them of the study’s 
purpose and stressed the confidentiality of their responses and the need for independent 
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work.27 They were then informed that they would be presented with a set of 60 pieces of 
information about XTC Inc., a new manufacturing audit client, and would later be asked 
to recall these pieces of information from memory.28 They were asked not to turn the 
page to begin reading the pieces of information until they were verbally told to do so. 
They were also asked not to make any written notes concerning the pieces of information 
they were about to read. When told to by the task administrator, all the participants then 
turned the booklet to the three pages where the 60 pieces of information were listed and 
studied the listing for 10 minutes.29 At the end of the 10-minute study period, the 
administrator told the participants to immediately stop studying the information. The 
participants then placed the listing back in the first envelope and sealed it to prevent them 
from reviewing it during the recall phase.  
Participants then removed the next two parts of the recall task from the second 
envelope. Before beginning to recall the information, participants first answered three 
multiple-choice accounting questions to clear their short-term memory.30 Participants 
then placed the questions back in the envelope and proceeded to read the instructions for 
the recall portion of the task. The instructions stated that the participants were to recall 
the pieces of information “in the order in which they come to mind” and that key-word 
                                                 
27 Unless otherwise noted, all of the instructions described in the Task Procedures section were written 
instructions contained within the body of the study materials. 
28 The client’s name was changed from VCC, which was itself a fictional name, to XTC Inc. for the 
purposes of the instrument. 
29 Ten minutes allowed participants to read and study each of the 60 facts for 10 seconds, an amount of 
time that is consistent with prior recall studies in accounting (e.g., Frederick 1991, who allowed nine 
seconds per item). 
30 The knowledge questions served as a distracter task in order to clear participants’ short-term memory and 
minimize primacy and recency effects on recall. None of the three questions dealt with issues that were 
pertinent to the client in the experiment. In particular, the questions dealt with why auditors gather 
evidence, how to account for dividends, and which party is responsible for proper financial statement 
disclosure. 
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rather than verbatim descriptions of the pieces of information were acceptable as long as 
enough information was provided to make it clear which piece of information was being 
recalled. Participants were also asked not to revise the pieces of information once they 
had written them down. Three lined sheets were provided to them for their responses and 
they were asked to list only one piece of information per line. Participants were allowed 
to proceed through the task at their own pace, with no limit placed on how long they 
could spend recalling the pieces of information. To track how much time each participant 
spent recalling the pieces of information, participants were asked to write down the time 
immediately before and after completing the recall task. When they finished the recall 
task, they placed their recall lists back in the second envelope and sealed it. They then 
proceeded with the risk-assessment and risk-justification tasks in the third envelope. 
Risk-assessment task 
 The risk assessment task proceeded as follows. Participants were told they would 
again be given the pieces of information pertaining to XTC so that they could review 
them and then assess the level of various risk factors that may be relevant to the audit of 
XTC.31 They were also informed that after making the risk assessments, they would be 
asked to write a memo to the engagement partner, which provided the rationale for their 
assessments. To invoke more effortful and complete processing of task information and 
judgments (Tetlock 1985; Tan and Kao 1999), participants were told to make their “risk 
assessments and prepare the related memo as if you were on an actual audit. For example, 
you should consider your judgment subject to review by the engagement partner.”32 The 
                                                 
31 For the risk task, the participants received the client facts in the same order as for the recall task. 
32 Admittedly, this is a weak form of accountability pressure, because participants were likely aware that no 
one but the author would be reviewing their memos. 
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participants were again allowed to complete these tasks at their own pace. They were 
asked to write down the time immediately before and after completing the risk-
assessment task. 
 Once they had reviewed and analyzed the client information, participants were 
told, “During the client-acceptance phase of the XTC Inc. engagement, several risk 
factors were identified based on the pieces of client information that had been gathered to 
date.” They were then asked to “assess the risk of material misstatement posed by each of 
these factors” based on their up-to-date knowledge of the client. After assessing each of 
the individual risk factors, they were also asked to “make an overall assessment of the 
risk of material misstatement on the XTC engagement.” 
Participants made their eight risk assessments (seven specific factors and one 
general assessment) on 100-point scales, with a scale presented immediately below each 
risk. The scales were anchored by 0 at the low end (labelled “Low Risk”) and 100 at the 
high end (labelled “High Risk”), with the midpoint of 50 labelled “Moderate Risk”. This 
scale format was adapted from Messier and Austen (2000), who used a very similar scale 
in their examination of auditors’ inherent and control risk assessments.33 
Once participants had made their risk assessments, they were asked to “prepare a 
memo to the engagement partner that provides the rationale for your risk assessments.” 
These instructions are consistent with Choo (1996), who used the same task in his 
examination of auditors’ going-concern judgments. Participants were provided with two 
lined pages to write their memo. Upon completing their memos, participants were asked 
to rate the case’s realism, the usefulness of the client information in making the risk 
                                                 
33 The only difference between the present study’s scales and those used by Messier and Austen is that they 
labelled the low end of the scale “Little Risk” instead of “Low Risk”. 
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assessments, the risk-assessment task’s similarity to how they would perform it in 
practice, and their firm’s use of decision aids to make risk assessments. When finished, 
participants placed the risk tasks in the third envelope and then completed a demographic 
questionnaire. 
Demographic questionnaire 
 The demographic questionnaire elicited information on: participants’ title, 
education, and professional training; their amount and types of audit experience, 
including the firms they have worked for; their experience with the specific tasks of 
gathering and analyzing client business knowledge; and their firm’s audit approach. Upon 
completing the questionnaire, participants placed it in the third envelope, sealed it, and 
returned the packet of three envelopes to the administrator.34 Participants were then 
debriefed on the purpose of the research and any questions were answered.  
Dependent Variables 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 
The dependent variable for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2 was the number of pieces of 
information correctly recalled by each participant. Consistent with Bonner, Davis, and 
Jackson (1992), this can be interpreted as a measure of the quantity of declarative 
knowledge regarding the case information that has been stored in long-term memory. 
Each participant’s recall protocol was coded to determine the number of pieces of 
information correctly recalled. Irrelevant intrusions and item repetitions were also coded 
                                                 
34 To keep the three envelopes for each participant together, they were wrapped in an elastic band before 
being returned to the administrator. The three envelopes for each participant were also labelled with a 
numerical code in case they were subsequently separated.  
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accordingly.35 Only recalled pieces of information that could be clearly matched to an 
originally presented piece of information were counted as “correct”. The coding was 
done by comparing each piece of information in a participant’s protocol to the 60 pieces 
of information from the stimulus list, which were numbered from one to 60 for coding 
purposes only. Each piece of information in the protocol that could be matched to one 
from the stimulus list was coded with the corresponding piece number and included in the 
total number of correctly recalled pieces of information. Intrusions were coded with an 
“X” and repeated pieces of information were simply coded with the corresponding piece 
number. Both were then excluded from the final total of correctly recalled pieces of 
information. 
Because coding the recall protocols involved some judgment, albeit minimal, it 
was possible for researcher bias to influence their coding. To permit detection of any 
bias, an auditing professor who is a CPA with significant auditing experience also coded 
a significant subset of the protocols independently from the author.36   
Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b 
 The testing of Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b required measures of the complexity of 
participants’ relational knowledge. The participants’ risk-justification memos provided 
                                                 
35 Irrelevant intrusions are facts that were not present in the stimulus list. For the purposes of this analysis, 
recalled facts that could not be clearly interpreted as relating to any of the initially presented facts were 
coded as intrusions. An item repetition is simply the recall of the same piece of information more than once 
in the same protocol. 
36 Extensive training of the independent coder was not necessary for the recall coding task, as little 
judgment was required in coding the protocols. The coder was given written instructions on the process to 
be followed and then practised coding on 20 memos. The coding of these memos was compared to the 
author’s to identify any common causes of discrepancies between the two sets of coding. The only common 
cause was the independent coder’s tendency to code as incorrect a recalled fact that did not resemble the 
verbatim wording of any original fact. As noted earlier, only the gist of a recalled fact had to be consistent 
with an original fact to be counted as correct; verbatim matches were not necessary. The independent coder 
incorporated this practice into his live coding of the protocols. 
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the raw data necessary for assessing this knowledge and causal mapping (Axelrod 1976) 
was used to analyze the data. Causal mapping involves analyzing the text of a document, 
looking specifically for statements containing cause-effect relationships. A simple 
example of this kind of statement is, “Stock options increase fraud risk”, wherein the 
cause concept is “stock options”, the effect concept is “fraud risk”, and the relationship 
between them is positive. Not all causal relationships are this basic, so a detailed coding 
manual by Wrightson (1976), which provides numerous cases and examples of more-
complex causal relationships, was used to assist in the coding process.  
For each participant, the result of this causal-mapping analysis is a list of all the 
cause-effect statements used in their risk-justification memo, which can be used to 
determine the participant’s knowledge comprehensiveness and density. Knowledge 
comprehensiveness is represented by the number of distinct cause or effect concepts 
appearing  in the participant’s memo. Knowledge density is determined by calculating the 
ratio of the number of distinct cause-effect statements (or relations) to the number of 
distinct cause and effect concepts (i.e., knowledge comprehensiveness). These two 
knowledge measures provide insight into the complexity of the participant’s mental 
representation of client business knowledge, with higher comprehensiveness and density 
scores indicating more-complex knowledge representations.37 These measures of 
knowledge complexity have been used in prior studies of mental representations (Carley 
and Palmquist 1992; Nadkarni 2003) and Nadkarni and Narayanan (2005) have recently 
shown that these constructs are valid measures of knowledge complexity. 
                                                 
37 The minimum possible density is 0.5, which indicates only one relation per distinct pair of concepts in a 
person’s knowledge representation. Thus, density scores approaching this ratio imply very low relational 
knowledge complexity. 
83 
To illustrate, Figure 7 contains a risk-justification memo drawn from pretest 
results and Table 5 presents the corresponding causal-mapping analysis of the content of 
this memo. This analysis revealed that the participant’s mental representation of client 
business knowledge contains 34 unique cause or effect concepts with 28 distinct causal 
relations among them, yielding knowledge comprehensiveness of 34 and knowledge 
density of 0.82. It is not difficult to visualize how much more complex this sample 
participant’s relational knowledge is compared to, say, a second participant who had only 
25 different concepts and 20 distinct relations in their mental representation. 
 The process of coding the memos was similar to that for conventional verbal 
protocol analysis (Ericsson and Simon 1984). As each memo was read, any cause-effect 
statements were cut and pasted into a coding table, with each distinct cause or effect 
concept labelled with a letter code.38 (See Table 5 for an example of how each memo was 
coded.) It is important to note that, under this approach and as in Choo (1996), the quality 
of the reasoning in each individual cause-effect statement was not evaluated; all cause-
effect statements in each memo were used to calculate the comprehensiveness and 
density scores, which served as the dependent variables for H3, H4a and H4b, and the 
independent variables for H5. To again permit detection of any researcher bias in coding, 
independent coding procedures were used to code roughly half of the memos. An 
accounting PhD student who is also a CA with auditing experience was trained to apply 
the coding method described above.39 
                                                 
38 The participants’ handwritten memos were transcribed into Microsoft Word to simplify the coding 
process. 
39 It is important to note that significantly more judgment is required in coding the memos compared to 
coding the protocols. Neither the author nor the other coder had any experience performing this kind of 
coding. To gain experience prior to conducting any live coding, both coders read the Wrightson (1976) 
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Hypothesis 5 
 To identify differences among participants’ risk judgments for the purpose of 
testing Hypothesis 5, their risk assessments made on the 100-point scales were used. 
Because there was no judgment involved in interpreting the participants’ ratings in this 
respect, no independent coding procedures were necessary. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the research design used to test the study’s hypotheses, 
with a focus on participant recruitment, task construction and administration, and the 
measures to be used as dependent variables. The next chapter presents the statistical 
analysis of the data generated by the participants. 
                                                                                                                                                 
manual in detail and then independently coded 10 memos from the pilot test of this study. Each pair of 
codings was then compared to identify discrepancies, inconsistencies with the Wrightson manual, and 
common causes of each of these types of problems. The coders then discussed these issues to clarify where 
each of them tended to err. Another 10 memos were then coded, and their discrepancies and inconsistencies 
were examined and discussed. At this point, both coders felt comfortable proceeding with the live coding.  
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CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents descriptive statistics regarding the participants in this study as well 
as statistical tests of this dissertation’s hypotheses and a variety of related analyses of the 
data generated by the participants. 
Participants 
In total, 118 participants completed the study. Eighty-eight of these participants 
were staff or senior auditors from a variety of Big 4 and other national and regional 
accounting firms. The other 30 participants were students from two Ontario universities, 
all of whom had some co-op work experience at a variety of accounting firms.  
Experience 
 For the purpose of testing the experience-related hypotheses in this study, 
participants were split into two groups with significantly different levels of assurance 
experience. Panel A of Table 6 presents details of the demographic characteristics of the 
study’s participants by these two experience levels. The 88 practising staff and senior 
auditors, who had eight to 93 months of assurance experience (mean = 33.8, s.d. = 17.2), 
were collapsed into a single group of more experienced auditors (referred to hereafter as 
“auditors”). The 30 undergraduate and Masters accounting students with assurance 
experience ranging from one to 20 months (mean = 7.9, s.d. = 5.1) served as the “audit 
student” comparison group. The 26-month difference in mean assurance experience 
between these auditors and audit students is significant (t = 12.58, p < 0.001). In addition, 
69% of the auditor participants had the title of senior auditor or equivalent, whereas only 
10% of the audit student participants had this title (2 = 31.72, p < 0.001), with the 
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remaining participants in each group holding the title of staff auditor.40 Of the 88 
auditors, 51 (or 58%) had an accounting designation (CA or CPA). Given their status, 
none of the audit students had yet acquired a professional designation. 
 The two groups also significantly differed on each of five more-specific 
experience measures (all p < 0.006): number of assurance engagements completed; 
number of engagements in which they gathered client business knowledge; number of 
engagements in which they analyzed client business knowledge; number of engagements 
in which they identified client risk factors; and, the number of engagements completed 
involving clients in the high-tech industry. The auditor and audit student groups did not 
differ in terms of the number of engagements performed for first-time clients of their 
particular firm (p = 0.339), hence specific experience on first-time audits (i.e., the context 
of the case instrument) does not drive the results. 
 Based on these significant differences in general and task-specific experience 
levels, which have been employed in prior research comparing auditor and audit student 
participants, these groups are appropriate for testing the experience-related hypotheses in 
this study.  
Methodology 
 For the purpose of testing the methodology-related hypotheses, only the 88 
auditors were used because only a few of the student participants had assurance 
experience with the firms from which the auditor participants were drawn, making it 
impossible to statistically compare auditors and audit students within each of the 
                                                 
40 Excluding the three auditing students who were seniors from the tests of H2, H4a, and H4b, which are 
the experience-related hypotheses in this study, resulted in the same pattern of results as reported below in 
the main tests of these hypotheses using the full sample of students. 
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methodology groups.41 Forty-five of the auditor participants worked for a Big 4 firm 
which employs an SSA approach, 23 worked for one of two Big 4 firms which employ a 
hybrid SSA-TBA approach, and the remaining 20 worked for one of three firms which 
employ a TBA approach.  
 Panel A of Table 7 presents the detailed demographic, and general and task-
specific experience levels of participants in each of the three auditor methodology 
groups. Twenty (44%) of the 45 SSA auditors were staff accountants, whereas one (4%) 
of 23 SSA-TBA auditors and six (30%) of 20 TBA auditors held that title, while the 
remaining participants in each group were senior or in-charge auditors. Twenty-three 
(51%) of the SSA auditors had an accounting designation (CA or CPA), whereas 14 
(61%) of the SSA-TBA auditors and 14 (70%) of the TBA auditors had a designation. 
There was also variation across the methodology groups in terms of the seven general and 
task-specific experience measures (see Panel A of Table 7 for details on these measures).  
 Chi-square tests were used to investigate cross-methodology differences in the 
proportions of participants who were staff/senior accountants and who had/didn’t have an 
accounting designation. For Title (i.e., staff vs. senior), the Chi-square of 11.51 was 
significant (p = 0.003), indicating a lower proportion of staff accountants in the SSA-
TBA group than in the other two groups. For Designation, the Chi-square of 2.14 was 
insignificant (p = 0.344), indicating no significant differences in the proportions of 
participants with a CA or CPA designation across groups. Of the 21 correlations (not 
tabulated) between the seven general and task-specific experience measures, 16 were 
                                                 
41 Of the 30 students, one worked for the SSA firm in this study,  nine worked for one of the two SSA-TBA 
firms, three worked for one of the three TBA firms, and 13 worked for a variety of other local or regional 
firms. 
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significant (all p < 0.028), with only the five correlations involving the number of high-
tech engagements performed being insignificant (all p > 0.070). Given this pattern of 
correlations, the six significantly correlated experience measures were examined in a one-
way MANOVA (not tabulated). The MANOVA showed a significant overall difference 
across methodologies (F = 42.79, p = 0.002). Individual follow-up ANOVAs on the six 
experience measures revealed significant differences in four of the six measures: the 
number of assurance engagements performed (F = 6.64, p = 0.002); the number of first-
time client assurance engagements performed (F = 4.09, p = 0.020); the number of 
engagements on which participants gathered client business knowledge (F = 5.05, p = 
0.008); and the number of engagements on which participants identified risks (F = 4.72, p 
= 0.012). There was also a significant difference in the number of high-tech engagements 
performed (2 = 40.11, p < 0.001).42 Given these six significant cross-methodology 
differences on demographic/experience measures, they were included as control variables 
in the hypothesis tests involving methodology as an independent variable (i.e., H1a, H1b,  
and H3).  Including them in these tests using ANCOVA analyses, however, showed that 
none of these four variables was significant (all p > 0.35) either as a main effect or in 
interaction with the variable of interest. Hence, they have been excluded from the formal 
analyses of H1a, H1b, and H3 discussed in following sections of this chapter.43 
In order to verify that the firms which provided the auditor participants for this 
                                                 
42 The Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test was used here due to unequal variances across groups. 
43 As an additional check for task-specific experience effects on this study’s knowledge measures, the mean 
of five experience measures (total audit engagements, first engagements, gathering engagements, analyzing 
engagements, and risk engagements), all of which loaded heavily on a single factor (all loadings > 0.68), 
was included as a covariate in the tests of H1a, H1b, and H3. This covariate was not significant (all p > 
0.10), either alone or in interaction with the Methodology variable, in any of the tests. All other significant 
effects described later in the formal tests of these hypotheses remained in the presence of this additional 
covariate.  
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study used audit methodologies falling into one of the three pre-defined methodology 
categories (i.e., SSA, SSA-TBA hybrid, and TBA), participants were asked to indicate 
(using an 11-point scale) the extent to which their firm typically analyzed a client’s 
business strategy, its key business processes, and its key performance.44 The scales were 
anchored by “Never” (score of 0) and “Always” (score of 10), with the midpoint labelled 
“Sometimes”. The ratings provided by participants are summarized in Panel B of Table 7. 
The SSA firm performs all three analyses quite frequently, with mean (s.d.) ratings of 7.8 
(2.1) for client business strategy, 9.2 (1.4) for key business processes, and 8.0 (2.2) for 
key performance indicators. The TBA firms performed these three analyses relatively less 
frequently, with mean ratings of 4.5 (2.1) for client business strategy, 6.4 (2.5) for key 
business processes, and 5.6 (1.9) for key performance indicators, while the SSA-TBA 
firms fell between these two groups, with mean ratings of 6.2 (2.6), 7.7 (1.5), and 6.9 
(2.0), respectively. Factor analysis (not tabulated) confirmed that all three of these 
measures loaded on a single factor that explained 66% of the variance, with factor 
loadings of 0.84 for the strategy measure, 0.72 for the business process measure, and 0.86 
for the performance indicator measure. These relatively high loadings on a single factor 
provide evidence that the three measures are good indicators of the methodology 
construct.  
 A one-way MANOVA (not tabulated) with the three ratings as dependent 
variables and methodology (SSA, SSA-TBA, and TBA) as the independent variable 
yielded significant differences in the frequencies of analyses across methodologies (F = 
8.19, p < 0.001). Individual ANOVAs (not tabulated) for each dependent variable yielded 
                                                 
44 A definition of each of these three terms was provided so that all participants had a common 
understanding of what the terms meant. 
90 
significant methodological differences for all three types of analyses (p < 0.001 in each 
case). Bonferroni tests were used to make multiple comparisons among the three 
methodologies for each type of audit analysis.45 Cross-methodology similarities and 
differences are summarized in Panel C of Table 7. The SSA firm analyzes a client’s 
business strategy significantly more frequently than the SSA-TBA firms (p = 0.038), and 
the TBA firms do so significantly less frequently than both the SSA and SSA-TBA firms 
(both p < 0.05). Also, the SSA firm analyzes key business processes significantly more 
frequently than either of the other two types of firms (both p < 0.005), while the SSA-
TBA firms do so marginally more frequently than the TBA firms (p = 0.08). The SSA 
and SSA-TBA firms analyze key performance indicators with similar frequency (p = 
0.17), as do the SSA-TBA and TBA firms (p = 0.157), whereas the SSA firm does so 
significantly more frequently than the TBA firms (p < 0.001). Comparing the mean of 
these three measures across methodologies showed a significant overall effect of 
methodology (F = 24.18, p < 0.001, not tabulated). Multiple comparison tests showed 
significant differences between each of the three pairs of firms (all p < 0.01). 
Overall, these results are consistent with the pre-defined methodology categories, 
with there being significant differences between the SSA and TBA firms on all measures, 
while there is some overlap between the hybrid SSA-TBA firms and the pure SSA and 
TBA firms on some measures. Thus, there is some assurance that significant 
methodology differences exist between these three categories of firms. Therefore, using 
this three-category classification scheme as the “methodology” variable for hypothesis-
testing purposes is justified. 
                                                 
45 The less-conservative Tukey’s HSD test was also used to examine these multiple comparisons. Any 
differences between the Bonferroni and Tukey tests are noted.  
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Task Realism 
 Participants provided feedback on three aspects of task realism using 11-point 
scales anchored by “Disagree” (a rating of –5) and “Agree” (a rating of 5), with the 
midpoint labeled “Neutral” (a rating of 0). Participants found the 60 client facts realistic 
(mean = 2.9, s.d. = 1.7) and useful for making risk assessments (mean = 3.3, s.d. = 1.6), 
and they thought the risk assessment task was reasonably similar to how they would have 
performed it in practice (mean = 1.7, s.d. = 2.3).46 Two MANOVAs (not tabulated) 
showed that these ratings did not differ across methodologies (F = 0.80, p = 0.573) or 
across experience levels (F = 1.49, p = .223). Overall, these results indicate that the 60 
client facts and risk assessment task combined to form a case exercise that was 
reasonably realistic when compared to all participants’ practice experiences.47 
Order Effects 
 In the presentation of the case materials, two orders of the 60 client facts were 
crossed with two orders of the seven specific risk factors in order to mitigate the chance 
that the order of presentation of either of these lists affected the variables of interest in 
this study. A one-way ANOVA (not tabulated) revealed that the order of the 60 client 
facts had no effect on the number of facts recalled (F = 0.02, p = 0.877).48 Two-way (fact 
order x risk order) ANOVAs (not tabulated) showed no effects of order on either 
knowledge comprehensiveness or knowledge density (all p > 0.10). Finally, a two-way 
MANOVA (not tabulated) with the seven specific and one general risk factors as 
                                                 
46 Each of these three means is significantly greater than the Neutral midpoint of 0 and the scale value of 1 
(all p < 0.01). 
47 The recall-task component of the case instrument obviously has no practice analogue, so participants 
were not asked to assess the realism of this task. Pretest participants found the recall task very easy to 
understand (mean = 4.2, s.d. = 1.2) and were neutral as to its difficulty (mean = 0.5, s.d. = 2.6). 
48 Participants did not see the risk factors prior to completing the recall task, so the order of the risks is not 
relevant to recall performance. 
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dependent variables showed no effects of order on any of the risk assessments (all p > 
0.23). Further testing for order effects is conducted in each of the hypothesis tests which 
follow. 
Recall Performance 
 Participants took a self-reported average of 13.4 minutes (s.d. = 3.3) to recall as 
many of the 60 client facts as they could and there was a significant correlation between 
the number of facts recalled and the time taken to perform the recall task (r = 0.44, p < 
0.001).49 Table 8 reports the results for participants’ performance on the recall task, both 
by methodology (Panel A) and by experience (Panel B). Participants correctly recalled 
from nine to 41 facts. The overall mean number of facts correctly recalled was 26.0 (s.d. 
= 6.5), with fewer than one incorrect or repeated fact recalled on average.50  
Methodology-related differences 
 The time taken to recall facts significantly differed across methodologies (F = 
4.25, p = 0.017, not tabulated), with the SSA auditors taking a mean (s.d.) of 12.8 (2.3) 
minutes, the SSA-TBA auditors 14.0 (3.9) minutes, and the TBA auditors 15.2 (3.8) 
minutes. Further discussion of this difference is provided in the tests of H1a and H1b 
below.  
                                                 
49 Nine auditors and one auditing student failed to provide the begin and/or end times for the recall task, so 
their completion times for this task could not be determined. All statistical tests involving recall 
performance time replaced the missing time data with the overall mean performance time of 13.4 minutes. 
Excluding these participants from the tests of H1a, H1b, and H2 resulted in the same pattern of results 
described in the formal tests of these hypotheses. 
50 One-hundred-and-thirteen of the 118 recall protocols were also coded by an independent coder. Of the 
3,101 coding decisions made by both the author and the other coder, there were 224 differences. The vast 
majority of the differences were caused by one of the coders coding a recalled fact as not matching one of 
the facts from the original list, whereas the other coder did match it to a fact. Using the kappa statistic to 
measure the level of agreement between the two sets of codings showed a  of 0.926. Given this very high 
level of agreement, the author’s coding was used as the basis for the statistical tests reported here. As will 
be seen, none of the recall-related hypotheses are supported by the data, so there is no evidence that the 
author’s coding was biased to support the hypotheses. 
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b propose that SSA auditors will either recall the same 
quantity of facts as TBA auditors (H1a) or a greater quantity of facts than TBA auditors 
(H1b). These are mutually exclusive hypotheses, so I expected to be able to reject the null 
for only one of H1a and H1b. Given the three methodology conditions in this study (SSA, 
SSA-TBA, and TBA), H1a’s null would be rejected if there are no differences in the 
quantities of facts recalled across these groups, whereas H1b’s null would be rejected in 
favour of H1b if the quantities of facts recalled are consistent with an SSA>SSA-
TBA>TBA pattern. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 8, the quantities recalled form a 
TBA>SSA-TBA>SSA pattern, with the TBA auditors recalling a mean (s.d.) of 31.1 
(6.4) facts, the SSA-TBA auditors recalling 28.0 (6.4), and the SSA auditors 23.1 (5.6) 
facts.51 Given the significant correlation between recall time and facts recalled, as well as 
the significant difference in time taken across methodologies, the statistical tests of H1a 
and H1b included recall time both as a covariate and in interaction with Methodology.52  
A one-way ANCOVA (see Table 9) yields a significant F-statistic of 4.68 (p = 
.012), indicating a significant effect of methodology on facts recalled, even with the 
presence of a significant time covariate (p < 0.001). This methodology effect is in the 
direction opposite of H1b, indicating that neither H1a nor H1b are supported by the recall 
data. We must, however, consider this methodology main effect in light of the significant 
interaction of the time covariate and methodology (p = 0.023), which violates the 
covariance assumption of homogeneous (parallel) regression. The significance of this 
interaction does not render the main effect uninterpretable, but requires multiple 
                                                 
51 An examination of the Studentized residuals for showed that only two of them (one SSA and one SSA-
TBA auditor) could be considered outliers on recall performance (Sresid > |2|). 
52 Including the order of facts as an additional covariate, alone and in interaction with Methodology, 
revealed no effect of order on recall (p > 0.11). 
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regression analysis to provide additional insight (Cohen and Cohen 1983). Entering the 
same set of ANCOVA variables into a hierarchical regression model with dummy 
variables to code methodology, and then examining the resulting regression equations for 
each of the three methodology groups (i.e., the prediction equations) reveals the nature of 
the interaction. The unstandardized B coefficient for the recall-time variable is 1.13 (p = 
0.001) for both the SSA and TBA equations, indicating that recall time had the same 
effect on recall in both these groups. For the SSA-TBA group, however, this coefficient 
is only 0.06 (p = 0.865), indicating that recall time had no effect on recall performance 
for the SSA-TBA auditors. There is no obvious explanation for this pattern of results, and 
because recall time is not a variable of interest in this study, it will not be explored 
further.  
As an alternative test (not tabulated) of H1a and H1b, the number of facts recalled 
was regressed on three variables: recall time, the mean of the three measures used to 
determine the frequency of each participant’s use of SSA-style audit analyses (strategic 
analysis, business process analysis, key performance indicator analysis), and the product 
of these two continuous variables.53 Results show that the coefficient on the continuous 
Methodology variable is –1.08 (p = 0.002), indicating that participants with high levels of 
SSA experience had significantly lower recall performance than those with low levels of 
SSA experience. This finding is consistent with that reported above using the categorical 
Methodology variable. The product term is not significant (p = 0.407), so there is no 
                                                 
53 In this regression, the continuous variable formed by the mean of the three analysis measures acts as the 
Methodology variable and captures individual differences in participants’ experience with SSA-style audit 
techniques. Such differences are not captured by the categorical measure of Methodology used in the main 
hypothesis test because each participant is classified as SSA, SSA-TBA, or TBA based on the firm they 
work for, regardless of how much personal experience each might have employing SSA-style audit 
techniques. Higher scores on this mean Methodology measure indicate greater experience applying SSA 
techniques in practice. 
95 
Time-Methodology interaction as is the case in the ANCOVA reported above. 
Therefore, based on the above results and contrary to expectations, TBA auditors 
recalled significantly more client facts than SSA auditors. This surprising finding will be 
investigated further in Chapter 5. 
Experience-related differences 
 Hypothesis 2 posits that more experienced auditors will recall more facts than 
auditing students. Panel B of Table 8 presents the recall data by experience level. The 
auditors took a self-reported 13.6 minutes on average (s.d. = 3.3) to correctly recall a 
mean of 26.2 facts (s.d. = 6.8), whereas the auditing students correctly recalled a mean of 
25.3 facts (s.d. = 5.7) in an average self-reported time of 12.8 minutes (s.d. = 2.6). There 
was no difference in recall times across the two experience conditions (F = 1.50, p = 
0.223, not tabulated). Given the significant correlation between recall time and facts 
recalled, the statistical test of H2 included recall time both as a covariate and in 
interaction with Experience.54 
As reported in Table 10, the results of a one-way ANCOVA  yielded an F-statistic 
of 0.01 (p = 0.945), indicating no difference in quantity of facts recalled between the 
auditors and auditing students, after controlling for the significant effect of time on recall 
(F = 32.64, p < 0.001).55 Hence, there is no evidence allowing the rejection of the H2 null 
of no experience-related difference in the quantity of facts recalled.56  I explore this 
surprising finding further in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
54 Including the order of facts as an additional covariate, alone and in interaction with Experience, revealed 
no effect of order on recall (p > 0.23). 
55 The interaction of Time and Experience was not significant (p = 0.717). 
56 Given the unequal cell sizes (N = 88 and 30), the ANCOVA may yield biased results. So, the variables of 
interest were also analyzed using regression analysis, which does not require equal N across comparison 
groups. The results were consistent with those of the ANCOVA. 
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Relational Knowledge Complexity 
 Participants took a self-reported average of 20.0 minutes (s.d. = 6.4) to assess the 
eight risks and write the justification memo.57 Participants’ memos contained from eight 
to 63 distinct cause or effect concepts, yielding mean knowledge comprehensiveness 
scores of 23.7  (s.d. = 9.0), and from six to 68 (mean = 25.8, s.d. = 11.2) causal 
assertions, resulting in relational-knowledge density scores (number of assertions divided 
by number of concepts) ranging from 0.68 to 1.63 (mean = 1.07, s.d. = 0.14). Table 8 
reports the means for these knowledge measures, both by methodology (Panel A) and by 
experience (Panel B).58  
There was a significant correlation of 0.498 (p < 0.001) between knowledge 
comprehensiveness and knowledge density, which are the two measures of relational-
knowledge complexity being used in this study. Despite the significant correlation 
between these two dependent measures, MANOVA procedures will not be used to 
analyze the effects of methodology and experience on them because the density score is 
linearly dependent on comprehensiveness, therefore precluding such multivariate 
analysis. There was also a significant correlation of 0.412 (p < 0.001) between the time 
taken to perform the risk exercise and knowledge comprehensiveness, so time will be 
                                                 
57 Twenty-one auditors and five auditing students failed to report the begin and/or end times for the risk 
task,  thus their completion times could not be determined. All statistical tests involving risk-task 
performance times replaced the missing time data with the overall mean performance time of 20.0 minutes. 
58 The author’s coding of the memos was used as the data source.  The independent coder coded 59 of the 
118 memos used to generate data for this study. In total, the author and the independent coder identified 
1,460 cause/effect concepts in these memos, and 1,479 causal relations. Of the concepts, 1,319 (90.3%) 
were identified by both coders, and of the relations, 1,162 (78.6%) were identified by both coders. To 
determine whether the author coded the memos in a way that would favour the hypotheses in this study, the 
coding differences were statistically examined. There were no significant differences in the number of 
coding differences either across methodology conditions or across experience conditions (all p > 0.40). 
Thus, there is no evidence of bias. In addition, as will be seen, none of this study’s knowledge complexity-
related hypotheses are supported by the data.  
97 
controlled for in tests involving this dependent measure.59 There was not a significant 
correlation between time taken and knowledge density (r = 0.169, p = 0.169), but to be 
consistent with the tests of knowledge comprehensiveness, time will be controlled for in 
tests involving density as well. 
Methodology-related differences 
 There was no difference in task performance time across methodology categories 
(F = 1.78, p = 0.175). Hypothesis 3 proposes SSA auditors will have more-complex 
relational knowledge than TBA auditors, after controlling for the number of client facts 
correctly recalled. Given the three methodology conditions in this study (SSA, SSA-
TBA, and TBA), H3 would be supported if the mean comprehensiveness scores and the 
mean  density scores of the three groups were consistent with an SSA>SSA-TBA>TBA 
pattern. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 8, just the opposite occurred, with both 
knowledge measures forming a TBA>SSA-TBA>SSA pattern.  
TBA auditors used a mean (s.d.) of 30.4 (9.1) concepts, SSA-TBA auditors 25.4 
(10.3) concepts, and SSA auditors 19.4 (7.8) concepts. A one-way ANCOVA (see Panel 
A of Table 11) yields an F-statistic of 4.11 (p = 0.020), indicating a significant effect of 
methodology on knowledge comprehensiveness, but in the direction opposite of H3.60 
This effect must, however, be considered in light of the significant interaction (p = 0.006) 
between methodology and quantity of facts recalled, which violates an important 
                                                 
59 There was no significant difference in time taken to complete the risk task across methodologies (p = 
0.175). 
60 In addition to the number of facts correctly recalled and time taken to perform the risk task, risk order 
was also included as a covariate because of its significance when included in the model. Fact order was not 
significant (p > 0.82), so was excluded from the formal hypothesis test. In the formal hypothesis test, time 
to complete, recall quantity, and risk order were all significant (p < 0.05). There was no significant 
interaction between methodology and either time or risk order (both p > 0.15), so these interaction terms 
were excluded from the model. There was an interaction between recall quantity and methodology, which 
is discussed further in the main text. 
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assumption of the ANCOVA analysis. Entering the same set of ANCOVA variables into 
a hierarchical regression model with dummy variables to code methodology, and then 
examining the resulting regression equations for each of the three methodology groups 
(i.e., the prediction equations) reveals the nature of the interaction. The unstandardized B 
coefficient for the recall-quantity variable is insignificant (p > 0.43) for both the SSA and 
TBA equations. For the SSA-TBA group, however, this coefficient is 0.84 (p = 0.002). 
The relationship between recall performance and knowledge comprehensiveness is 
considered further at the end of this section. 
As an alternative test (not tabulated) of knowledge comprehensiveness 
differences, the number of concepts was regressed on five variables: task time, facts 
recalled, risk order, the continuous Methodology measure discussed earlier, and the 
product of this measure and Facts recalled. Results show that the coefficient on the 
continuous Methodology variable is –1.01 (p = 0.042), indicating that participants with 
high levels of SSA experience had significantly lower knowledge comprehensiveness 
than those with low levels of SSA experience. This finding is consistent with that 
reported above using the categorical Methodology variable. The product term is not 
significant (p = 0.463), so there is no Recall-Methodology interaction as was the case in 
the ANCOVA reported above. 
Thus, based on the preceding analyses and contrary to expectations, TBA auditors 
showed a higher level of knowledge comprehensiveness than their SSA counterparts. 
The TBA auditors had a mean (s.d.) knowledge density of 1.11 (0.13), the SSA-
TBA auditors a density of 1.09 (0.13), and the SSA auditors a density of 1.01 (0.13). A 
one-way ANCOVA (see Panel B of Table 11) yields an F-statistic of 4.85 (p = .010), 
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indicating a significant effect of methodology on knowledge density, but again in the 
direction opposite of H3.61 Once again, however, there was a significant interaction 
between the time covariate and methodology, thus violating a key ANCOVA assumption. 
Entering the same set of ANCOVA variables into a hierarchical regression model with 
dummy variables to code methodology, and then examining the resulting regression 
equations for each of the three methodology groups (i.e., the prediction equations) reveals 
the nature of the interaction. The unstandardized B coefficient for the time variable is 
insignificant (p > 0.37) for both the SSA-TBA and TBA equations. For the SSA group, 
however, this coefficient is 0.01 (p = 0.013). There is no obvious explanation for this 
pattern of results, and because recall time is not a variable of interest in this study, it will 
not be explored further. 
As an alternative test (not tabulated) of knowledge density differences, the density 
score was regressed on four variables: task time, facts recalled, the continuous 
Methodology measure discussed earlier, and the product of this measure and task time. 
Results showed that the coefficient on the continuous Methodology variable was –0.08 (p 
= 0.003), indicating that participants with high levels of SSA experience had significantly 
lower knowledge density than those with low levels of SSA experience. This finding is 
consistent with that reported above using the categorical Methodology variable. The 
product term was also significant (B = 0.003, p = 0.008), so there was a Time-
Methodology interaction as was the case in the ANCOVA above. 
Thus, contrary to expectations, TBA auditors showed a higher level of knowledge 
                                                 
61 The covariates (the number of facts correctly recalled and the time taken to perform the risk task) were 
not significant (both  p > 0.27). The recall covariate in interaction with methodology was not significant (p 
= 0.198). Including risk order and fact order as additional covariates, alone and in interaction with 
methodology, revealed no significant effects of order on knowledge density (all p > 0.11). 
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density than their SSA counterparts. Considered together, this pair of results indicate that 
the TBA auditors possessed a significantly higher level of relational-knowledge 
complexity than the SSA auditors. 
As an additional test of the effects of methodology on auditors’ knowledge 
complexity, a composite measure of knowledge complexity was constructed by taking the 
average of the three individual knowledge measures for each participant: the quantity of 
facts correctly recalled, the number of cause or effect concepts from the risk memo, and 
the number of causal assertions from the risk memo. Factor analysis (not tabulated) 
showed that these three measures loaded onto a single factor (all loadings > 0.63), with 
this factor explaining 75% of total variance. 62 Given this result, averaging the three 
scores to form a composite measure of knowledge is appropriate. The SSA auditors had a 
mean (s.d.)  composite knowledge score of 20.8 (6.2), the SSA-TBA auditors one of 27.1 
(8.7), and the TBA auditors one of 31.9 (7.3). 
An ANCOVA (not tabulated) with this composite knowledge measure as the 
dependent variable revealed the same significant effect of methodology on knowledge 
that was found when testing recall quantity, comprehensiveness, and density (F = 19.83, 
p < 0.001).63 This test provides further support that the TBA auditors possessed a higher 
level of more-complex knowledge than their SSA counterparts. Additional post-hoc 
analyses in Chapter 5 will explore these unexpected results.  
                                                 
62 The factor analysis was conducted using all 118 participants, not just the auditors being studied in this 
section. 
63 The covariates for this analysis were time taken to complete the risk task and risk order (fact order and 
recall time were not significant and nor were any of the interactions between methodology and the 
covariates). Both covariates were significant at p < 0.02. Regression analysis revealed consistent results. 
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Experience-related differences 
Hypothesis 4a posits that auditors will have more-complex relational knowledge 
than auditing students, after controlling for the number of client facts correctly recalled. 
The auditors identified a mean of 23.5 (s.d. = 9.8) concepts, whereas the auditing students 
identified 24.4 (6.3) concepts (see Panel B of Table 8 for details). A one-way ANCOVA 
(see Panel A of Table 12) yields an F-statistic of 6.49 (p = .02), indicating a significant 
effect of experience on knowledge comprehensiveness, but in the direction opposite of 
H4a.64 Thus, contrary to expectations, auditing students showed a higher level of 
knowledge comprehensiveness than their auditor counterparts. 
The auditors had a mean knowledge density of 1.05 (s.d. = 0.14) and the auditing 
students a density of 1.11 (0.15). A one-way ANCOVA (see Panel B of Table 12) yields 
an F-statistic of 4.96 (p = .028), indicating a significant effect of experience on 
knowledge density, but in the opposite direction to that hypothesized.65 Thus, auditors 
possessed a significantly lower level of knowledge density than their auditing student 
counterparts.  
As an additional test of experience on knowledge complexity, the composite 
knowledge measure discussed previously was also examined for experience effects. The 
auditors had a mean (s.d.) composite knowledge score of 25.0 (8.4) and the students one 
of 25.7 (6.0). An ANCOVA (not tabulated) again revealed a significant effect of 
                                                 
64 The two covariates, number of facts correctly recalled and time taken to perform the risk task, were also 
significant (p < 0.001). The covariates were not significant in interaction with experience (p > 0.50), so the 
interaction terms were excluded from the formal test of H4a. Neither risk order nor fact order were 
significant when included as additional covariates, either alone or in interaction with experience (p > 0035). 
Regression analysis revealed consistent results. 
65 None of the covariates was significant (p > 0.10). The interactions of experience with each covariate 
were not significant (p > 0.135). When fact order and risk order were included as additional covariates, 
alone and in interaction, none was significant (all  p > 0.11). The regression analysis showed consistent 
results. 
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experience on knowledge (F = 4.83, p = 0.030), but in the unexpected direction.66 
Considered together, this set of results provides no support for the hypothesis that the 
auditors possess a significantly higher level of relational-knowledge complexity than 
auditing students, which is a very puzzling finding that will be explored further in 
Chapter 5. 
Interaction of Methodology and Experience 
 Hypothesis 4b predicts that the knowledge complexity differences between 
auditors and auditing students predicted in H4a will be larger for SSA auditors than for 
TBA auditors. Given the pattern of results found when testing H3 (i.e., SSA auditors 
having significantly less-complex knowledge complexity than TBA auditors) and H4a 
(i.e., no significant difference in knowledge complexity between auditors and auditing 
students), it is clear that H4b will not be supported by the data. Nevertheless, this 
interaction is analyzed so that further insight may be gained into the unexpected results 
found thus far. 
 Contrast tests were used to compare the knowledge complexity measures of each 
of the three methodology groups to those of the group of students. For comparison 
purposes, Panel A of Table 13 presents the mean knowledge comprehensiveness and 
density scores for these four groups as well as the differences in these scores between 
each of the methodology groups and the auditing students. Compared to the auditing 
student mean score of 24.4, the mean knowledge comprehensiveness scores differed as 
follows: -5.0 for the SSA auditors, 1.0 for the SSA-TBA auditors, and 6.0 for the TBA 
                                                 
66 Covariates in the model were the times taken to perform the recall and risk tasks and both were 
significant (both p < 0.05). The interactions of each of these covariates with experience were not significant 
and nor were risk order or fact order (all p > 0.44), so they were excluded from the test. Regression results 
were consistent. 
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auditors. The trend was the same for knowledge density scores compared to the auditing 
students’ mean of 1.11: -0.10 for SSA, -0.02 for SSA-TBA, and 0.00 for TBA. 
 The results of the contrast tests on the knowledge comprehensiveness scores are 
reported in Panel B of Table 13. They reveal that the SSA auditors’ knowledge 
comprehensiveness is significantly less than the auditing students’ (t = -3.76, p < 0.001), 
whereas the SSA-TBA auditors (t = -0.95, p = 0.374) and TBA auditors (t = 0.00, p = 
0.993) do not significantly differ from the auditing students.67 Panel C of Table 13 reports 
the results of the knowledge density contrast tests, which showed that the SSA auditors’ 
knowledge density was significantly lower than the auditing students (t = -3.29, p = 
0.001) and that neither the SSA-TBA auditors (t = -0.62, p = 0.576) nor the TBA auditors 
(t = 0.50, p = 0.720) significantly differed from the auditing students in terms of 
knowledge density.68 Testing the contrasts using the composite knowledge measure as the 
dependent variable revealed the same pattern of results as those for comprehensiveness 
and density. Combined, these results indicate that the experienced SSA auditors had the 
least-complex relational knowledge of the four groups in the study, while neither the 
SSA-TBA nor the TBA auditors significantly differed from the auditing students in terms 
of knowledge complexity.  
Risk Assessments 
 Hypothesis 5 proposes that auditors with more-complex relational knowledge will 
make different risk assessments than auditors with less-complex knowledge. Table 14 
presents the mean ratings for each of the eight risks assessed by the participants as well as 
                                                 
67 These contrast tests controlled for both number of facts recalled and time taken to perform the risk task, 
just as in the regular tests of knowledge comprehensiveness and density reported earlier. 
68 These tests controlled for the number of facts recalled, just as in the regular tests of knowledge density 
reported earlier. 
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the correlations between these risk assessments and the relational knowledge 
comprehensiveness and density scores. Eleven of the 16 correlations are insignificant (p 
> 0.18). Knowledge comprehensiveness is significantly correlated with three of the eight 
risks: the fact that family members hold all senior management positions (r = -0.21, p = 
0.021); the fact that overseas production may cause production and quality problems (r = 
0.26, p = 0.005); and the risk due to the implementation of a new SAP/inventory 
management system (r = 0.19, p = 0.04).69 The correlation between knowledge 
comprehensiveness and the fact that the client is not staying current with technological 
development is marginally significant (r = 0.16, p = 0.079). Knowledge density is 
significantly correlated with the risk assessment relating to the fact that this was a first-
year engagement for the auditing firm (r = 0.21, p = 0.023). Given that only five of the 
sixteen correlations between the knowledge complexity measures and the risk 
assessments are significant (marginally in one case), H5 is only very weakly supported.70 
 As a supplemental analysis, exploratory factor analysis (not tabulated) was 
conducted on the seven specific risk factors to see if they could be reduced in number. 
The seven risks loaded on three factors (all loadings > 0.48) that explained 62% of total 
variance. Of the risks in Table 14, the inaccurate budgeting system, first-year audit, and 
new SAP system risks loaded on one factor and the family management risk loaded on its 
own. The other three specific risks (overseas production, poor technological 
                                                 
69 Two-sided tests of Pearson correlations are presented here. Results are the same when Spearman 
correlations are used, except that knowledge comprehensiveness is now marginally significantly correlated 
with the risk of this being a first-audit for the firm (r = 0.17,  p = 0.06), but is no longer significantly with 
the risk of not staying current with technological development (r = 0.15,  p = 0.102). 
70 Correlating the composite knowledge measure used in the supplementary tests of H3, H4a, and H4b with 
the eight risk factors revealed two significant (family management and overseas production, p < 0.05) and 
two marginally significant (new SAP system and overall risk, p < 0.10) correlations. Spearman correlations 
showed that these four risks remained (marginally) significant and that the correlation with first-year audit 
risk was also significant (p = 0.043). 
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development, and obsolescence problems) loaded on the third factor. 
 For the two factors with multiple risk loadings, composite risk measures were 
constructed by averaging the risks that loaded on each of these two factors.71 These 
composite risks were then correlated with knowledge comprehensiveness, density, and 
the composite knowledge measure. The first composite risk factor (inaccurate budgeting 
system, first-year audit, and new SAP system risks) was marginally significantly 
correlated with density (r = 0.18, p = 0.052) and the other composite risk factor (overseas 
production, poor technological development, and obsolescence problems) was 
significantly correlated with comprehensiveness (r = 0.24, p = 0.01) as well as the 
composite knowledge measure (r = 0.21, p = 0.02). The other three correlations were not 
significant (all p > 0.29).72 These results provide no extra support for the previously 
noted weak relation between knowledge and risk judgment. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented the results of a study involving 118 participants, 88 of 
whom were classified as “auditors” based on their roughly three years of assurance 
experience with firms using one of three audit methodologies that varied in the extent to 
which they incorporated SSA techniques into their audit approaches. The other 30 
participants, classified as “auditing students”, were university accounting students with 
mean assurance experience of seven months. Contrary to expectations, TBA auditors 
recalled significantly more client facts than SSA auditors (H1a and H1b) and also 
                                                 
71 Because the family management risk loaded on its own and its correlations with all three knowledge 
measures have already been reported and discussed, there is no need to analyze any supplemental 
correlations for this factor.  
72 Spearman correlations revealed the same pattern of results, except that the first composite risk factor was 
no longer significantly correlated with anything (all p > 0.10). 
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displayed significantly more-complex relational knowledge than their SSA counterparts 
(H3). In addition—and also unexpectedly—the auditors did not recall significantly more 
facts than the auditing students (H2), nor did they display significantly more-complex 
relational knowledge than their less-experienced counterparts (H4a). Most surprisingly, 
the SSA auditors in this study possessed the least-complex relational knowledge of any of 
the four groups in this study, even the auditing students (H4b). Weak support was found 
for the relation between relational knowledge complexity and auditors’ risk judgments 
(H5), with just four of 16 correlations between the two complexity measures and the 
eight risk judgments being significant. This rather puzzling set of results will be 
investigated further in the next chapter, which presents some post-hoc analyses of the 
data. 
107 
CHAPTER 5 – SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS 
Introduction  
The results presented in the previous chapter revealed that none of the study’s hypotheses 
were supported by the data. Indeed, I observed statistically significant methodological 
differences that were in the opposite direction of what was expected (i.e., H1 and H3).  
Furthermore, the expected relationships between experience and knowledge were not 
obtained (i.e., H2, H4a, and H4b), and there was only weak support for a link between 
knowledge and judgment (i.e., H5).  In this chapter, I concentrate mainly on the 
methodology-related differences among the experienced auditors because the lack of 
success with the experience-related hypotheses may be attributed to the relatively large 
amount of experience that the auditing students had, which may have lead to a substantial 
overlap in knowledge between the two groups. 
Factual Knowledge Recall 
In this section I summarize the pair-wise cross-methodology differences in factual 
knowledge found and also examine the possible explanation that the recall differences 
could be attributed to a focus on the more-important facts by the SSA auditors during the 
study phase of the recall task. 
Recall performance 
To further explore the significant main effect of methodology on recall 
performance found in Chapter 4, three pair-wise multiple comparisons were made using 
Bonferroni tests.73  With a mean (s.d.) recall performance of 23.1 (5.6) facts, the SSA 
                                                 
73 The multiple comparisons in this chapter were also examined using Tukey’s HSD test, which is less 
conservative than the Bonferroni test, and using ANCOVA, which allows for inclusion of the covariates 
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auditors recalled significantly fewer facts than both the SSA-TBA auditors (p = 0.005), 
who recalled 28.0 (6.4) facts, and the TBA auditors (p < 0.001), who recalled 31.1 (6.4) 
facts. There was no significant difference between the SSA-TBA and TBA auditors (p = 
0.308). See Panel B of Table 15 for a summary of the results of these multiple 
comparison tests. 
Fact Importance and Recall Performance 
One possible explanation for the SSA auditors recalling fewer facts than the other 
groups of auditors is that when studying the facts, they ignored facts that did not fit into 
their existing knowledge acquisition template. To the extent that this focused the SSA 
auditors on the more-important facts in the list, these are the only ones they would have 
encoded and would have been subsequently able to recall.74  Bell et al. (1997) suggest 
that one of the advantages of the SSA is that it helps an auditor identify the high risk 
areas of a client’s operations, so he can focus most of his audit attention on these areas 
while spending little effort on low risk areas of the engagement. Eilifsen et al. (2001) 
note this result in their field study of KPMG’s 1997 SSA audit of a Czech bank. If this is 
what occurred with the SSA participants in the present study, then their increased 
attention to the more important facts may have allowed them to recall a higher number of 
them than the other auditors (Kahneman 1973; Lynch and Srull 1982; Libby and Lipe 
1992), but a lower number of facts overall. 
                                                                                                                                                 
used in the corresponding hypothesis tests in Chapter 4. In the cases where the results of either or both of 
these additional tests differ from those of the Bonferroni tests, the differences are footnoted.  
74 This possibility is greatly lessened by the fact that all participants were instructed to study the entire list 
of 60 facts so they could later attempt to recall as many as possible from memory. Also, during both the 
study and recall phases of the memory task, none of the participants knew they would later be asked to use 
the same set of facts in the risk assessment task. Thus, there were no explicit or implicit reasons for any of 
the participants to focus only on what they believed to be the most important facts in the list of 60. Indeed, 
given the stated goal of the recall task, doing so would have knowingly hindered their performance on the 
task. 
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As described in more detail in Chapter 3, 21 senior managers rated the importance 
of each of the 60 facts used in the study.75 The highest possible rating a fact could receive 
was 3, which indicated they thought the fact was “Very Important” to understanding the 
client’s business. Thus, facts receiving a mean rating of 2 or higher (including those with 
ratings less than, but insignificantly different from 2; p > 0.05) could be construed as 
being highly important to the auditors. Table 16 presents the fifteen facts that received 
such ratings (see Table 1 for the full list of facts and their mean ratings).76  
Panel A of Table 17 presents the mean number of important facts recalled by 
auditors in each methodology. The pattern of results here is the same as that found for the 
full set of 60 facts, with the SSA auditors recalling a mean (s.d.) of 6.8 (2.1) important 
facts, the SSA-TBA auditors 7.9 (2.3) facts, and the TBA auditors 8.3 (1.5) facts. An 
ANCOVA (see Panel B of Table 17), with the total number of important facts correctly 
recalled as the dependent variable and methodology as the independent variable (and 
controlling for time spent on recall task), showed a significant  effect of methodology (F 
= 5.30, p = 0.042).  As in the test of H1a and H1b, there was also a marginally significant 
interaction between time and methodology (F = 2.30, p = 0.10). 
Weighting the important facts correctly recalled by their respective mean 
importance ratings and using the sum of these weights as the dependent variable yielded 
the exact same pattern of results as for the unweighted facts (see panel A of Table 17 for 
                                                 
75 Twelve of the senior managers were from one of the SSA-TBA firms that supplied participants for the 
main study, while five came from one of the TBA firms and four from the SSA firm. The ratings were 
made in an Excel spreadsheet, which was sent and returned via email. 
76 If only the ratings of the SSA senior managers are used to determine the 15 most important facts, seven 
of the fifteen facts in Table 16 would be different. The results of the statistical tests described next, 
however, are the same if these SSA-only facts are used. 
110 
a summary).77 The SSA auditors recalled a weighted mean (s.d.) of 14.3 (4.4) important 
facts, the SSA-TBA auditors 16.7 (5.0) facts, and the TBA auditors 17.5 (3.2) facts. An 
ANCOVA (see Panel C of Table 17) showed a significant effect of methodology (F = 
3.50, p = 0.034) and a marginally significant interaction between time and methodology 
(F = 2.60, p = 0.078).  
Thus, considering fact importance when analyzing recall performance does not 
alter the main findings in the tests of H1a and H1b: the SSA auditors recalled 
significantly fewer facts overall, significantly fewer important facts, and significantly 
fewer weighted important facts than the TBA auditors. Paired-comparison tests 
(Bonferroni, Tukey, and ANCOVA) revealed no significant differences between the 
SSA-TBA auditors and either of the other two auditor groups on either the raw or 
weighted number of important facts recalled (all p > 0.10, not tabulated). 
Relational Knowledge Complexity 
In this section I summarize the pair-wise cross-methodology differences in 
relational knowledge complexity using the knowledge comprehensiveness, knowledge 
density, and composite knowledge measures used in the tests of H3 in Chapter 4. Panel A 
of Table 15 presents the means of these measures by methodology and Panel B of the 
Table shows the results of the Bonferroni tests. 
Knowledge comprehensiveness 
To further explore the significant main effect of methodology on knowledge 
                                                 
77 More specifically, each important fact correctly recalled by a participant was multiplied by its 
corresponding fact rating from Table 16. The sum of these weights formed the dependent variable for this 
test. For example, a participant who correctly recalled the first and last facts in Table 16 would have a 
weighted recall score of 4.63, whereas someone who recalled the first two in the list would have scored 
5.06. 
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comprehensiveness found in Chapter 4, three pair-wise multiple comparisons were made 
using Bonferroni tests.  With mean (s.d.) knowledge comprehensiveness of 19.4 (7.8), the 
SSA auditors scored significantly lower than the SSA-TBA auditors (p = 0.029), who 
scored 25.4 (10.3), and the TBA auditors (p < 0.001), who scored 30.4 (9.1). There was 
no significant difference between the SSA-TBA and TBA auditors (p = 0.197). 
Knowledge density 
To further explore the significant main effect of methodology on knowledge 
density found in Chapter 4, three pair-wise multiple comparisons were made using 
Bonferroni tests.  With mean (s.d.) knowledge density of 1.01 (0.13), the SSA auditors 
scored significantly than the SSA-TBA auditors (p = 0.029), who scored 1.09 (0.13), and 
the TBA auditors (p = 0.009), who scored 1.11 (0.13). There was no significant 
difference between the SSA-TBA and TBA auditors (p = 1.00). 
Knowledge composite measure 
To further explore the significant main effect of methodology on composite 
knowledge found in Chapter 4, three pair-wise multiple comparisons were made using 
Bonferroni tests.  With mean (s.d.) composite knowledge of 20.8 (6.2), the SSA auditors 
scored significantly less than the SSA-TBA auditors (p = 0.003), who scored 27.1 (8.6), 
and the TBA auditors (p < 0.001), who scored 31.9 (7.3). There was no significant 
difference between the SSA-TBA and TBA auditors (p = 0.101).78 
Thus, consistent with the pattern of results for recall performance, the SSA 
auditors possessed significantly less-complex relational knowledge than both the SSA-
TBA and TBA auditors, while the latter two groups did not significantly differ in their 
                                                 
78 The Tukey HSD test showed a marginally significant difference between the SSA-TBA and TBA 
auditors (p = 0.084). 
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relational knowledge. 
Correctness of Causal Relations 
 When coding the causal relations in the participants’ memos, all causal statements 
were included when calculating the knowledge comprehensiveness and density measures 
used in the relational-knowledge hypothesis tests, regardless of whether a causal 
statement was logical or correct in light of the existing case facts. Conceptually, 
including invalid causal statements in the determination of knowledge complexity may 
not make sense because a memory schema populated with invalid concepts and relations, 
while appearing complex, may result in poor decision-making in cases where such 
invalid relations are relied upon. Therefore, it is possible that the measures of knowledge 
complexity for some participants may be higher than warranted if the validity of the 
statements is considered.  
 For example, consider two participants, one who initially had 25 concepts and 25 
causal statements in his memo and another who initially had 27 concepts and 29 
statements. The latter fictional participant here shows a higher level of knowledge 
complexity, with a knowledge comprehensiveness score two units higher (27 vs. 25) and 
a knowledge density score of 1.07 compared to one of 1.0. But, now assume that all of 
the first participant’s causal statements were logical and correct, leaving his complexity 
scores the same, whereas the second had seven incorrect or illogical statements, which 
resulted in revised counts of only 24 concepts and 22 statements. The latter participant 
would now have a comprehensiveness score of 24 and a density score of 0.92, which are 
both lower than the first participant’s scores. Thus, after considering the validity of the 
causal statements, the first participant has higher relational knowledge complexity than 
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the latter participant. 
 It is possible, therefore, that the results of this study’s hypothesis tests involving 
knowledge complexity would change if one or more of the participant groups displayed 
significant numbers of invalid causal statements compared to the other groups. To 
examine this possibility, all of the originally coded causal statements from each of the 30 
student memos were analyzed for correctness. The student group was chosen for this 
analysis because theory suggests that, due to their significantly lower levels of general 
and task-specific audit experience, they may have included more invalid causal 
statements in their memos than their experienced auditor counterparts (Libby and Luft 
1993). In performing this analysis, any causal statement that the author considered 
illogical or incorrect in light of the case facts and/or the relevant conceptual framework 
(e.g., the audit risk model) was excluded when calculating revised knowledge 
comprehensiveness and density scores for each student. 
 The results of this analysis shows that the mean number of invalid causal 
statements per memo was 1.1 (s.d. = 2.31), which led to a mean reduction of 0.8 (s.d. = 
1.8) cause/effect concepts per memo. Thus, overall, the students had few incorrect 
statements in their memos. Deducting the number of incorrect statements and concepts 
from the knowledge complexity measures for each student results in a mean 
comprehensiveness score of 23.6 (6.2) and a mean density score of 1.09 (0.16). The 
original scores on these measures were 24.4 (6.3) and 1.11 (0.15), respectively. Using 
these revised measures in the tests of H4a, which compared the knowledge complexity of 
the auditors and students, shows there are no significant differences in 
comprehensiveness (p = 0.907) or density (p = 0.125) between the two groups. The 
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students scored significantly higher on both measures in the original tests that ignored 
statement validity. Thus, there is still no support for H4a, which proposed that auditors 
would have significantly more-complex relational knowledge than the students. 
 Given that there were only 1.1 incorrect statements per student memo, that we 
would expect even fewer “errors” in the auditors’ memos, and that the TBA auditors 
(SSA-TBA auditors) had an average of 34 (28) causal statements in their memos 
compared to only 20 in the SSA memos, it is unlikely that removing incorrect statements 
from the auditors’ complexity measures would alter the results of the original tests of H3. 
As reported above in the analysis of H3, the SSA auditors showed significantly less-
complex relational knowledge than the SSA-TBA and TBA auditors. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that failing to consider the correctness of the causal statements 
when coding the memos and conducting the complexity-related hypothesis tests does not 
contribute to the puzzling results of this study.  
Direct Effects of Methodology on Risk Assessment 
It is possible that differences in audit methodology may result in different risk 
assessments, after controlling for auditors’ knowledge differences. Indeed, some recent 
studies (Kotchetova 2002; O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; Kopp and 
O'Donnell 2005) that have manipulated methodology in the lab have found that SSA vs. 
TBA methodology differences have resulted in different audit judgments. Using auditor-
participants from a TBA firm, O’Donnell and Schultz (O'Donnell 2003; O'Donnell and 
Schultz 2003) found that performing risk tasks using an SSA structure led the auditors to 
identify more risks and make higher risk assessments compared to auditors who 
performed the tasks using a TBA structure. Kotchetova (2002), who also used auditors 
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from TBA firms as participants, found that in some cases SSA-type information and 
analysis led to better risk judgments, but in others a basic TBA-type understanding of the 
client’s business led to judgments that were just as accurate as those made using 
extensive strategic information. Moreover, participants with the TBA-type understanding 
made better substantive planning decisions than those with SSA-type information. Using 
students in their first undergraduate accounting course, Kopp and O’Donnell (2005) 
found that presenting internal control information in an SSA structure led participants to 
identify more control risks than participants who received the information in a TBA 
structure. Thus, studies that have manipulated methodology in the lab have found SSA 
vs. TBA differences in risk assessment, with mixed results on which methodology leads 
to better judgments. It therefore seems worthwhile to look for direct effects of 
methodology on judgment in this dissertation, while controlling for knowledge 
differences that may also affect those judgments. Table 18 presents the mean risk 
assessments by methodology and overall. 
Assessment of specific risks 
To examine cross-methodology differences in the assessments of the seven 
specific risk factors rated by participants, a one-way MANCOVA with Methodology as 
the independent variable, the three knowledge measures as controls, and the seven 
specific risk assessments as dependent variables was run using the data from the 83 
auditors.79 The results of this analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 19. The 
MANCOVA showed a marginally significant effect of methodology on the specific risk 
assessments (F = 1.55, p = 0.099), whereas none of the knowledge covariates was 
                                                 
79 None of the interactions between each of the three covariates and Methodology was significant, so the 
interaction terms were excluded from the analysis. 
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significant (all p > 0.18).80 Individual follow-up ANCOVAs revealed significant 
differences for only two of the seven specific risk factors: first-year audit (p = 0.030) and 
the new SAP system (p = 0.010).81 None of the other five risk ratings differed across 
auditor groups (all p > 0.11). 
Multiple comparison tests showed that, as can be seen descriptively in Table 18, it 
is the SSA-TBA group driving these significant differences.82 With a mean rating of 82.8, 
the SSA-TBA auditors rated the risk of it being a first-year audit significantly higher than 
both the SSA auditors (rating of 65.8, p = 0.024) and the TBA auditors (rating of 64.8, p 
= 0.051), while the difference between the SSA and TBA auditors was not significant (p 
= 1.000). For the risk related to the new SAP system, the SSA-TBA auditors’ mean rating 
of 72.3 was significantly higher than the SSA auditors’ rating of 52.0 (p = 0.002), but not 
the TBA auditors’ rating of 62.1 (p = 0.414), while the SSA and TBA ratings again did 
not differ (p = 0.285).  
Overall risk assessments  
Panel B of Table 19 reports the results of an ANCOVA, with the same covariates 
and independent variable as in the preceding MANCOVA, and the auditors’ overall 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement as the dependent variable. The effect of 
                                                 
80 Using the composite knowledge measure as a covariate in place of the three individual measures resulted 
in the same pattern of results, except there was now a marginally significant difference between the ratings 
of the risk related to the inaccurate budgeting system (p = 0.096). 
81 Using the composite risk measures developed in Chapter 4 resulted in the same pattern of results as 
found here. The composite risk measure formed by averaging the means of the inaccurate budgeting, first-
year audit, and new SAP system assessments (i.e., the first three specific risks just found to significantly 
differ across methodologies) differed across methodologies (p = 0.001), whereas the measure formed by 
averaging the means of overseas production, poor technological development, and obsolescence problems 
did not differ (p = 0.901). As the family-run business risk loaded on its own factor, the result is the same as 
above when it is included in a MANCOVA with the two composite measures. 
82 Bonferroni tests were used for the multiple comparison tests. The less-conservative Tukey HSD test, as 
well as pair-wise ANCOVAs, which could control for the three knowledge measures used in the overall 
MANCOVA, revealed the same pattern of results. 
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methodology on these overall assessments was significant (F = 5.80, p = 0.004), and as in 
the MANCOVA, none of the three knowledge covariates was significant (all p > 0.29).83 
Bonferroni tests showed that the SSA-TBA auditors’ overall rating of 84.4 was 
significantly higher (p < 0.001) than the SSA auditors’ rating of 70.3, but not 
significantly different from the TBA rating of 79.0 (p = 0.607). The TBA auditors’ rating 
was marginally significantly higher than the SSA auditors’ rating (p = 0.058). Panel C of 
Table 19 summarizes the risk assessment differences found in the above analyses. 
Thus, based on this set of findings and after controlling for knowledge differences 
(none of which had a significant effect on risk assessments), there was a significant effect 
of methodology on three of the eight risk assessments made by the auditors in this study. 
The effect was driven primarily by the SSA-TBA auditors, who rated two specific risks 
and the overall risk significantly higher than one or both of the SSA and TBA groups. To 
a very limited extent, this finding is consistent with new assurance standards recently 
issued by the CICA (2005, Section 5141), which require auditors to gain an enhanced 
understanding of their client’s business, with particular emphasis on strategic-risk 
analysis and increased testing of internal controls. The hybrid SSA-TBA methodology 
used by one of the three auditor groups in this study most closely resembles the approach 
required by these new standards. Because the goal of the new standards is improved risk 
assessment by auditors, we might expect the SSA-TBA auditors employing such an 
approach in this study to make different risk assessments than auditors using a pure SSA 
or pure TBA approach, which is what was found in three of eight cases.  
                                                 
83 Using the composite knowledge measure as the covariate in place of the three individual knowledge 
measures resulted in the same finding. 
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Demographic Similarities and Differences 
 This section examines similarities and differences between each of the three 
auditor groups and the student group on the task-specific experience measures discussed 
in Chapter 4. Overall, the 88 auditors in the study had significantly more experience on 
each of the six task-specific measures than the 30 students. It is possible, however, that 
the puzzling findings of H2 and H4a, in which the students recalled the same number of 
facts as the auditors and possessed higher relational knowledge than the auditors, may be 
explained by similarities in task-specific experience levels between the students and one 
or more of the auditor groups. Table 20 presents the task-specific experience levels for all 
four of the groups in this study. 
 The TBA auditors have performed more audit engagements than each of the other 
three groups (all p < 0.05).84 The TBA auditors have also performed more first-time audit 
engagements than all other groups (all p < 0.09). The TBA auditors also have more 
experience gathering knowledge of the client’s business than all others (all p < 0.03) and 
more experience analyzing this knowledge than the students (p = 0.014). The TBA 
auditors have identified risks on more engagements than any other group (all p < .065). 
Finally, the SSA auditors have worked on more engagements for high-tech clients than 
any of the other three groups (all p < 0.01). Overall, the greatest areas of overlap in task-
specific experience are between the SSA auditors and students (same on five of six 
measures) and the SSA-TBA auditors and students (same on all six measures). This 
finding lends credence to the possibility that similarities in task-specific experience 
                                                 
84 The multiple comparisons in this section were done using Bonferroni tests. Only significant differences 
are discussed in the main text. All other pair-wise comparisons on each measure were not significant (p > 
0.10). 
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between 68 of the 88 auditors and the 30 students accounts for the lack of higher factual 
and relational knowledge among the auditors when compared to the students.  
To further explore this possibility, the experience-related hypotheses were 
examined using only the TBA auditors as the experienced group and comparing them to 
the students on recall performance, knowledge comprehensiveness, knowledge density, 
and the composite knowledge measure. The results of these four tests (not tabulated) 
revealed no significant differences between the significantly more experienced TBA 
auditors and the students on any of the knowledge measures (all p > 0.32), except that the 
TBA auditors recalled more facts (p = 0.043). Thus, it appears that even the overlap in 
task-specific experience between 68 of the 88 auditors and the students does not 
adequately explain the failure to find significant experience-related knowledge 
differences. 
Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented several supplementary statistical analyses intended to 
provide additional insights into the series of puzzling results found in Chapter 4. Three 
sets of tests showed that the TBA and SSA-TBA auditor groups each recalled more facts 
and possessed higher relational knowledge complexity than the SSA group of auditors. 
Another set showed that considering only the recall of the 15 most important facts in the 
list of 60 presented to the auditors did not alter the results of recall performance: the SSA 
auditors recalled fewer of these facts than both the other groups. Controlling for these 
cross-methodology differences in knowledge and examining the direct effect of 
methodology on the auditors’ risk assessments showed that the SSA-TBA auditors made 
significantly higher risk assessments than either or both of the other two groups for three 
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of the eight risks assessed. This finding is somewhat consistent with recent changes to 
assurance standards, which require a hybrid SSA-TBA approach to understanding the 
client’s business and making risk assessments. Finally, tests revealed that even though the 
SSA and SSA-TBA auditors had very similar levels of task-specific experience compared 
to the students, this experience overlap between 68 of the 88 experienced auditors could 
not explain the failure to find higher levels of factual and relational knowledge among the 
auditors as compared to the students: the students possessed similar levels of factual and 
relational knowledge compared to even the significantly more experienced TBA auditors. 
The next chapter concludes this dissertation by summarizing and discussing its purpose 
and results, and noting its limitations. 
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CHAPTER 6 - DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Dissertation Summary 
This dissertation was designed to investigate the effects of audit methodology and 
experience on the content and organization of knowledge in an auditor’s long-term 
memory, and, ultimately, on their risk judgments. More specifically, it examined how 
differences between the strategic-systems audit approach and the traditional, transaction-
based audit approach affect the content and complexity of client business knowledge in 
long-term memory, how these mental representations develop with experience, and how 
the representations affect risk assessment. Knowledge of the client’s business is essential 
to conducting an effective and efficient audit, but researchers have devoted little attention 
to how this knowledge is represented in memory, how these representations develop with 
experience, and what effect they have on audit judgment. Moreover, proponents of the 
strategic-systems approach argue that this approach leads to the formation of a more-
complex client business model and results in better audit judgments than the transaction-
based approach (Bell et al. 1997). This study cannot—and was not intended to—
determine which type of audit methodology is most effective, but merely to provide 
evidence on how knowledge and judgment varies across methodologies. Its results, 
however, could provide a base from which to pursue further research on the overall 
effectiveness of different audit methodologies.  
Relying on a synthesis of the memory, knowledge and judgment literatures in 
psychology and accounting, as well as existing professional and academic work related to 
recent changes in audit methodologies, seven hypotheses were developed in connection 
with the dissertation’s research questions. Hypotheses 1a and 1b were competing 
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hypotheses, proposing that SSA and TBA auditors would either recall equivalent 
numbers of client-environmental facts, or that SSA auditors would recall more facts than 
TBA auditors. Hypothesis 2 proposed that experienced auditors would recall more facts 
than their less-experienced counterparts. Hypothesis 3 predicted that SSA auditors would 
possess more-complex knowledge of the relations among client-environmental facts than 
TBA auditors. Hypothesis 4a predicted that experienced auditors would possess more-
complex knowledge of the relations among client-environmental facts than less-
experienced auditors, and Hypothesis 4b proposed that this experience-related difference 
would be greater for SSA auditors than for TBA auditors. Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicted 
that auditors with more-complex relational knowledge would make different risk 
assessments than auditors with less-complex relational knowledge. 
To provide the data needed to investigate these hypotheses, 118 participants 
completed an instrument that included a series of short exercises involving a fictional 
first-year audit client. Eighty-eight of the participants were practicing auditors who had 
roughly three years of assurance experience with firms using one of three audit 
methodologies that varied in the extent to which they incorporated SSA techniques into 
their audit approaches. The auditors in these three methodology groups were used to test 
the methodology-related hypotheses (H1a, H1b, H3, and H4b) and also, as a single group, 
served as the experienced-auditor group for purposes of testing the experience-related 
hypotheses (H2, H4a, H4b). The other 30 participants were 4th-year university accounting 
students with mean assurance experience of about seven months, and they served as the 
less-experienced comparison group for H2, H4a, and H4b. All participants completed an 
instrument that required them to first study a list of 60 facts about a fictional audit client 
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and then recall as many of these facts as possible after performing a short distracter task. 
They then again studied the same list of 60 facts, but this time for the purpose of 
assessing the level of risk associated with seven specific and one general risk factor. They 
then had to write a memo justifying their risk assessments and finished by providing 
demographic information about their education, experience, and audit methodology. 
Contrary to expectations, TBA auditors recalled significantly more client facts 
than SSA auditors (H1a and H1b) and also displayed significantly more-complex 
relational knowledge than their SSA counterparts (H3). In addition—and also 
unexpectedly—the auditors did not recall significantly more facts than the auditing 
students (H2), nor did they display significantly more-complex relational knowledge than 
their less-experienced counterparts (H4a). Most surprisingly, the SSA auditors in this 
study possessed the least-complex relational knowledge of any of the four groups in this 
study, even the auditing students (H4b). Weak support was found for the relation between 
relational knowledge complexity and auditors’ risk judgments (H5), with four of 16 
correlations between the two complexity measures and the eight risk judgments being 
significant. 
Controlling for cross-methodology differences in knowledge and examining the 
direct effect of methodology on the auditors’ risk assessments showed that the SSA-TBA 
auditors made significantly higher risk assessments than either or both of the other two 
groups for three of the eight risks assessed. This finding is somewhat consistent with 
recent changes to assurance standards, which require a hybrid SSA-TBA approach to 
understanding the client’s business and making risk assessments. Despite the significant 
differences in factual and relational client knowledge between the TBA and SSA 
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auditors, these two groups differed on only one of eight risk assessments: the TBA 
auditors rated the overall risk of material misstatement as being significantly higher than 
the SSA auditors. 
Discussion 
A variety of supplementary analyses were conducted to further explore and possibly 
explain the puzzling results of the hypothesis tests. Three sets of multiple comparison 
tests showed that the TBA and SSA-TBA auditors each recalled more facts and possessed 
higher relational knowledge complexity than the SSA auditors. One possible explanation 
for the lower recall performance of the SSA auditors is that when studying the list of 60 
facts, they paid particular attention to what they perceived to be the most important client 
facts, while focusing less on the perceived less-important facts. This attention to the 
most-important facts during the encoding phase of the recall task may have led them to 
recall a higher proportion of these facts than the other auditors, but a lower number of 
facts overall. Tests showed, however, that considering only the recall of the 15 most 
important facts in the list of 60 (as determined by 21 senior audit managers) presented to 
the auditors did not alter the results of recall performance: the SSA auditors recalled 
significantly fewer of these important facts than both the other groups. Thus, considering 
fact importance cannot explain the unexpected cross-methodology recall results. 
 Another possibility was that ignoring the validity of causal statements in the 
participants’ memos when initially determining knowledge complexity measures resulted 
in misstated knowledge comprehensiveness and density scores, thus clouding the results 
of the related hypothesis tests. Analysis showed, however, that it was very unlikely that 
the TBA and SSA-TBA auditors would have made incorrect causal statements in 
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quantities significant enough to lower their comprehensiveness and density scores to 
levels that would be the same or lower than the SSA auditors. Thus, removing incorrect 
statements from the knowledge complexity measures would not alter the results. 
 It is possible that varying levels of participant motivation could have affected the 
results (Libby and Luft 1993). Less-motivated participants may have put less effort into 
the recall and memo tasks than other more-motivated participants, thus leading to lower 
recall and knowledge complexity measures, regardless of actual knowledge differences. 
Indeed, the SSA auditors spent significantly less time on the recall task than the other two 
groups of auditors, which may indicate lower mean motivation in the SSA group. The 
recall hypothesis tests (H1a and H1b), however, controlled for time spent performing the 
recall task (or motivation) and still found a significant effect of methodology on recall. In 
addition, there were no significant differences between the three auditor groups in time 
spent performing the risk task and the methodology effect was significant even after 
controlling for time on this task. Also, the auditors spent significantly more time 
performing the risk task than the students, but the students showed significantly higher 
knowledge complexity after controlling for time. Based on this set of results, it seems 
apparent that motivation is not a factor that can explain the unexpected findings of this 
study. 
 The auditors completed the study in varying settings, so it is possible this 
variation affected the results across groups. The SSA auditors completed the study in two 
groups of 20-25 while attending a training session, as did 20 of the 23 SSA-TBA 
auditors, while the remaining SSA-TBA auditors and all the TBA auditors completed it in 
groups of two to ten in their office boardrooms. It seems, however, that the varying study 
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settings can be ruled out as a factor affecting the results because all the SSA and 20 of the 
23 SSA-TBA auditors completed the study in similar conditions, but the latter group of 
auditors had significantly higher scores on all three of the knowledge measures used in 
this study. In addition, a vast majority of the SSA-TBA auditors completed the study in 
conditions that differed from all the TBA auditors, but these two groups scored the same 
on all three knowledge measures. Thus, it is unlikely that the varying study conditions 
can explain the puzzling results. 
 There were also significant differences in task-specific experience across auditor 
groups, with the TBA auditors having significantly more experience than the SSA (SSA-
TBA) auditors on five (six) of six audit tasks, while the SSA and SSA-TBA auditors had 
the same amount of experience on all six tasks. Including a measure of task-specific 
experience as a covariate in the relevant hypothesis tests did not alter the findings in any 
way, however. Thus, these task-specific experience differences cannot account for the 
unexpected results.   
 The experience-related hypotheses in this dissertation (H2 and H4a), in which 
experienced auditors were expected to possess higher factual and relational knowledge 
complexity than their less-experienced counterparts, were essentially replications of 
earlier experience-related studies of auditor knowledge, but in this case examining a type 
of knowledge (i.e., client business knowledge) that had yet to be investigated. These 
earlier studies (e.g., Weber 1980; Bonner and Lewis 1990; Frederick 1991; Tubbs 1992) 
all found significant differences in the amount and/or organization of knowledge, with 
experienced auditors possessing higher levels of better organized knowledge than their 
junior colleagues. Thus, it was very surprising to not find such differences in this 
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dissertation, but instead to see similar levels of recall performance between the two 
groups and higher levels of relational knowledge complexity in the students than in the 
experienced auditor group. Further analyses showed that the SSA and SSA-TBA auditors 
had very similar amounts of task-specific experience compared to the students, thus 
providing a possible explanation for the puzzling experience-related results. That is, 
because of the significant overlap in task-specific experience between 68 of the 88 
experienced auditors and the 30 students, the experience gap between the auditors and the 
students may not have been large enough to lead to significant knowledge differences.  
To further explore this possibility, the SSA and SSA-TBA auditors were dropped 
from the experienced group, and the experienced TBA auditors, who possessed 
significantly higher levels of task-specific experience on six of six measures, were 
compared to the students. Again, there was no significant difference in recall 
performance between the two groups. There was also no significant difference in 
relational knowledge complexity between the two groups. So, while the students no 
longer had higher levels of relational knowledge complexity than the auditors, as they did 
in the test of H4a, nor were any knowledge differences detected between the significantly 
more experienced auditors and the students. Thus, the earlier experience-related empirical 
findings cannot be replicated, even after ensuring significant experience differences exist 
between the two groups in this study. 
Limitations    
Theory suggests another possible explanation for the unexpected results of this 
dissertation, but because the data needed to explore this possibility was not obtained from 
participants, this is also a limitation of the study. The theoretical model of Libby and Luft 
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(1993), which underlies all of this dissertation’s hypotheses, proposes that in addition to 
experience, another important determinant of both knowledge and judgment performance 
is a person’s innate ability for things like problem solving, and encoding and retrieving 
information from memory. Thus, individual differences in ability can also lead to 
knowledge and judgment differences, beyond any effects of experience and methodology 
on these measures (e.g., Bonner and Lewis 1990; Libby and Tan 1994).  
So, if there were a higher proportion of lower-ability auditors in the SSA group 
compared to the TBA and SSA-TBA groups, this might account for the lower recall 
performance and knowledge complexity of the SSA auditors. Similarly, if there were a 
higher proportion of higher-ability individuals in the student group compared to the 
auditor group, this might explain the failure to detect experience-related knowledge 
differences, particularly if combined with a disproportionate number of lower-ability 
SSA auditors. Admittedly, such a possibility may be remote; it is, however, possible 
because participants were not randomly assigned to conditions in this study. Instead, they 
were placed into the methodology and experience groups into which they naturally fell 
based on their backgrounds. The individual participants’ abilities were not measured 
because to do so would have added perhaps 10 minutes to a study that already took 
upwards of one hour to complete. Thus, given limits on the participants’ time, as well as 
potential fatigue issues, ability was not measured. Because of this limitation, the 
possibility of ability affecting the knowledge measures in this study cannot be explored. 
Another major limitation is that all the SSA participants were drawn from U.S. 
offices of the participating SSA firm, whereas participants in all other groups were from 
Canadian offices of their respective firms. Therefore, it is possible that cross-national 
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differences may have influenced the results, thus confounding the effects of 
methodology, and perhaps experience, on knowledge and judgment. The most likely 
confound relates to accounting education and training differences between the two 
countries. All 43 of the Canadian auditors (i.e., all the SSA-TBA and TBA auditors) 
worked in Ontario offices of their respective firms, and it can be safely assumed that the 
vast majority of these participants were educated in Ontario universities. Therefore, the 
vast majority of these auditors were educated and trained according to the guidelines set 
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, the professional body that oversees 
CA certification in Ontario. The 45 SSA auditors were drawn from offices all over the 
U.S., and because CPA education and training requirements differ on a state-by-state 
basis (e.g., some require 150 semester-hours of accounting education, some require less; 
some require two years of practice experience, some require none), there is likely a 
greater inconsistency in training and education among the U.S. participants compared to 
the consistent background of the Canadian auditors. So, it is likely that some of the U.S. 
participants had education and training backgrounds similar to those of the Canadian 
auditors (i.e., those U.S. participants that came from states with requirements similar to 
Ontario’s), while many others did not. To the extent that the education and training of 
some of the U.S. participants could be construed as inferior to that of the Canadian 
participants, such a difference may partially explain the lower levels of knowledge 
displayed by the SSA auditors in this study given that education and training are 
important determinants of knowledge (Libby and Luft 1993). This type of information 
was not gathered from participants, so it is not possible to further investigate this 
limitation. 
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Another possible limitation is that the case used as the basis for the study’s recall 
and risk tasks could be construed as a “novice task” in the context of Libby and 
Frederick’s expertise paradigm (Libby and Frederick 1986; Libby 1995). This paradigm 
basically states that, when examining expert-novice differences in knowledge and 
judgment, a researcher should use a task that is difficult enough that one would expect to 
find differences in knowledge and performance between the two experience levels. That 
is, the task should not be so basic that a novice auditor could be expected to perform as 
well as an expert on the given task (i.e., it should not be a novice task). In this study, the 
case facts were drawn from an undergraduate auditing case, so it is possible that the case 
facts and context were basic enough that the student participants were able to perform at 
levels comparable to those of the auditor participants, which is what actually occurred. 
Thus, it is possible that this novice-task limitation can explain the unexpectedly high 
levels of knowledge displayed by the students in this study compared to their auditor 
counterparts.  
This dissertation has a variety of other limitations. First, all participants 
completed case exercises based around a common set of fictionalized client facts. While 
this was necessary to enhance internal validity, it is possible that different results may 
have been found had participants worked from client facts they were familiar with from 
practice. Related to this, no client financial statements were provided in the set of 
information provided to participants, as they would be on every real audit. While some 
critical financial results were included as facts in the information provided, the lack of 
complete financial statements may have hindered the performance of some participants in 
the study. Third, to help secure the participation of various accounting firms and mitigate 
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participant fatigue, participants were given roughly one hour to complete the exercises. 
To properly study, analyze, and integrate a set of client facts and then make related risk 
judgments would take much more time than this in practice, so performance on the 
exercises may have differed had participants been given more time to complete them.  
Conclusions 
In light of these limitations, and given the puzzling pattern of results that could 
not be satisfactorily explained after many supplementary analyses, caution should be used 
when interpreting or applying the findings of this dissertation. In particular, definitively 
concluding that the SSA-TBA and TBA methodologies result in higher levels of factual 
and relational knowledge than the SSA methodology is too strong a conclusion to draw 
from this dissertation’s results. It does seem reasonable to conclude, however, that the 
SSA methodology does not lead to higher levels of factual and relational client 
knowledge than the TBA methodology. The TBA auditors recalled a mean of eight more 
facts than the SSA auditors (31 vs. 23) and recalled just over half of the 60 client facts 
originally presented. In addition, the TBA auditors’ risk memos contained a mean of 11 
more cause/effect concepts (30 vs. 19) and 14 more causal statements (34 vs. 20) than the 
SSA auditors’ memos. Given these sizable knowledge differences between the two 
groups, it is difficult to imagine that a different group of SSA auditors, perhaps one 
drawn from Ontario offices of the SSA firm that supplied participants for this study, 
would perform significantly better than the TBA auditors who completed this study. 
Therefore, conservatively interpreting this dissertation’s results leads to the conclusion 
that—contrary to the claims of some SSA proponents (e.g., Bell et al. 1997)—the SSA 
methodology does not result in an auditor possessing an enhanced knowledge of the 
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client’s business compared to that possessed by an auditor employing a traditional audit 
approach. 
Unfortunately, the opportunities for future research to follow-up on these 
unexpected results are severely limited by the fact that international and Canadian 
assurance standards now require auditors to apply a methodology very similar to those 
used by the SSA-TBA auditors in this study. Therefore, all firms must now incorporate 
SSA-type evidence and analyses into their audit approaches, making it impossible to 
investigate the types of SSA vs. TBA research questions that were examined in this 
dissertation. These changes also make such questions somewhat moot, because standard 
setters have clearly decided that an SSA-based methodology is better than a pure TBA 
approach. Two recent studies (Ballou et al. 2004; O’Donnell and Schultz 2005), however, 
have exposed potential flaws in the SSA approach. Given the questionable SSA-related 
knowledge gains identified in this dissertation and these recently identified problems with 
the SSA approach, it seems that future research should address other needed changes or 
improvements to the approach that will actually improve an auditor’s knowledge of the 
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Based on the notion that the whole can be 
discerned by examining the parts 
Holistic Orientation 
Based on the belief that the broader context 
infuses meaning into the parts 
Focus on the Information Process 
Through an understanding of the 
interrelationships among reported 
information, one is able to develop a sound 
expectation model about performance 
Focus on the Business Processes 
Presumes the objectives of the business 
strategy are delivered through key 
processes; therefore a sound expectation 
model must be based on a review of 
strategy and process indicators 
Expert Knowledge of Accounting and 
Auditing 
 
Relies on in-depth understanding of 
auditing procedures and accounting rules 
predominantly to enable the attester to 
verify consistencies and detect anomalies 
Expert Knowledge of Business 
 
Considers a broader understanding of the 
entity and its environment to contribute 
significantly to the attester’s ability to 
verify consistencies and detect anomalies 
Discrete Systems 
Comprehends systems as disconnected 
from one another, generating unrelated 
transactions that can be reviewed by 
individuals working independently 
Networked 
Understands the organization as a dynamic 
network whose systems cannot be 
examined in isolation 
Audit Risk 
Based on belief that opinions about 
financial statements can be issued 
independently from a commentary on the 
client business risk 
Business Risk 
Considers the financial-statement opinion 
to be inextricably connected to a broader 




Adapted from Bell et al. (1997, p. 72). 
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Table 2 
Partial List of Client Business Factors with Potential Audit Significance 
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 
Nature of the business 
• Profit-oriented 
• Government 
• Government organization 
• Not-for-profit organization 
General economic factors 
• General level of economic activity 
• Interest rates 
• Inflation 
• Foreign currency rates, controls and revaluation 
• Government policies 
Industry conditions affecting the entity's business 
• Adverse conditions 
• Favourable conditions 
• Changes in technology 
• Cyclical or seasonal activity 
• Energy supply and cost 
• Laws and regulations affecting industry/sector 
• Industry / sector-wide norms 
Financial reporting environment 
• Regulatory financial reporting requirements 
• Accounting policies and disclosure issues peculiar 
to the industry / sector 
• Audit reporting requirements 
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 
Beneficial owners 
• Form of ownership 
Related parties 
• Names 
• Nature and extent of relationship 
• Types of transactions normally undertaken 
Board of directors or equivalent 
• Composition 
• Business reputation and experience of members 
• Degree of independence from, and control over, 
operating management 
• Frequency of meetings 
• Scope of audit committee responsibilities 
• Attitude toward control environment and other 
aspects of corporate governance 
Operating management 
• Experience and reputation 
• Objectives (e.g., philosophy; strategic plans) 
• Authority, responsibilities, accountability 
• Management structure  
• Amount of turnover 
• Quality of accounting department staff 
• Types of incentive or bonus plans 
• Pressures on management 
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS 
Revenue 
• Services or products and markets (e.g., major 
customers and contracts; market share; 
competitors; pricing policies; reputation of 
products; warranties; marketing strategy and 
objectives; manufacturing processes) 
• Tax revenues; grants; contributions; fees 
• Constraints imposed by legislation, regulation or 
contract on fees / prices charged, revenue sources 
or frequency of service 
• Method of service delivery 
Expenditures 
• Facilities 
• Production methods 
• Employees  
• Important suppliers of goods and services  
• Legal advice 
• Inventories 
• Research and development 
 
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS cont’d 
Finance 
• Sources, methods and availability of financing 
• Capital structure 
• Debt structure 
• Derivative financial instruments 
• Credit risk exposure 
• Interest rate risk exposure 
• Liquidity risk exposure 
• Foreign exchange risk exposure 
• Acquisitions, mergers, or disposals 
• Restricted assets and revenues 
• Borrowing restrictions imposed by legislation 
Administration 
• Organizational structure 
• Information systems, including use of current 
information technology 
• Franchises, licenses, patents 
• Taxation (e.g., tax status; unique taxation issues) 
• Internal audit function 
Source: CICA Handbook Section 5140 (CICA 2001) 
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Table 3 
Client Information used in Recall and Risk Tasks 
(with Mean and SD of Importance Ratings) 
 
Piece of Information Meana SD 
XTC may be going public   2.73    0.70  
XTC's revenues have shrunk by one third since 2000    2.36    0.79  
XTC's budgeting has been inaccurate in recent years   2.27    0.63  
XTC needs more capital to compete with larger joystick makers   2.23    1.02  
XTC's defect rate is 25% higher than industry average   2.14    0.77  
XTC's inventory turnover has decreased while competitors' turnovers increased   2.14    0.83  
The industry is characterized by short product life cycles   2.14    0.99  
85% of current revenues are from consumer joystick sales   2.09    0.81  
XTC has lost half of its high-end market share   2.05    0.84  
XTC is currently converting to an SAP platform   2.05    0.95  
Net income is 10% of its fiscal 2000 level    2.05    1.13  
XTC buys majority of raw materials from overseas   1.95    0.79  
Other manufacturers have introduced technologically advanced digital joysticks    1.95    1.17  
Return on equity declined 82% in past two years   1.95    1.17  
The company manufactures consumer and industrial joysticks    1.86    1.08  
Fiscal 2001 is your firm's first year auditing XTC   1.82    1.50  
XTC's current ratio is significantly below the industry average   1.77    1.02  
Core business processes are R&D, inventory management, and distribution   1.77    1.02  
XTC has 10 direct competitors, including Logitech and Microsoft   1.77    1.07  
In past five years, XTC significantly decreased development efforts   1.73    1.08  
Industry observers expect joystick market growth to slow   1.73    1.08  
Joysticks are subject to rapid technological changes   1.73    1.28  
Family members hold all senior executive positions   1.68    0.84  
Significant portion of joystick sales occur during Christmas season   1.64    1.05  
XTC is a privately-owned company   1.64    1.29  
XTC's industrial joysticks much more profitable than consumer joysticks   1.50    0.86  
XTC's new information system should improve inventory management   1.50    0.86  
Management constantly monitors patent applications, inventory turnover, and 
defects   1.50    1.26  
XTC will enter mass market with lower-cost products   1.45    1.01  
New strategy is being a "one-stop gaming-device shop"   1.45    1.06  
Accurate sales estimates critical to timely delivery and inventory management   1.45    1.18  
XTC is based in Ontario, with branches in US   1.41    0.96  
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Table 3 continued 
   
XTC's offshore purchases require long lead times   1.41    1.40  
XTC sells only analog joysticks   1.36    1.40  
XTC has no patents; other developers average four each   1.32    1.04  
XTC has no bank debt   1.32    1.49  
Joysticks are predominantly sold through stores like Wal-Mart   1.27    0.98  
XTC has relatively few joystick/software bundling arrangements   1.23    1.11  
Customers typically have very tight, strict delivery deadlines   1.23    1.34  
Rivals offer more products and command more shelf space   1.23    1.57  
CEO is also company president and founder   1.05    1.25  
XTC's R&D expenditures are considerably lower than other manufacturers    1.05    1.29  
XTC's low-end joysticks will be produced in Taiwan   1.05    1.29  
Retaining skilled workforce is essential to XTC's success   0.86    1.36  
Merchants negotiate prices based on large purchasing volumes   0.86    1.39  
XTC must constantly check the quality of raw materials   0.77    1.54  
Price is a significant factor for consumers   0.73    1.32  
Good retailer relationships essential for adequate promotion and shelf space    0.64    1.36  
Common industry practice is to package joysticks with software    0.59    1.30  
Resource management processes are Human Resources, treasury, and 
information management   0.59    1.56  
XTC asks suppliers for bids to get competitive prices   0.45    1.22  
In the past, XTC developed leading-edge joysticks   0.45    1.60  
XTC's joysticks were formerly the benchmark for gaming excellence   0.41    1.65  
Opposition's well-established distribution channels reduce their costs   0.23    1.60  
Consumer joystick purchases are discretionary - 0.09    1.87  
Management favours group discussion over formal goal-setting processes - 0.14    1.55  
Large competitors have sophisticated sales forecasting and tracking systems - 0.23    1.31  
End users are mostly low-to-middle income earners - 0.36    1.68  
XTC's original goal was producing high quality, innovative joysticks  - 0.55    1.84  
The industry's target demographic is 18-35 year-old males - 0.64    1.36  
Overall Mean and SD   1.29    0.77 
 
a Twenty-one senior managers from three firms (one SSA, one TBA, and one SSA-TBA firm) that also 
provided participants for the main study rated the importance of each piece of information within the 
context of gaining an understanding of a manufacturing client’s business. A seven-point scale anchored at 
the low end (-3) by “Very Unimportant” and at the high end (+3) by “Very Important” was used to rate 
each piece of information. 
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Table 4 
















Specific risks   
XTC’s budgeting system has produced inaccurate results in recent 
years. 
75% 50% 
This is our firm’s first year auditing XTC. 75% 50% 
XTC is implementing an SAP/inventory management platform. 100% 100% 
Family members hold all senior management positions. 100% 67% 
The overseas production situation may cause production shortfalls or 
quality problems. 
100% 67% 
XTC is not staying current with its technological development. 50% 75% 
XTC may experience significant inventory obsolescence problems. 25% 75% 
   
General risk   
Please assess the overall risk of material misstatement on the XTC 
engagement. 
N/A N/A 





Causal-Mapping Analysis of Risk-Justification Memo in Figure 7 
 Cause Concept Effect Concept  
A1 short product life cycle inventory obsolescence [risk]2 B 
C poor inventory management system inventory obsolescence [risk] B 
D XTC doesn’t have any patents put [XTC’s] products behind competitors E 
F decline in R&D efforts in recent years put [XTC’s] products behind competitors E 
E put [XTC’s] products behind competitors adversely affect sales G 
H 
 
Family members holding management 
positions 
Won’t increase [risk] J 
AB 
 
Family members holding management 
positions 
[Our firm] should assess [family 




Family members holding management 
positions 
[Our firm] should assess [family 





Family members holding management 
positions 
[Our firm] should assess [family 
management’s] capability to run business 
effectively 
AF 
AG [The firm] should be concerned with 
implementation of SAP 
[to ensure] proper change in info systems AH 
AG [The firm] should be concerned with 
implementation of SAP 
[to ensure] completeness of documentation AI 
AG [The firm] should be concerned with 
implementation of SAP 
[to ensure] info wasn’t tampered with during 
change 
AJ 
AG [The firm] should be concerned with 
implementation of SAP 
[to ensure] info wasn’t lost during change AK 
K low current ratio going concern risk L 
M decreased revenues going concern risk L 
N ROE down 82% going concern risk L 
O performance behind competitors going concern risk L 
P overseas production risk J 
P overseas production delay in delivery of items Q 
Q delay in delivery of items XTC sales will suffer G 
Q delay in delivery of items [XTC’s]  relationship with distributors will 
suffer 
R 
G XTC sales will suffer Risk J 





first time audit  need to gain understanding of internal 
controls 
U 
V Assess if internal controls are effective [planned] audit procedures W 
X [increased] control risk audit risk Y 
Z [increased] inherent risk audit risk Y 
AA the nature of industry XTC operates in Inherent risk Z 
    
Notes: 
1. Concepts with same letter code denote a single concept used in multiple relations. 









General and Task-specific Experience n = 88 n = 30 n = 118 
    
Number (%) of participants with title of Staff auditor 27 (30.7) 27 (90.0) 54 (45.8)
Number (%) of participants with title of Senior auditor 61 (69.3) 3 (10.0) 64 (54.2)
Number (%) of participants with a CA or CPA 
designation 51 (58.0) 0 (0.0) 51 (43.2)
    
Months of assurance experience [Mean (SD)] 33.8 (17.2) 7.9 (5.1) 27.2 (18.8)
Number of audit engagements performed 23.2 (19.9) 14.9 (11.0) 21.0 (18.4)
Number of first-time audit engagements performed 2.5 (3.0) 2.0 (2.3) 2.4 (2.8)
Number of engagements in which gathered knowledge of 
a client’s business 13.5 (17.2) 6.5 (6.6) 11.7 (15.4)
Number of engagements in which analyzed knowledge of 
a client’s business 13.7 (18.2) 6.0 (5.5) 11.7 (16.3)
Number of engagements in which identified risks 10.0 (14.2) 2.6 (3.7) 8.1 (12.8)
Number of engagements performed involving clients in 
high-tech industry 4.6 (6.6) 1.3 (2.0) 3.7 (6.0)
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Table 7 
Participants’ Demographic Information by Methodology 
 SSA SSA-TBA TBA Overall 
Panel A: General and Task-specific Experience n = 45 n = 23 n = 20 n = 88 
     
Number (%) of participants with title of Staff auditor 20 (44.4) 1 (4.3) 6 (30.0) 27 (30.7) 
Number (%) of participants with title of Senior auditor 25 (55.6) 22 (95.7) 14 (70.0) 61 (69.3) 
Number (%) of participants with a CA or CPA 
designation 23 (51.1) 14 (60.9) 14 (70.0) 51 (58.0) 
    
Months of assurance experience [Mean (SD)] 30.5 (17.6) 37.1 (18.0) 37.2 (14.3) 33.8 (17.2) 
Number of audit engagements performed 18.0 (16.6) 21.6 (14.6) 36.6 (25.8) 23.2 (19.9) 
Number of first-time audit engagements performed 2.3 (2.4) 1.7 (3.2) 4.2 (3.4) 2.5 (3.0) 
Number of engagements in which gathered knowledge 
of a client’s business 10.1 (13.1) 11.0 (12.4) 23.9 (24.7) 13.5 (17.2) 
Number of engagements in which analyzed knowledge 
of a client’s business 11.8 (17.0) 11.3 (13.4) 20.3 (24.0) 13.7 (18.2) 
Number of engagements in which identified risks 6.9 (7.8) 8.6 (11.8) 18.2 (22.7) 10.0 (14.2) 
Number of engagements performed involving clients in 
high-tech industry 7.7 (7.7) 2.2 (3.9) 0.6 (1.2) 4.6 (6.6) 
    
Panel B: Frequency of Audit Analyses [Mean (SD)]    
    
Extent to which your firm analyzes a client’s business 
strategy1 7.8 (2.1) 6.2 (2.6) 4.5 (2.1) 6.7 (2.5) 
Extent to which your firm analyzes a client’s key 
business processes1 9.2 (1.4) 7.7 (1.5) 6.4 (2.5) 7.6 (2.5) 
Extent to which your firm analyzes a client’s key 
performance indicators1 8.0 (2.2) 6.9 (2.0) 5.6 (1.9) 7.0 (2.4) 
Average of preceding three frequencies 8.3 (1.4) 6.9 (1.6) 5.5 (1.7) 7.1 (2.0) 
    
Panel C: Methodological Similarities and Differences    
    
Extent to which your firm analyzes a client’s business 
strategy2 A B C  
Extent to which your firm analyzes a client’s key 
business processes2 D E F  
Extent to which your firm analyzes a client’s key 
performance indicators2 G G, H H  
    
Note 1:  Responses were on a scale from 0 (Never) to 10 (Always), with the midpoint (i.e., 5) 
labeled ”Sometimes”. 
Note 2: For each analysis, the same letter code indicates no cross-methodology difference in 




 SSA SSA-TBA TBA Overall 
Panel A: By Methodology n = 45 n = 23 n = 20 n = 88 
     
Minutes taken to perform recall task 12.8 (2.3) 14.0 (3.9) 15.2 (3.8) 13.6 (3.3) 
Number of facts correctly recalled 23.1 (5.6) 28.0 (6.4) 31.1 (6.4) 26.2 (6.8) 
    
Minutes taken to perform risk task 20.4 (4.4) 19.9 (5.8) 22.9 (8.0) 20.7 (5.8) 
Knowledge comprehensiveness1 19.4 (7.8) 25.4 (10.3) 30.4 (9.1) 23.5 (9.8) 
Number of causal assertions 20.0 (9.5) 28.0 (11.8) 34.1 (11.4) 25.3 (12.0) 
Knowledge density2 1.01 (0.13) 1.09 (0.13) 1.11 (0.13) 1.05 (0.14) 




Panel B: By Experience n = 88 n = 30 n = 118 
    
Minutes taken to perform recall task 13.6 (3.3) 12.8 (2.6) 13.4 (3.1) 
Number of facts correctly recalled 26.2 (6.8) 25.3 (5.7) 26.0 (6.5) 
    
Minutes taken to perform risk task 20.7 (5.8) 17.5 (4.2) 19.9 (5.6) 
Knowledge comprehensiveness1 23.5 (9.8) 24.4 (6.3) 23.7 (9.0) 
Number of causal assertions 25.3 (12.0) 27.4 (8.8) 25.8 (11.2) 
Knowledge density2 1.05 (0.14) 1.11 (0.15) 1.07 (0.14) 
    
 
Note 1: Knowledge comprehensiveness = the total number of distinct cause or effect concepts appearing in 
a participant’s risk memo. 
Note 2: Knowledge density = (Number of causal assertions) divided by (Knowledge comprehensiveness). 
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Table 9 
The Effect of Audit Methodology on Recall Performance (H1a and H1b) 
Source of Variance df F-statistic p-value 
    
Intercept 1 38.54 < 0.001 
Time taken to perform recall task (covariate) 1 17.13 < 0.001 
Methodology 2 4.69 0.012 
Methodology x Time 2 3.96 0.023 
Error 82   
Total 88   
    




The Effect of Experience on Recall Performance (H2) 
Source of Variance df F-statistic p-value 
    
Intercept 1 28.96 < 0.001 
Time taken to perform recall task (covariate) 1 32.64 < 0.001 
Experience 1 0.01 0.945 
Error 115   
Total 118   
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Table 11 
The Effects of Methodology on Relational Knowledge Complexity (H3) 
Source of Variance df F-statistic p-value 
    
Panel A: Knowledge Comprehensiveness as 
Dependent Measure    
    
Intercept 1 1.26 0.266 
Number of facts correctly recalled (covariate) 1 4.23 0.043 
Time taken to perform risk task (covariate) 1 40.16 < 0.001 
Presentation order of risk factors (covariate) 1 5.32 0.024 
Methodology 2 4.11 0.020 
Methodology x Number of facts correctly recalled 2 4.45 0.015 
Error 80   
Total 88   
    
Panel B: Knowledge Density as Dependent Measure    
    
Intercept 1 140.73 < 0.000 
Number of facts correctly recalled (covariate) 1 0.42 0.518 
Time taken to perform risk task (covariate) 1 1.22 0.272 
Methodology 2 4.85 0.010 
Methodology x Time taken to perform risk task 2 3.10 0.051 
Error 81   
Total 88   
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Table 12 
The Effect of Experience on Relational Knowledge Complexity (H4a) 
Source of Variance df F-statistic p-value 
    
Panel A: Knowledge Comprehensiveness as 
Dependent Measure    
    
Intercept 1 1.15 0.287 
Number of facts correctly recalled (covariate) 1 22.92 < 0.001 
Time taken to perform risk task (covariate) 1 40.58 < 0.001 
Experience 1 6.49 0.012 
Error 114   
Total 118   
    
Panel B: Knowledge Density as Dependent Measure    
    
Intercept 1 197.23 < 0.001 
Number of facts correctly recalled (covariate) 1 2.16 0.144 
Time taken to perform risk task (covariate) 1 2.70 0.103 
Experience 1 4.96 0.028 
Error 114   
Total 118   
    




The Effects of Methodology and Experience on Relational Knowledge (H4b) 
 SSA SSA-TBA TBA Student 
Panel A: Knowledge differences compared to 
auditing students     
     
Mean (s.d.) knowledge comprehensiveness 19.4 (7.8) 25.4 (10.3) 30.4 (9.1) 24.4 (6.3) 
Difference in mean knowledge comprehensiveness 
compared to auditing students -5.0 1.0 6.0 N/A 
     
Mean (s.d.) knowledge density 1.01 (0.13) 1.09 (0.13) 1.11 (0.13) 1.11 (0.15) 
Difference in mean knowledge density compared to 
auditing students -0.10 -0.02 0.00 N/A 
     
Panel B: Contrast tests of knowledge 
comprehensiveness differences     
     
Contrast estimate (std. err.)1 -6.4 (1.7) -1.7 (1.9) 0.2 (2.1) N/A 
t-statistic -3.76 -0.95 0.00 N/A 
p-value 0.000 0.374 0.993 N/A 
     
Panel C: Contrast tests of knowledge density 
differences     
     
Contrast estimate (std. err.)1 -0.1 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) N/A 
t-statistic -3.29 -0.62 0.50 N/A 
p-value 0.001 0.576 0.720 N/A 
     
 
Note 1: The contrast tests compared each of the three methodology groups to the auditing student group 
and controlled for number of facts recalled and time taken to perform the risk task. 
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Table 14 














    
Specific risks    
XTC’s budgeting system has produced inaccurate 
results in recent years. 
67.8 (21.6) -0.06 0.07 
This is our firm’s first year auditing XTC. 74.0 (23.7) 0.09 0.21** 
XTC is implementing an SAP/inventory 
management platform. 
60.6 (24.8) 0.19** 0.10 
Family members hold all senior management 
positions. 
68.3 (25.9) -0.21** -0.08 
The overseas production situation may cause 
production shortfalls or quality problems. 
62.5 (22.6) 0.26*** 0.05 
XTC is not staying current with its technological 
development. 
68.7 (23.5) 0.16* 0.05 
XTC may experience significant inventory 
obsolescence problems. 
79.1 (16.5) 0.10 0.05 
    
General risk    
Overall risk of material misstatement on the XTC 
engagement. 
77.3 (14.3) 0.12 0.09 
    
 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10 
 
Note 1: The risk assessments were made using scales anchored by 0 at the low end (“Low Risk”) and 100 




Cross-Methodology Multiple Comparison Tests of Knowledge Differences 
 SSA SSA-TBA TBA Overall 
Panel A: Knowledge Measures by Methodology n = 45 n = 23 n = 20 n = 88 
     
Minutes taken to perform recall task 12.8 (2.3) 14.0 (3.9) 15.2 (3.8) 13.6 (3.3) 
Number of facts correctly recalled 23.1 (5.6) 28.0 (6.4) 31.1 (6.4) 26.2 (6.8) 
    
Minutes taken to perform risk task 20.4 (4.4) 19.9 (5.8) 22.9 (8.0) 20.7 (5.8) 
Knowledge comprehensiveness 19.4 (7.8) 25.4 (10.3) 30.4 (9.1) 23.5 (9.8) 
Number of causal assertions 20.0 (9.5) 28.0 (11.8) 34.1 (11.4) 25.3 (12.0) 
Knowledge density 1.01 (0.13) 1.09 (0.13) 1.11 (0.13) 1.05 (0.14) 
    
Composite knowledge 20.8 (6.2) 27.1 (8.6) 31.9 (7.3) 25.0 (8.4) 
    
 Factual Knowledge Knowledge Composite 
Panel B: Results of Bonferroni Tests (p values) Recall Comp. Density Knowledge 
    
SSA vs. SSA-TBA *** ** ** *** 
SSA vs. TBA *** *** *** *** 
TBA vs. SSA-TBA n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
    
    
*** p < 0.01     ** p < 0.05     
    
    
    
    
    






Fifteen Most Important Client Facts as Rated by Senior Managers 
(with Mean and SD of Importance Ratings) 
 
Fact Meana SD 
XTC may be going public   2.73    0.70  
XTC's revenues have shrunk by one third since 2000    2.36    0.79  
XTC's budgeting has been inaccurate in recent years   2.27    0.63  
XTC needs more capital to compete with larger joystick makers   2.23    1.02  
XTC's defect rate is 25% higher than industry average   2.14    0.77  
XTC's inventory turnover has decreased while competitors' turnovers increased   2.14    0.83  
The industry is characterized by short product life cycles   2.14    0.99  
85% of current revenues are from consumer joystick sales   2.09    0.81  
XTC has lost half of its high-end market share   2.05    0.84  
XTC is currently converting to an SAP platform   2.05    0.95  
Net income is 10% of its fiscal 2000 level    2.05    1.13  
XTC buys majority of raw materials from overseas   1.95    0.79  
Other manufacturers have introduced technologically advanced digital joysticks    1.95    1.17  
Return on equity declined 82% in past two years   1.95    1.17  
The company manufactures consumer and industrial joysticks    1.86    1.08  
 
a Twenty-one senior managers from three firms (one firm from each methodology condition) that also 
participated in the main study rated the importance of each fact within the context of gaining an 
understanding of a manufacturing client’s business. A seven-point scale anchored at the low end (-3) by 




Cross-Methodology Differences in Recall of 15 Most-Important Facts 
 SSA SSA-TBA TBA Overall 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Mean (SD)] n = 45 n = 23 n = 20 n = 88 
     
Minutes taken to perform recall task 12.8 (2.3) 14.0 (3.9) 15.2 (3.8) 13.6 (3.3) 
Raw number of most-important facts recalled1 6.8 (2.1) 7.9 (2.3) 8.3 (1.5) 7.4 (2.1) 
Weighted number of most-important facts recalled2 14.3 (4.4) 16.7 (5.0) 17.5 (3.2) 15.6 (4.5) 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA on Raw Most-Important Facts df F-statistic p-value 
    
Intercept 1 31.87 < 0.001 
Time taken to perform recall task (covariate) 1 5.16 0.026 
Methodology 2 3.30 0.042 
Methodology x Time 2 2.30 0.100 
Error 82   
Total 88   
 
Panel C: ANCOVA on Weighted Most-Important Facts df F-statistic p-value 
    
Intercept 1 31.27 < 0.001 
Time taken to perform recall task (covariate) 1 5.30 0.023 
Methodology 2 3.50 0.034 
Methodology x Time 2 2.60 0.078 
Error 82   
Total 88   
    
    
Note 1: Represents the mean number of important facts from Table 16 recalled by auditors in each group. 
Note 2: Each fact from Table 16 that was correctly recalled by an auditor was weighted by the importance 
rating appearing beside the corresponding fact in the Table, and these weights were then summed to form 
this measure. 
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Table 18 
Risk Assessments by Methodology [Mean (s.d.)]1 
 SSA SSA-TBA TBA Overall 
     
Specific risks     
XTC’s budgeting system has produced 
inaccurate results in recent years. 63.5 (24.2) 73.7 (19.3) 60.8 (18.9) 65.5 (22.2) 
This is our firm’s first year auditing XTC. 65.8 (24.4) 82.8 (17.5) 64.8 (29.0) 69.9 (24.9) 
XTC is implementing an SAP/inventory 
management platform. 52.0 (23.8) 72.3 (20.5) 62.1 (20.2) 59.4 (23.6) 
Family members hold all senior management 
positions. 75.3 (23.5) 72.1 (23.5) 56.3 (18.6) 70.1 (23.5) 
The overseas production situation may cause 
production shortfalls or quality problems. 59.9 (23.8) 62.1 (21.6) 68.8 (20.4) 62.5 (22.6) 
XTC is not staying current with its 
technological development. 68.4 (23.8) 70.9 (21.6) 70.0 (26.0) 69.4 (23.5) 
XTC may experience significant inventory 
obsolescence problems. 78.3 (18.9) 82.0   (9.3) 83.5 (14.7) 80.4 (16.0) 
     
General risk     
Overall risk of material misstatement on the 
XTC engagement. 70.3 (16.6) 84.4 (10.8) 79.0 (7.5) 75.9 (14.8) 
     
 
Note 1: The risk assessments were made using scales anchored by 0 at the low end (“Low Risk”) and 100 




Cross-Methodology Differences in Risk Assessments 
Panel A: MANCOVA on Seven Specific Risks df F-statistic p-value 
    
Intercept 7 6.58 < 0.001 
Number of facts recalled 7 0.32 0.942 
Knowledge comprehension 7 1.48 0.186 
Knowledge density 7 0.73 0.650 
Methodology 14 1.55 0.099 
Error 450   
Total 478   
 
Panel B: ANCOVA on Overall Risk df F-statistic p-value 
    
Intercept 1 30.26 < 0.001 
Number of facts recalled 1 1.11 0.296 
Knowledge comprehension 1 0.23 0.636 
Knowledge density 1 0.03 0.862 
Methodology 2 5.80 0.004 
Error 82   
Total 88   
    
Panel C: Summary of Risk Assessment Differences1 SSA SSA-TBA TBA 
    
This is our firm’s first year auditing XTC. A B A 
XTC is implementing an SAP/inventory management platform. C D C, D 
Overall risk of material misstatement on the XTC engagement. E F F 
    
    
    
    
Note 1: For each risk listed, the same letter code indicates no cross-methodology difference in risk 
assessments (p > .10); different letter codes indicate cross-methodology difference (p < .10). 





Task-Specific Experience Similarities and Differences 
 Students SSA SSA-TBA TBA 
     
Number of audit engagements performed 14.9 (11.0) 18.0 (16.6) 21.6 (14.6) 36.6 (25.8) 
Number of first-time audit engagements performed 2.0 (2.3) 2.3 (2.4) 1.7 (3.2) 4.2 (3.4) 
Number of engagements in which gathered knowledge 
of a client’s business 6.5 (6.6) 10.1 (13.1) 11.0 (12.4) 23.9 (24.7) 
Number of engagements in which analyzed knowledge 
of a client’s business 6.0 (5.5) 11.8 (17.0) 11.3 (13.4) 20.3 (24.0) 
Number of engagements in which identified risks 2.6 (3.7) 6.9 (7.8) 8.6 (11.8) 18.2 (22.7) 
Number of engagements performed involving clients in 
high-tech industry 1.3 (2.0) 7.7 (7.7) 2.2 (3.9) 0.6 (1.2) 
   
   





The SSA Auditor’s Organization of Client Business Knowledge 
 

























Adapted from Bell et al. (1997, p. 41) 
 
Note: This business model is not generic, but is one that may be used for a large retailing organization.
External Forces and Agents 
Lifestyle trends     Regulators     New entrants     International politics     Customers 







































































Business Processes Alliances Core 
Products 
Customers 
Strategic Management Process 




Resource Management Processes 


























Adapted from Knechel (2001) 
 
Panel C: PEST Analysis 
 
Factors that are germane to a PEST analysis include: 
 
1) Political factors: (a) government stability, (b) taxation policy, (c) government 
spending, (d) government relations with other countries, (e) industrial policy (e.g., 
towards privatization, regulation and nationalization). 
Legal factors: (a) employment law, (b) monopolies and mergers legislation, (c) 
environmental protection laws, (d) foreign trade regulations. 
 
2) Economic factors: (a) inflation, (b) employment, (c) disposable income, (d) business 
cycles, (e) interest rates, (f) GNP growth rates, (g) exchange rates, (h) energy and 
basic raw materials prices. 
 
3) Social and cultural factors: (a) population demographics, (b) income distribution, (c) 
levels of education, (d) lifestyle changes, (e) attitudes to work and leisure, (f) 
consumerism, (g) social mobility. 
 
4) Technological factors: (a) new discoveries/developments in our own or related (e.g., 
supplier) industry, (b) speed of technology transfer (diffusion), (c) government 
spending on research, (d) rates of obsolescence. 
 


















Intensity of Rivalry 
Client’s Strategy 

















































Adapted from Porter (1979) 
 
 






























Competitive pressures coming from 
the market attempts of outsiders to 
win buyers over to their products 
Competitive pressures coming from 
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Ability 
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Figure 3  
 




























Partial Internal-Control Schema 





 Purchasing Receiving Accounts Cash Journal Entry 






 Prenumbered cheques Cheque signers are Paid invoices are After signing, cheques 
 are used and controlled required to review effectively cancelled are handled and mailed 
  supporting documents  by an independent party 
  before signing 
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Complexity 
Inherent risk 





Sample Risk-Justification Memo 
 
• inventory obsolescence high because short product life cycle and poor inventory 
management system  
• Due to the fact that XTC doesn’t have any patents and decline in R&D efforts in 
recent years, may put their products behind competitors  
• this may adversely affect sales  
 
• Family members holding management positions is appropriate since it is privately 
owned  
• however, we should assess their knowledge and capability of carrying responsibilities 
and to run business effectively, especially if XTC is planning to go public  
 
• we should be concerned with implementation of SAP to ensure proper change in info 
systems and completeness of documentation  
• in addition, to ensure that info wasn’t tampered with or lost during the change  
 
• going concern due to low current ratio, decreased revenues, ROE down 82%, 
performance behind competitors  
• the overseas production increases risk because if delay in delivery of items, XTC 
sales will suffer as well as its relationship with distributors  
  
As a first time audit, we need to gain understanding of internal controls, especially that it 
it’s run by family.  
Assess if internal controls are effective before planning audit procedures.  
  
The audit risk is high due to the expected high control risk as well as inherent risk.  
Inherent risk is high considering the nature of industry XTC operates in. 
Note: See Table 5 for the related causal-mapping analysis of this memo. 
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APPENDIX B – CASE INSTRUMENT 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
This study focuses on how auditors gain an understanding of a client’s business. Please 
follow the instructions and complete all parts of the exercises. Please complete these 
exercises without any aids or assistance. Your responses will be held in strict confidence; 




The study has five components: 
 
Exercise #1:    Learning about a new client 
 
Exercise #2: Accounting knowledge questionnaire 
 
Exercise #3: Recall from memory the pieces of information presented in Exercise #1 
 
Exercise #4: Audit case exercise 
 
Exercise #5: Assurance experience questionnaire 
 
You will receive written instructions prior to completing each of these exercises.  
 




The next three pages contain a listing of 60 pieces of information about XTC Inc. (XTC). 
XTC is a new audit client in the manufacturing industry. Please do not turn the page until 
instructed to do so. Please study these pieces of information for 10 minutes. You may 
unstaple the three pages to facilitate your review of them. Please do not make any written 
notes regarding the pieces of information presented on the following pages. You will 
later be asked to recall these pieces of information from memory. You will be informed 
when 10 minutes have elapsed. Upon receiving this notification, please stop reading the 
list, place the list in Envelope A, and seal it. Please then proceed with Exercise #2, which 




The industry's target demographic is 18-35 year-old males 
Consumer joystick purchases are discretionary 
End users are mostly low-to-middle income earners 
XTC has no bank debt 
Net income is 10% of its fiscal 2001 level  
XTC has 10 direct competitors, including Logitech and Microsoft 
Rivals offer more products and command more shelf space 
Accurate sales estimates critical to timely delivery and inventory management 
XTC has relatively few joystick/software bundling arrangements 
Opposition's well-established distribution channels reduce their costs 
85% of current revenues are from consumer joystick sales 
Customers typically have very tight, strict delivery deadlines 
XTC is a privately-owned company 
Industry observers expect joystick market growth to slow 
Price is a significant factor for consumers 
Joysticks are predominantly sold through stores like Wal-Mart 
XTC buys majority of raw materials from overseas 
XTC's joysticks were formerly the benchmark for gaming excellence 
In the past, XTC developed leading-edge joysticks 




The industry is characterized by short product life cycles 
CEO is also company president and founder 
Family members hold all senior executive positions 
XTC sells only analog joysticks 
Resource management processes are Human Resources, treasury, and information management 
Other manufacturers have introduced technologically advanced digital joysticks  
Merchants negotiate prices based on large purchasing volumes 
XTC's low-end joysticks will be produced in Taiwan 
Fiscal 2003 is your firm's first year auditing XTC 
XTC's offshore purchases require long lead times 
XTC may be going public 
XTC is based in Ontario, with branches in the US 
XTC's budgeting has been inaccurate in recent years 
XTC's current ratio is significantly below the industry average 
Joysticks are subject to rapid technological changes 
XTC's revenues have shrunk by one third since 2001  
XTC's industrial joysticks much more profitable than consumer joysticks 
Good retailer relationships essential for adequate promotion and shelf space  
The company manufactures consumer and industrial joysticks  
Significant portion of joystick sales occur during Christmas season 
XTC's new information system should improve inventory management 
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Management constantly monitors patent applications, inventory turnover, and defects 
XTC has lost half of its high-end market share 
XTC has no patents; other developers average four each 
New strategy is being a "one-stop gaming-device shop" 
Core business processes are R&D, inventory management, and distribution 
Common industry practice is to package joysticks with software  
In past five years, XTC significantly decreased development efforts 
XTC's R&D expenditures are considerably lower than other manufacturers  
Retaining skilled workforce is essential to XTC's success 
Return on equity declined 82% in past two years 
XTC needs more capital to compete with larger joystick makers 
XTC will enter mass market with lower-cost products 
XTC must constantly check the quality of raw materials 
XTC asks suppliers for bids to get competitive prices 
XTC's defect rate is 25% higher than industry average 
XTC's inventory turnover has decreased while competitors' turnovers increased 
XTC's original goal was producing high quality, innovative joysticks  
Large competitors have sophisticated sales forecasting and tracking systems 
Management favours group discussion over formal goal-setting processes 
 
When told to stop, please place this list in Envelope A, seal the envelope, and then 
proceed with Exercise #2, which is in Envelope B. 
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Please remove all contents of Envelope B. Before proceeding with Exercise #2, please 




Please circle the best response to each question. These questions have been derived from 
a variety of sources. The questions vary in difficulty by design. 
 
1. The major reason an independent auditor gathers audit evidence is to: 
 
a. Form an opinion on the financial statements 
b. Detect fraud. 
c. Evaluate management. 
d. Assess control risk. 
 
2. A company declared a cash dividend on its common stock in December 2002, payable 
in January 2003. Retained earnings would: 
 
a. Increase on the date of declaration. 
b. Not be affected on the date of declaration. 
c. Not be affected on the date of payment. 
d. Decrease on the date of payment. 
 
3. The primary responsibility for the adequacy of disclosure in the financial statements 
and footnotes rests with: 
 
a. The partner assigned to the audit engagement. 
b. The senior or in-charge auditor. 
c. The audit staff member who drafts the statements and footnotes. 
d. The client’s management. 
 
Once you have answered all three questions, please place Exercise #2 in Envelope B. Do 






Attached to this sheet are several blank, lined pages. When ready, please turn the page 
and begin listing the pieces of information you recall about your audit client, XTC Inc. 
Please list these pieces of information in the order in which they come to mind. List only 
one piece of information per line. You do not have to recall the pieces of information 
verbatim, but provide enough key words so that it is clear what pieces of information you 
have remembered. Once you have written a piece of information, do not go back and 
revise it.  
 
Before you begin this exercise, please write down the current time: _____________ 
 
Now please immediately turn the page and proceed with listing the pieces of information 

















































































Before you begin this exercise, please write down the current time: _____________ 
 
Listed on the next three pages are the same pieces of information about XTC Inc. that 
were presented in Exercise #1. For this next exercise, please review the pieces of 
information presented and then provide an assessment of the level of risk associated with 
several risk factors that may be relevant to the audit of XTC. You may refer to the pieces 
of information as you assess the risks and may make any notes you wish as you review 
the information and assess the risks. After you have assessed all the risks, you will be 
asked to prepare a memo to the engagement partner that reports the rationale for your risk 
assessments. 
 
You should make your risk assessments and prepare the related memo as if you were on 
an actual audit. For example, you should consider your judgment subject to review by the 
engagement partner. 
 
You may separate the three pages of information from the attached response sheets to 
facilitate your review of the pieces of information and your assessment of the risk factors. 
 
Now please immediately proceed with the risk assessment exercise. When you have 
finished this exercise, please proceed with the concluding questionnaire, which is also 
included in Envelope C. 
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The industry's target demographic is 18-35 year-old males 
Consumer joystick purchases are discretionary 
End users are mostly low-to-middle income earners 
XTC has no bank debt 
Net income is 10% of its fiscal 2001 level  
XTC has 10 direct competitors, including Logitech and Microsoft 
Rivals offer more products and command more shelf space 
Accurate sales estimates critical to timely delivery and inventory management 
XTC has relatively few joystick/software bundling arrangements 
Opposition's well-established distribution channels reduce their costs 
85% of current revenues are from consumer joystick sales 
Customers typically have very tight, strict delivery deadlines 
XTC is a privately-owned company 
Industry observers expect joystick market growth to slow 
Price is a significant factor for consumers 
Joysticks are predominantly sold through stores like Wal-Mart 
XTC buys majority of raw materials from overseas 
XTC's joysticks were formerly the benchmark for gaming excellence 
In the past, XTC developed leading-edge joysticks 




The industry is characterized by short product life cycles 
CEO is also company president and founder 
Family members hold all senior executive positions 
XTC sells only analog joysticks 
Resource management processes are Human Resources, treasury, and information management 
Other manufacturers have introduced technologically advanced digital joysticks  
Merchants negotiate prices based on large purchasing volumes 
XTC's low-end joysticks will be produced in Taiwan 
Fiscal 2003 is your firm's first year auditing XTC 
XTC's offshore purchases require long lead times 
XTC may be going public 
XTC is based in Ontario, with branches in the US 
XTC's budgeting has been inaccurate in recent years 
XTC's current ratio is significantly below the industry average 
Joysticks are subject to rapid technological changes 
XTC's revenues have shrunk by one third since 2001  
XTC's industrial joysticks much more profitable than consumer joysticks 
Good retailer relationships essential for adequate promotion and shelf space  
The company manufactures consumer and industrial joysticks  
Significant portion of joystick sales occur during Christmas season 
XTC's new information system should improve inventory management 
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Management constantly monitors patent applications, inventory turnover, and defects 
XTC has lost half of its high-end market share 
XTC has no patents; other developers average four each 
New strategy is being a "one-stop gaming-device shop" 
Core business processes are R&D, inventory management, and distribution 
Common industry practice is to package joysticks with software  
In past five years, XTC significantly decreased development efforts 
XTC's R&D expenditures are considerably lower than other manufacturers  
Retaining skilled workforce is essential to XTC's success 
Return on equity declined 82% in past two years 
XTC needs more capital to compete with larger joystick makers 
XTC will enter mass market with lower-cost products 
XTC must constantly check the quality of raw materials 
XTC asks suppliers for bids to get competitive prices 
XTC's defect rate is 25% higher than industry average 
XTC's inventory turnover has decreased while competitors' turnovers increased 
XTC's original goal was producing high quality, innovative joysticks  
Large competitors have sophisticated sales forecasting and tracking systems 







During the client-acceptance phase of the XTC Inc. engagement, several risk factors were 
identified based on the pieces of client information that had been gathered to date. Based 
on your up-to-date knowledge of the client, please assess the risk of material 
misstatement posed by each of these factors. Once you have rated each of the individual 
risk factors, please also make an overall assessment of the risk of material misstatement 
on the XTC engagement. Please rate each factor on a scale from 0 (Low risk) to 100 
(High risk) by placing a slash (/) at that point on the scale that best indicates your 
perception of the level of misstatement risk associated with the factor.  
 
Risk factor:  XTC’s budgeting system has produced inaccurate results in recent years.  
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
 
Risk factor:  This is our firm’s first year auditing XTC. 
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
 
Risk factor:  XTC is implementing an SAP/inventory management platform. 
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
Risk factor:  XTC’s budgeting system has produced inaccurate results in recent years.  
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
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Risk factor:  The overseas production situation may cause production shortfalls or  
  quality problems. 
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
Risk factor:  XTC is not staying current with its technological development. 
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
Risk factor:  XTC may experience significant inventory obsolescence problems. 
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
 
Overall assessment of risk of material misstatement on this engagement 
 
 
On the scale below, please assess the overall risk of material misstatement on the XTC 
engagement. 
 
 Rating: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
 
  Low     Moderate     High 
  Risk     Risk     Risk 
 
Once you have assessed all the risks, please proceed to page 7 to prepare a memo 
that provides the rationale for your risk assessments. 
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Before you answer the questions below, please write down the current time: _________ 
 
Please indicate your response to each of the following statements by placing a slash (/) at 
that point on the scale that best indicates your perception of the risk assessment exercise 
you just completed. 
 
1. I found the pieces of information about XTC Inc. to be realistic. 
 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Disagree     Neutral     Agree  
 
2. I found the pieces of information about XTC Inc. to be useful in making risk 
assessments. 
 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Disagree     Neutral     Agree  
  
3. The risk assessment exercise was similar to how I would perform it in practice. 
 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Disagree     Neutral     Agree  
  
4. On a typical engagement, my firm would use decision aids to assist with risk 
assessment. 
 
  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Disagree     Neutral     Agree  
  
5. I have seen these pieces of information about XTC Inc. on another occasion. 
 
 No    Yes   If yes, please note where you have seen them    




Please place this exercise in Envelope C and proceed with the next exercise, which is in 






Please answer the following demographic questions. 
 
1. What is your educational background? (Check all that apply) 
 
a.  Currently pursuing Bachelor’s in __________ (please indicate discipline) 
 
b.  Possess Bachelor’s in __________ (please indicate discipline) 
 
c.  Currently pursing Master’s in __________ (please indicate discipline) 
 
d.  Possess Master’s in __________ (please indicate discipline) 
 
e.  Other (specify) __________ 
 
2. What is your job title? (Check one item that best matches your title) 
 
a.  No public accounting experience (Please go directly to Question 18 if this is the case) 
 
b.  Staff (or Associate) auditor 
 
c.  Senior (or In-Charge) auditor 
 
d.  Manager 
 
e.  Other (specify) ____________________ 
 
3. How many total months of experience do you have working for a public accounting firm? 
 
 Please break your experience down by the firms you have worked for, beginning with your 
present firm. 
 
 ______ months with ___________________________________________ (present firm) 
 
 ______ months with ___________________________________________ (previous firm) 
 
 ______ months with ___________________________________________ (next previous) 
 
4. Of the total months of experience in Question 3, how many of those months were spent working 
solely on auditing/assurance engagements (as opposed to tax, compilations, or other non-
assurance engagements)? 
 
Please break your assurance experience down by the firms you have worked for, beginning with 
your present firm. 
 
 ______ months with ___________________________________________ (present firm) 
 
 ______ months with ___________________________________________ (previous firm) 
 
 ______ months with ___________________________________________ (next previous) 
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5. What proportion of your total assurance experience in Question 4 has been spent auditing the 
following types of clients (Please ensure the percentages add to 100%): 
 
Public companies   _______ % 
 
Private, for-profit companies _______% 
 
Not-for-profit organizations _______% 
 
Government agencies  _______% 
 
6. Please list the industries that you specialize in on your engagements (e.g., manufacturing, high-
tech, financial institutions, health services, retail/wholesale, not-for-profit, etc.). If you do not 







7. Does the office you work in (or have worked in) audit public company clients? 
 
Office of present firm   Yes          No 
 
Office of previous firm   Yes          No  
 
Office of next previous firm  Yes          No 
 
8. On approximately how many audit engagements have you participated to this point in your career? 
 
 __________ engagements 
 
9. On approximately how many engagements did you participate in gathering information to be used 
to develop or update knowledge of a client’s business?  
 
 __________ engagements 
 
10. On approximately how many engagements did you participate in analyzing information to be used 
to develop or update knowledge of a client’s business?  
 
 __________ engagements 
 









13. On approximately how many engagements that were your firm’s first audit of a client (i.e., new 





14. On typical audit engagements, how frequently does your firm analyze the client’s business 
strategy (i.e., the client’s formal plans, commitments and actions designed to provide value to 
customers and gain a competitive advantage)? (Place a slash (/) at that point on the scale that best 
indicates how frequently your firm does this) 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Never     Sometimes     Always  
 
15. a. Has your firm provided you with any training in strategic analysis (i.e., techniques and tools 
useful in analyzing a client’s strategic position; e.g., Porter’s Five Forces, PEST, SWOT)? 
 
  Yes          No  
  
b. If yes, please note approximately how many hours of such training you have received and 
briefly describe the nature of this training? 
 
 _______ hours 
 
16. On typical audit engagements, how frequently does your firm select and analyze the client’s key 
business processes (i.e., processes that create value for, and/or sustain the value-creation potential 
of, the client)? (Place a slash (/) at that point on the scale that best indicates how frequently your 
firm does this) 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Never     Sometimes     Always  
   
17. On typical audit engagements, how frequently does your firm analyze the client’s key performance 
indicators (i.e., financial or nonfinancial measures that provide diagnostic or predictive 
information regarding a process’s critical success factors) as part of analyzing its business 
processes? (Place a slash (/) at that point on the scale that best indicates how frequently your firm 
does this) 
 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  | | | | | | | | | | | 
  Never     Sometimes     Always  
  






Please write down the current time: _____________ 
 
 




Please place Exercise #5 in Envelope C and seal it. Then place the elastic around all three 
envelopes and return them to the study coordinator. 
